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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Introductory Comment
’’Covenants, without the sword, are but words . . .
wrote Thomas Hobbes.^

Indeed, at the root of all but the most

primitive of social organizations there must lie the sanction
of force: force to assure order, to prevent rebellion at home,
and to subdue enemies abroad.

The manner in which that force

is organized and controlled will significantly influence the
interaction of political actors, both at home and abroad.
In Latin America the armed forces have always held a mo
nopoly over the control of force, the ultimate argument in
2
their nation's politics.
It is not so strange, then, that
militarism, or "the domination of the military man over the
civilian, the undue emphasis on military demands, or any
transcendence of ’true military purposes’,!’^ is extremely

■^Thomas Hobbes, The Leviathan, ed. by Michael Oakeshott
(London: H. R. Mowbray and Co., 1946), p. 109.
2

Robert J. Alexander, Latin American Politics and Gov
ernment (New York: Harper and Ross, 1965], p. 85.
3
John J. Johnson, "The Latin American Military as a
Politically Competing Group in Transitional Society," in
The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, ed.
by John J. Johnson'(Princeton: Princeton University Press,
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common in Latin America.

Imparting some perspective to the

political relationship between the armed forces and the
civilian groups in Latin America, Elizabeth H. Hyman has
commented:
Realistically, the military has to be seen as
a force within the Latin American political uni
verse which is highly interrelated with civilian
political forces. While the Latin American mili
tary is clearly "outside" the political party
structure as such, still political parties are
not by any means the exclusive centers of activity
in Latin American politics, and many disparate
nonparty forces belong within the political world.
Among a miscellaneous collection of nonparty "ir
regular" forces--including unions, student orga
nizations, radical churchmen, economic pressure
groups and foreign governments--which contend in
political contests and confrontations, the mili
tary is merely one, albeit often the most effective,
non-party force in the political process.4
The effectiveness of the armed forces, as a nonparty force, is
related to the unique potential it possesses in competing with
other nonparty forces in attempting to influence the political
process.

The military is more than a pressure group for it

periodically assumes governing authority, and, therefore, "the
center of power upon which it is supposedly exerting pressure

1962), p. 91. For a corresponding definition and an indispens
able discussion of militarism, see Alfred Vagts, A History of
Militarism (New York: W. W. Norton and Company,. 1937) , pp. 1215. For a discussion of the various levels of militarism, see
Martin Needier, Latin American Politics in Perspective (Prince
ton: D. Van NostiFand and Company, Inc., 1963), pp. 65-69.
"^Elizabeth H. Hyman, "Soldiers in Politics: New Insights
on Latin American Armed Forces," Political Science Quarterly,
LXXXVII (September, 1972), 409.
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becomes occupied by the pressure group itself.
Charles D. Corbett has suggested some causes and charac
teristics of extramilitary activity in Latin America in recent
years :
Once the officer’s professional or militaryoriented education is rounded out by graduation
from the general staff course, and he finds him
self involved in larger issues, he becomes con
cerned about the anomalies of his profession in
a region that has had a minimum of international
conflict.
In the absence of a serious shortrange external threat, he frequently universal
izes the communist threat to the "Western,
Christian" world and posits a role for his coun
try in countering it. Military interpretations
of the local manifestations of that threat, and
considerations of the nature of the military
response, have led in recent years to a redefini
tion and great expansion of the concept of na
tional security.
The salient characteristic is
a nexus of security and economic development that
transcends the definitions of national security
policy generally ascribed to other Western coun
tries.^
7
As a result of their "low conflict environment," the Latin Amer
ican armed forces may be interpreted as having expanded their
concepts of national security or, more accurately, as having

^Ibid., 410.
^Charles D. Corbett, "Politics and Professionalism: The
South American Military," Orbis, XVII (Winter, 1973), 936.
7
Alfred G. Stepan and Luigi R. Einaudi, Latin American
Institutional Development: Changing Military Perspectives in
^ r u and Brazil Report prepared for the Department of External
Research, Department of State, R-586-DOS (Santa Monica, Cali
fornia: The RAND Corporation, 1971), p. 3. For a discussion of
the relative absence of conflict between Latin American nations
and the lack of participation by those nations in international
conflicts on a larger scale, see Robert J. Alexander, "The Army
in Politics," in Government and Politics in Latin America, ed.
by Harold Eugene Davis (New Yofkl The Ronald Press Company, 195 8)
pp. 151-52.
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placed a greater emphasis on one component of national security
policy, that of internal security policy,

concerned primarily

with the threat of subversion.
Historically, the chief source of friction between the
republics of Latin America has been their ill-defined borders.

9

However, since 1864, the year hostilities with Argentina were
ended, Brazil, the subject of this study, has been at relative
peace with her neighbors.

Despite bordering on every nation in

South America except Chile and Ecuador, Brazil has been able to
define her long borders without recourse to arms.

Like her

neighbors, Brazil is only marginally threatened militarily by
the outside world.

The absence of a direct external threat

has, in part, caused the Brazilian military to modify its con
cept of national security and to emphasize the importance of
eradicating communist subversion and ’’corruption" in public
office at home.
Q
Samuel P. Huntington conceives of national security policy
as existing in three forms: military security policy, internal
security policy, and situational security policy.
The Soldier
and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Rela
tions (Cambridge, Mass.: HarvarcT"University Press, 195 7), p. 1.
9
William L. Schurz, Latin America: A Descriptive Survey
(New York: E. P. Dutton and" Company, Inc., 1963) , p . 2’3S.
^^Brazil's history of peaceful foreign relations is due in
large part to the efforts of her legendary Foreign Minister,
The Baron of the Rio Branco.
For a descriptive summary of his
contributions, see E. Bradford Burns, ’’Tradition and Variation
in Brazilian Foreign Policy," in Latin American International
Politics: Ambitions, Capabilities', and tïïë~ National T n terests
of Mexico", Brazil an3~~Argentina, ed. By Carlos A. Astiz'(Notre
Darnel UniversTty of Notre Dame Press, 1969), pp. 176-80.
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Scope and Objectives of the Study
The present study undertakes to analyze the major internal
security policies, or those national security policies designed
to insure domestic political and social order, of the three
military governments of Brazil between 1964 and 1970 and to
demonstrate why, by the end of 1970, the various military gov
ernments had either been unable or unwilling to restore "democracy.*'

11

This procedure will include an attempt to account for

the apparent discrepancies between major speeches, proclaiming
intentions to return Brazil to a political system open to civil
ian participation, and the actual policies the governments
adopted, which made a rapid return to "democratic" forms and pro
cedures of government impossible.
The major research question is:
What effect did the steadily expanding internal
security policies of the Brazilian military gov
ernments between 1964 and 1970 have on the pros
pects for an eventual return to civilian leader
ship and to democratic forms and procedures of
government?
The argument of Vicente Barreto is adopted.

His thesis is

that the "amplification of the concepts of national security has
given the Brazilian military "carte blanche” to intervene against
internal enemies or

11

Democracy in Brazil carries a much different meaning and
connotation in Brazil than it does in the Anglo-American exper
ience, and, therefore, when referring to democracy in Brazil,
the word democracy will be placed in quotation marks.
For a
brief description and explanation of the Brazilian "democratic
experience," see pages 15 through 34 of this work.
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anything that contributes or could contribute
to the weakening of the nation . . . . National
security comprehends not only the military pro
tection of the nation, but principally all
manifestations of national life, whether in
political economic, social or cultural areas.
In seeking to extend the Barreto argument, I attempt to
show that internal security policies, initially designed to
restore order, permitted the armed forces sufficient penetra
tion into the political system to enable them to become exploi
tative of that system.

For example, active non-support for the

regime came to be equated with subversion.

Here my efforts will

be confined principally to the area of internal security policy
formulation, that is, it will focus on some of the forces influ
encing the policy formulation of each regime, such as the mili
tary officers' perceptions of internal communist subversion and
their attitudes concerning civilian fitness to govern (as ex
pressed in speeches); the role of Escola Superior de Guerra
(the Superior War College); and the composition of the hierarchy
of each regime.

The latter consideration involves the relative

balance of the linha dura (hard line) elements and the more
moderate, Sorbonne Wing of the armed forces.
I will attempt to indicate how each of the foregoing fac
tors, or combination thereof, may have caused the military to
pursue policies that either (1) alienated significant portions

12

Vicente Barreto, Cadernos_ Braslleiros (Rio de Janeiro:
November-December, 1966), 35-39, quoted in Charles D. Corbett
op. cit., 957.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

of the civilian populace and the armed forces as well, thereby
rendering a return to "democratic" processes more difficult or
(2) resulted in institutional modifications of both civilian
and military structures and the creation of new roles, each of
which, having acquired momentum and a domain of responsibility,
assumed a self-sustaining nature and became more difficult to
dissolve.
William Stokes has written, "Violence seems to be institu
tionalized in the organization, maintenance, and changing of
governments in Latin America."

13

Until 1930 Brazil did not

meet the criteria of political violence developed by Stokes,
however, it will be demonstrated that in the past two decades,
violence has become more institutionalized in the Brazilian
political process.
Aspects of Civil-Military Relations in Brazil
Between 1889 and 1964 the Brazilian armed forces occupied
an influential, stabilizing position in the Brazilian political
system.

Compared with the experiences of most of the other Latin

American nations, military intervention in Brazilian politics
prior to 1964 was marked with temperance.

Commenting on the

Brazilian military during that era, John J. Johnson has re
marked:

^^William S. Stokes, "Violence as a Power Factor in Latin
American Politics," Western Political Quarterly, V [September,
1952), 445.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

8

. . . although the Brazilian military has re
peatedly encroached on the civilian preserve
and played a decisive role in the political
life of the nation, it has done so without
creating turmoil or arousing public wrath,
Because she was able to win her independence without indebting herself to a generation of military heroes^^ and because
of unique internal political developments, Brazil was able to
escape the normal South American experience of military inter
ference in public affairs before 1870.
The key to the political organization of Brazil during
the nineteenth century was the moderating power of the Emperor,
called poder moderador.

Embodied in Article 101 of the Con

stitution of 1824, the poder moderador enabled the Emperor
•'to play the role of the balancer to maintain or restore the
political forces of the country."

1A

The article provided that

he might (1) name the members of the Senate from lists se
lected by indirect election, (2) sanction decrees and resolu
tions of the general assembly, (3) approve and suspend resolu
tions of provincial councils, postpone meetings of the general

^^John J. Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin
America (Stanford, California: Stanford Ünivers'ity Press,
1964), p . 177.
15
Ibid., p. 179. The author states that Brazil did not
develop a "military spirit," as well, in winning her indepen
dence. Alan K. Manchester contends that Brazil's independence
"not won on the field of battle but by diplomacy." See, "The
Recognition of Brazilian Independence," The Hispanic American
Historical Review, XXXI (February, 1951), 80.
^^Vladimir Reisky de Dubnic, Political Trends in Brazil
(Washington, B.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1968) , p . 9l
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assembly, as well as dissolve the Chamber of Deputies as re
quired for the "salvation of the state," (4) freely name and
dismiss the ministers of the state and (5) suspend judges under
circumstances.

17

Combined with the directives of Article 99,

stating that the Emperor should be inviolable and sacred, the
poder moderador, became so ample in its exercise, that the
remaining three functions (legislative, executive and judicial)
could not be effectuated without imperial approval.

18

From 1824 to 1889 the poder moderador, as a "mediating
but ultimately authoritarian device," was occasionally subject
to abuse but was generally applied with restraint and sensi
bility by Pedro II (1840-1889)
Problems soon beset Dorn Pedro and, following a decade of
irresponsibility by the military,

20

the decade was overturned

17

T. B. Cavalcanti, Las Constituciones del Brazil, xxix,
cited in James L. Busey, "The Old and the New in1:he Politics
of Modern Brazil," in The Shaping of Modern Brazil, ed. by
Eric N. Baklanoff (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1969), p. 69.
18

Busey, o p . cit., p. 69. Joao Pondia Cologeras states
that the Emperor "deserves to be called a redresseur de torts,
a sort of Roman censor." See A History of Brazil, trans. and
ed. by Percy Alvin Martin (ChapelTHill : University of North
Carolina Press, 1939), p. 221.
IQ

Busey, op. cit., pp. 71, 82-83.

20

Johnson, Military and Society, pp. 187-88. The author
argues that during the 1880's the military grew increasingly
insubordinate of Pedro II because of its opposition to slavery
and because it felt the civilians were not appreciative of its
presence in Brazilian society. The overthrow of Pedro II was
peaceful and was supported by an overwhelming proportion of
the population, he concludes.
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10

in 1889 by the military, which then assumed the function of
poder moderador.

Gilberto Freyre has correctly observed that

since then it has been the armed forces, not the civilian pol
iticians, who have acted as the ultimate constitutional author
ity:
. . . from the end of the nineteenth century to
the present day the army in Brazil--in the last
decades, the entire armed forces, army, navy,
and air force--has acted as a substitute for
the crown during the monarchial days [sic]-that is, as a corrective influence acting, es
pecially during critical days, to prevent abuse
or power by any single individual or by any
particular . . . group within the national
organization of Brazil.21
The Constitutions of 1891, 1934, 1937 and 1946 all ac
knowledged the moderating power of the Brazilian armed forces
and "nowhere does one find evidence that more than a few elected
officials of the Brazilian government have ever sought to de
prive the armed forces of the political prerogatives that they
assumed upon the overthrow of Pedro II."

22

In addition to pro

viding for the national defense, the armed forces were specif
ically charged by Article XIV of the 1891 Constitution with

21

Gilberto Freyre, New World in the Tropics: The Culture
of Modern Brazil (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1*959) , p . 207 .
22

Johnson, Military and Society, p. 233. Alfred C. Stepan
writes: "My analysis indicates that the military was often felt
to be the only available structure that could perform certain
funcfions the participant elite felt had to be performed. Mili
tary performance of these functions --whether checking the execu
tive or maintaining internal order--was thus granted some degree
of legitimacy, even by many groups who were deeply antimilitarist." The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in
firaz.il (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19 71), p. 66.
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maintaining Brazil's domestic laws; this assigned domestic
function was not affected by either the Constitutions of 1934
or 1937, except that the military's domestic responsibilities
were more fully delineated.

9 T

After the military reasserted

its poder moderador in disposing of the Vargas dictatorship,
it was once again assigned a moderating function in the 1946
Constitution.
The poder moderador of the armed forces was described in
Articles 176 and 177 of the 1946 Constitution.

Like all of

the constitutions of the Republic, the 1946 Constitution con
tained the requirement that the armed forces were subject to
the authority of the President "within the limits of the law."

25

Article 176 states:
The armed forces, constituted essentially by
the army, navy, and air force, are permanent
national institutions, organized on a basis of
hierarchy and discipline, under the supreme
authority of the President of the Republic, and
within the limits of the l a w . 26
The last phrase, in effect, conferred upon the War Ministers the

7X

“ Johnson, Military and Society, p. 235.
24

Busey, op. cit., p. 73. On the question of who exercised
the poder moderador during the Estado Novo, Busey contends that
Vargas filled that traditional role with the military never far
in the background.
For a different interpretation of civilmilitary relation during the Estado Novo, see John D. Wirth,
The Politics o f Brazilian Development: 1930-1954 (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1970), p. 8.
25
Stepan and Einaudi, o p . cit., p. 73.
^^E. Bradford Burns, "The Constitution of 1946," in A Docuinentary History of Brazil, ed. by E. Bradford Burns (New~YorT:
Alfred A. Knopt, 1966), p. 366.
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privilege of "discretionary obedience," depending on their
judgment as to the legality of specific presidential orders.

27

If they concluded such an order threatened the normal function
ing of the three constituted powers (the legislative, executive,
and judicial branches), for which they were responsible under
Article 177 ("The armed forces are intended to defend the
Fatherland and to guarantee the constituted powers and law
and order."

28

), they could simply deny final authority to the

President and consequently disobey his order.
In 1930, 1945, 1954, and 1964 the armed forces were called
upon by civilians to exercise its poder moderador.

For exam

ple, in 1945, a newspaper editorial stated:
The Brazilian armed forces are deeply conscious
of their responsibilities in the present political
situation . . . . It is incumbent on them to main
tain the constitutional powers and laws of the
Republic. Nothing is more right and legitimate
than that the political parties should ask the
army, navy, and air force to intervene in the
sense of guaranteeing the election laws already
designated, and to impede them from being modi-

fied:29
On this occasion, as well as in others, it appears the poder
moderador was interpreted and applied as a power to defend the
prerogatives of the Congress by removing or restraining the

27
Stepan and Einaudi, op. cit., p. 73.
78
See Burns, "The Constitution of 1946," p. 366.
29

0 Journal, August 10, 1945 cited in Stepan, op. cit.,
p. 102. Stepan uses the editorials of Brazil’s major daily
newspapers to demonstrate one manner in which the military
was called upon to exercise its poder moderador in 1945,
1954, 1955, 1961, and 1964. See pp. 99-115.
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President whenever he clashed with the legislative branch.
Viewed from this perspective, it seems evident the poder
moderador inadvertently became a mechanism by which to con
trol Brazil's prediliction for paternalism, a condition the
military itself helped to create.

30

The poder moderador

of the military became so ample that the functions of the
executive office could not be performed without some recog
nition of the potential application of that power or without
tacit military approval.

31

The practical application of the poder moderador between
1945 and 1964 created a framework of expectations in the
civilian populace at large about military activity in the
political arena, principally that the right to overthrow the
President did not imply the right to assume power.

Few, if

any, of those who appealed to the armed forces to exercise its
moderating function during that time, asked that body to assume
power nor did they expect it to assume power.

32

Hence, while a

For a discussion of the military's part in creating
Brazil's tradition of presidential paternalism during the
twentieth century, see de Dubnic, o p . cit., p. 28.
^^Thomas E. Skidmore stresses that the continued existence
of any government between 1945 and 1964 was dependent to a
large extent on the ability of the President to develop
cobertura militar (military support) and dispositivo militar
(active military backing).
Politics in Brazil, 1950-1964: An
Experiment in Democracy (London: Oxford University Pres si
1067), p. 235.
32
After conducting an editorial analysis on the editorials
of the leading Brazilian newspapers that appeared prior to the
coups of 1945, 1954, and 1964 and the attempted coups of 1955
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relatively high degree of legitimacy was ascribed to military
33
intervention, military rule remained illegitimate.
In summary, several components of civil-military relations
in Brazil warrant attention because of their impact on Brazil's
"democratic experience."

Briefly they are:

1. All major political actors attempt to co-opt
the military. A politicized military is the
norm.
2. The relevant political actors grant legiti
macy to the military under certain circum
stances to act as moderators of the political
process and to check or overthrow the execu
tive or to avoid the breakdown of the system.
3. Approval given by civilian elites to the po
litically heterogeneous military to overthrow
the executive greatly facilitates the con
struction of a winning coup combination.
4. There is a strong belief among civilian elites
and some military officers that while it is
legitimate for the military to intervene and
exercise temporary political power, it is
illegitimate for the military to assume the
direction of the political system for long
periods of time.34
Until 1964 the manner in which the armed forces could wield
its force in the application of the poder moderador was shaped
and influenced by any one of several elite, civilian groups: the
government, the anti-regime civilians, and the proregime civil-

and 1961, Stepan concludes that no editorial "ever explicitly
asked the military to assume power, although dozens of the edi
torials demanded that the military intervene to remove or check
the executive." Military in Politics, p. 115.
33

Stepan and Einaudi, o p . cit., p. 74.

^^Stepan, o p . cit., p. 64.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

15

ians.^^

The government consisted of the President and his

advisors; the anti-regime civilians included those who opposed
not only the government but the regime itself and who want to
change the basic rules and authority structures; the proregime
civilians embraced those individuals who generally supported
the regime but who periodically disagreed with the government
and wanted to check the executive by other than legislative
or electoral methods.

Depending on the success of any of

these groups in co-opting the military, the course of Brazil’s
’’democratic experience” was to be shaped differently by the
application of the military’s force.
Brazil's ’’Democratic Experience”
R. A. Humphreys has described Latin America’s affinity
for democratic forms of government in this manner:
Constitutional government and political prac
tices almost invariably differ. But it can not
be denied that in Latin America, or at least in
large parts of that area, the discrepancies between
them have been peculiarly marked. The theory in
their hearts, believing, indeed, that it is quite
unsuited for Latin American conditions, few among
their statesmen venture to repudiate it with their
lips.
The political experience of Brazil between 1945 and 1964 sup
ports the validity of this observation.
Jordan M. Young has argued that Brazil practiced real

3Sibid., p. 67.
?A
R. A. Humphreys, Tradition and Revolt in Latin America
(New York: Columbia UniversTty Press, 19691, p^ 216 .
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37

democracy only between 1945 and 1964. .

While this may be

true when the political activities of that era are compared
with those in earlier periods of Brazilian history, Brazil's
real political practices between 1945 and 1964 were at vari
ance with classical and Anglo-American concepts of a democratic
%O
society,
as well as with the provisions of her "democratic"
constitution.

In this regard, the Brazilian experience under

a "democratic" constitution was quite typical of Latin American
nations and their constitutions:
. . . these [Latin American] constitutions tend
to be normative and anticipatory.
That is, their
texts often provide for what the constitutionwriters hope will come to pass rather than what
the structure is or can be in reality,
In most cases, when conflicts develop between the "written"
constitution and the "real" constitution, or the existing
power relationships in a political community, the latter has

37

Jordan M. Young, "Some Permanent Political Characteris
tics of Contemporary Brazil," Journal of Inter-American Studies,
VI (July, 1964), 290.
3R
Henry Mayo has listed the following features as being
characteristic of a classical democratic state: decision-making
by majority rule, political equality of all citizens, freedom
to oppose, and observation of the principle of constitutional
ism, or a "higher law" to Impose limitations on political power.
See An Introduction to Democratic Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), ^ S T i
Peter H. Odegard has remarked
that in the Anglo-American tradition representative assemblies
and the idea of human perfectability have remained central
tenets of most democracies.
See The American Republic: Its
Government and Politics (New Yorkl Harper and Row, T9"69]^
pp. 34-45.
S^George I. Blanksten, "Revolutions," in Government and
Politics in Latin America, ed. by Harold Eugene Davis "(New
York: The Ronald Press Company, 1958), p. 142.
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prevailed.
The Brazilian constitution, promulgated September 18, 1946,
theoretically established a presidential, federal political
system with all the mechanisms of a democratic government: free
and fair elections; representative legislative bodies; freedom
of dissent and organization; and numerous political parties.
Primarily the work of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, the
Constitution of 1946 superseded the Constitution of 1937, "an
authoritarian, corporatist document" decreed by Getulio
41
Vargas.
The formation of the new constitution was facilitated by
the armed forces' removal of the Vargas dictatorship from power
on October 25, 1945.

If one accepts the Young thesis that

Brazil practiced real democracy between 1945 and 1964, it is
significant to note that the very document on which that ex
perience was supposedly based, the Constitution of 1946,
actually "re-established the institutions of the republic
more or less as they prevailed before V a r g a s . w h i c h was
hardly an era of democracy.

^^George I. Blanksten, "Constitutions and the Structures
of Power," in Government and Politics in Latin America, ibid.,
p. 227.
^^James L. Busey, "Brazil’s Reputation for Political
Stability," Western Political Quarterly, XVIII (December,
1965), 868.
^^Ibid., 869.
^^On the creation of the Estado Novo in 1937, de Dubnic
writes that it did not represent the end of democracy, "since
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The majority of those elected to Congress in December,
1945 were either politicians who had actively supported Var
gas' Estado Novo or politicians from the old, republican era
who had been stifled by the former dictator's regime.

Neither

group could accurately be labelled as having been particularly
dedicated to democratic principles.

In fact, the two political

parties created or controlled by the ex-dictator, the Partido
Social Democratico (PSD) and the Partido Trabhalista Brasileiro
(PTB), controlled a majority of the seats in Congress at the
time the new constitution was formed and a d o p t e d . V a r g a s
himself was elected to Congress, less than two months after
his ouster.
In light of the preceding facts, it seems that the Consti
tution of 1946 was more the statement of a nation's rejection
of one-man dictatorial rule in the anti-fascist atmosphere of
the post-World War II days than it was a statement of a committhere could not be an end to something that had not really begun."
de Dubnic, op. cit., p. 12. For a brief discussion of the undem
ocratic style of the old republican era (1889-1930), see John W.
P. Dulles, "The Contributions of Getulio Vargas to the Moderniza
tion of Brazil," in Eric N. Baklanoff, op. cit., p. 40.
'‘
^'^For a breakdown of the party membership in the 1946
Brazilian Congress, see Theodore Wyckoff, "Brazilian Political
Parties," The South Atlantic Quarterly, LVl (Summer, 1957), 292.
With regard to the participation of the PSD in the 1945 elec
tions Thomas Skidmore has written: "Final direction came from
on high, as Vargas personally supervised the organization of
the PSD in order to support the official candidacy of Dutra."
Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964, p. 56. For a brief discussion of
Vargas' role in the creation and control of the PTB, see John W.
F. Dulles, "Post-Dictatorship Brazil, 1945-1964," in New Perspectives of Brazil, ed. by Eric N. Baklanoff (Nashville: VanderbllT
University Press, 1966), pp. 9-10; Young, op. cit., 297; and
Busey, "Brazil's Reputation," 873.
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ment to democratic institutions and processes.

It is even

questionable that the constitution-writers hoped Brazil would
evolve eventually into a democratic state.

Although a dicta

tor was deposed and a new constitution adopted, the same elites
continued to control the nation and democracy remained nothing
but a formal concept.
The Constitution of 1946 "obliged” all citizens over the
age of eighteen to vote.

Exceptions were those who could not

speak Portuguese, criminals, or those who did not enjoy "full
political rights," and those who served as enlisted seamen or
soldiers.

The reason for the inclusion of the latter was that

they could have conceivably been intimidated to vote for the
candidate endorsed by the m i l i t a r y . T h e s e restrictions
effectively excluded substantial portions of the population
from v o t i n g . I n

the 1950 presidential elections, the first

de Dubnic, o p . cit. The author contends the establish
ment of Dutra's democratic regime represented an evolutionary,
rather than revolutionary, development because the elites re
mained the same (p. 13). On the political system that followed
Vargas, de Dubnic writes: "Although the regime changed to a
formal democracy, the men in power were the men of the Estado
Novo" (p. 14).
Wyckoff, o p . cit., p. 284.
"^^While Jordan Young admits that the electorate constantly
increased between 1945 and 1964, he also points out that of
Brazil’s 75 million inhabitants in 1964, her "political popula
tion" (that is, over the age of 15) was comprised of some 38
million.
Of this 38 million only 19 million were actually
eligible to vote due to a high rate of illiteracy and sickness.
See "Some Permanent Political Characteristics of Contemporary
Brazil," op. cit., 296.
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held under the new constitution, only IS.9 percent of the
population actually voted, but this was a dramatic increase
48
over the 3.1 percent who voted in the 1930 elections.
Those
who did vote were easily influenced by demagogic appeal, and
coronelismo, ”a kind of latter day adaptation of feudalism to
the conditions of republican Brazil,'* flourished in the rural
a r e a s . C o n s e q u e n t l y , vote buying was a widespread practice.
Just over five years after his ouster as dictator, Getulio
Vargas, was elected President of Brazil in 1950, thereby suc
ceeding Caspar Dutra, whose lackluster administration had
served as a "caretaker regime for the Vargas f o r c e s . V a r g a s
used the organization of his party, the PTB, as his personal
vehicle to power during the democratic phase of his political
career.

While only the third largest party during the fifties,

its ability to deliver the poor rural vote and to form a series
of complicated alliances with the PSD and the PSP fPartido
Social Progressista) enabled its candidates to hold either
the Presidency or the Vice-Presidency until 1964.^^

The

^^For electoral statistics on the Brazilian elections from
1945-1965, see Brazil: Election Factbook, No. 2, September, 1965
(Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Comparative Study of Polit
ical Systems), p. 19. Percentage of population voting in 1930
election cited in de Dubnic, op. cit., p. 13.
^^For a discussion of electoral fraud and corruption in
Brazil during the 1950's, see James W. Rowe, "The 'Revolution*
and the 'System*: Notes on Brazilian Politics, Part I: Seeds of
the *System*," American Universities Field Staff, East Coast
South America Series, Vol. XXI (Washington, D.C.: American Universitië's' Reports Së'rvice, May, 1966), pp. 13-14.
50de Dubnic, o p . cit., p. 14.
SlThe PSD-PTB domination over the Presidency was interrupted
only by J&nio Quadros' seven month tenure in 1961.
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frustrated members of the opposition party, the UDN (Uniao
Democratico Nacional) , the second largest political party,
continued to envision democracy in a negative manner: primarily as means by'which to control Vargas and his forces.

52

From their inception, all major political parties tended to
be personalista and, as a result, political contests continued
to be related more to personalities than to any sort of mean
ingful political ideas or programs; the chief tendency of
political parties was to identify themselves as either proor anti-Vargas, even after his death in 1954.
The Vargas regime was troubled from the start by infla
tion and communist activity.

Because wages were substantially

increased (as Vargas promised they would be during his cam
paign) , the cost of living rose 23 percent in 1952.

World

demand for coffee, Brazil’s largest industry and major export
during the fifties, sharply declined.

Communist activities

increased steadily until 1954, when Joao Goulart, Vargas’
Labor Minister, was forced to resign by the armed forces for
allegedly promoting communist infiltration into labor unions
This swirling vortex of political tensions and economic dis
tress was culminated by the unsuccessful assassination attempt

52

de Dubnic, op. cit., p. 14.

^^Johnson states that this move by the armed forces was
the first in a series of moves that drew the military back
into active participation in politics. Military and Society,
p. 208.
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on Carlos Lacerda, the most violent critic of the Vargas
Administration.^^

Investigations soon disclosed that the

head of the presidential guard had ordered the shooting;
further disclosures of graft and influence peddling totally
discredited V a r g a s . U n d e r intense military and civilian
pressure to resign, Vargas committed suicide on August 24,
1954.

Proregime civilian forces had first co-opted the

armed forces to secure the removal of Goulart and then,
later and more importantly, to check the executive in the
person of Vargas.

In both instances the basic rules and

authority structures remained intact while the usual legis
lative and electoral procedures were temporarily suspended.
On learning of Vargas' death, the hostile crowds that
had been demonstrating against him only moments before did
an about-face and became full of devotion for the dead Presi
dent and openly expressed wrath against his e n e m i e s . I m m e 
diately thereafter, Vargas' now famous suicide note in which
5
he severely rebuked unnamed foreign and domestic foes, ' was

54

For a discussion of the events surrounding the attempt
on Lacerda's life, the so-called "Tonoleros Case," and the in
fluence it exerted in determining Vargas' political fate, see
J. V. D. Saunders, "A Revolution of Agreement Among Friends,"
The Hispanic American Historical Review, XLIV (May, 1964),
197-213.
SSgee John W. F. Dulles, Unrest in Brazil, PoliticalMilitary Crises: 1955-1964 (Austin: IJniversity of Texas
Press, 197ÜTT p. 27 an<r~S¥idmore, op. cit., p. 159.
S^See Samuel Pope Brewer, "Vargas Commits Suicide After
Ouster by Military," The New York Times, August 25, 1954, p. 1,
S^Soon after the disclosure of Vargas’ suicide note.
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released to the press and a wave of sympathy for Vargas en
gulfed the country.

It became politically impossible for the

anti-Vargas forces, who had centered their criticisms on the
person of the former President, to fill the power vacuum.
By his final act of self-sacrifice Vargas
neutralized the political and psychological
advantages his opponents had accumulated.
In
death, as in life, Vargas' action was well
designed to yield maximum political effect.^8
Vice-President Cafe Filho acceded to the presidency and the
first test of presidential succession under the 1946 Consti
tution was passed.
In 1955 amidst charges of possible electoral fraud and
demands for a coup d'etat to prevent the pro-Vargas forces
from re-assuming office, the Liga pela Legalidade (League for
Legality) was formed by civilians dedicated to preserving
Brazil’s "democratic" institutions of free speech and free
elections.

In addition, it was to guard against the threat

of military interference in the 1955 elections, "a clear indi
cation" according to de Dubnic
. . . that the holding of free elections was
still a struggle rather than the routine con
stitutional procedure it should have been after
ten years of democratic government.
another version of the note was found and a controversy, as to
which of the two, if either, was written by Vargas, ensued. The
two versions are printed in The Quest for Change in Latin Amer
ica, ed. by W. Raymond Duncan and James Nelson Goodsell
(Toronto : Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 151-53.
S^skidmore, op. cit., p. 142.
59de Dubnic, op. cit., p. 15.
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As soon as it became evident that the coalition candidates
of the PSD (Juscelino Kubitschek for President) and the PTB
(Joao Goulart for Vice President) would win the 1955 presi
dential election, the anti-Vargas forces began to demand that
they be prevented from assuming office.

Filho, although not

an ardent admirer of the now martyred former President,
stressed that the election would be held as constitutionally
authorized and the victors permitted to assume office.

On

October 13, 1955 Juscelino Kubitschek was elected President
with only 36 percent of the vote; Goulart, who actually re
ceived more votes than Kubitschek, was elected Vice President.
Before they were inaugurated in January, 1956 events were to
disclose that the election and constitutional processes ceased
to be an adequate assurance of succession.
Cafe Filho, the lame duck, caretaker President, suffered
a heart attack on November 3, 1955 and Carlos Luz, the Presi
dent of the Chamber of Deputies, temporarily took over as
President.

When the military became convinced that Luz was

collaborating in an attempt to obstruct Kubitschek's inaugura
tion, he was forced from office by members of the Novimsnto
Militar Constitucionalista, a legalist military faction devoted

For a breakdown of the votes cast in the 1955 elections,
see Skidmore, o p . cit., pp. 148-49. Under the 1946 Constitu
tion party alliances and coalitions were legal. Therefore, it
was possible for a President of one party to be elected with
a Vice-President of another party.
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to constitutional p r o c e s s e s , a n d replaced by the President
of the Senate, Nereu Ramos.

In late November, Cafe Filho,

fully recuperated from his illness, prepared to reassume the
presidency; although this intention was acceptable to Ramos,
newly appointed War Minister, Texeira Lott, the leader of the
’’legalist movement” earlier that month, objected on the
grounds Filho might retain his former ministers whom the
military regarded with suspicion.

Faced with overwhelming

opposition from an informal alliance of the armed forces and
the PSD-PTB controlled Congress, Filho was prevented from re
entering the office to which he was legally entitled.

On

January 31, 1956 Kubitschek ’’took office not only through the
normal processes, i.e., the will of the people, but also the
grace of the army.”

62

In the final analysis, the presidential musical chairs
of November, 1955, orchestrated by the armed forces, repre
sented a short-term victory for the proregime forces and a
long-term victory for the anti-regime forces.

The immediate

challenge by the anti-Vargas forces to the right to conduct

John W. Dulles discusses this "legalist” move in "PostDictatorship Brazil,” pp. 32-53.
Skidmore suggests that part
of the reason for Luz’s removal from office was that he was a
member of the PSD faction that opposed Kubtischek's presi
dential nomination and was still suspected of being in sympathy
with moves designed to obstruct Kubitschek when he succeeded
the stricken Filho. Politics in Brazil, 1950-1964, p. 152.
de Dubnic, op. cit., p. 16.
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elections was subdued and, on this level o£ interpretation,
the basic rules of the polLtical system were upheld.

But the

"legalist" move actually modified the manner in which those
rules were enforced.

The "legalist" deposition of Luz,

based on such obscure considerations, and obstruction of
Filho's return is a clear indication the military was evolv
ing toward a position where it might exercise wider discre
tion in applying its poder moderador.

The military moves in

1955 established the framework for the precedent set in
August, 1961: in order to permit succession of the President's
office, the military supervised the drastic amendment of the
basic rules of political interaction among the three constitu
tional powers.
The Kubitschek Administration was marked by several sig
nificant features.

The new President's political toleration

strengthened democracy and freedom^ ^ and his apparent aversion
for the paternalistic style of Vargas led him to share his
powers, at times with unscrupulous elites.

In his quest for

economic development he launched Brazil on an economic journey
on which he promised "fifty Years of Progress in Five Years.
Money for his programs of national development was obtained by
printing new currency--the volume of currency in circulation
nearly tripled between 1955 and 1 9 6 1 . During the same period.
63xbid., p. 17.
64por a general outline of Kubitschek's ambitious goals
and strategies, see Skidmore, op . cit., pp. 164-70.
^^Dulles, "Post-Dictatorship Brazil, p. 38.
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however, the cost of living more than tripled, a noticeable
rise even in light of Brazil's history of chronic inflation.
(Some observers of the Kubitschek era say he gave Brazil
"Fifty Years of Inflation in Five Years.
As in the Dutra presidency, the armed forces tended to
withdraw from public view during Kubitschek's term but they
remained a potential threat to his administration, primarily
because of the widespread distrust of Goulart harbored by the
anti-communist and anti-Vargas officers.

Kubitschek deftly

deterred possible military intervention by increasing military
expenditures to new highs
munism.

7

and by repeatedly denouncing com

Though hampered during the first part of his term by

those who refused to accept the legitimacy of his election and
despite his administration's miserable economic performance,
Kubitschek emerged as a widely popular leader by the end of
his term.
The presidential elections of 1960 were conducted in an
atmosphere of freedom and peace; no Liga pela Legalidade was
necessary.

68

Janio Quadros, a political outsider free of

^^See Young, op. cit., 299.
fs7

Although most of the attention is given to Kubitschek's
expenditures on programs of national development, more money
was spent on military demands than on any single development
program.
See Johnson, Military and Society, p. 208.
^^There is some disagreement as to whom, the armed forces
or Kubitschek, "guaranteed" the elections,
de Dubnic states
Kubitschek provided this function, o p . cit., p. 18. Busey
states that the armed forces guaranteed^the 1960 elections.
"The Old and the New," p. 65.
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entangling alliances who promised to sweep away the corruption
and inefficiency of the Kubitschek era, was elected President
with 44.8 percent of the 11.7 million votes cast.

69

Never a

party man, Quadros had used the organization of the UDN to
achieve his political ends; although his election represented
the first time in Brazilian history an opposition candidate was
elected, his convincing victory over Texeira Lott was more a
personal victory than a triumph for the U D N . T h r o u g h a
strange series of developments, Joao Goulart of the PTB was
once again elected Vice President.

71

*

Confronted with a paralyzing PTB-PSD opposition in Con
gress and not accustomed to working within the apparatus of
the UDN, Quadros attempted to appeal directly to the masses
that elected him; finally, frustrated by his inability to
implement his policies over the obstruction of Congress and
governmental bureaucrats,

72

he suddenly resigned on August 25,

69

For a breakdown of the votes cast for President, see
de Dubnic, op. cit., p. 123.
70
Ibid.. p. 18. One indication of Quadros' political
independence was his temporary resignation as the presidential
nominee of the UDN during the midst of the campaign. He re
portedly resigned in a maneuver to secure his independence from
political bosses. See Dulles, "Post-Dictatorship Brazil," p. 41.
71

For a brief description of the circumstances leading to
Goulart's election, see de Dubnic, op. cit., pp. 122-24.
72

Young states that Quadros did not understand the art
of log rolling or "pork barreling," which frequently resulted
in deadlocks with Congress.
"Some Permanent Political Fea
tures," 291.
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1961, less than seven months after his election.

In a move

reminiscent of Vargas’ last acts, Quadros issued a written
statement charging that forcus occultas (occult, or hidden,
forces) had brought about his resignation.
motives behind his resignation,

73

Regardless of the

it was accepted by Congress ;

there was no spontaneous uprising in his behalf.

The legal

heir to the presidency was Joao Goulart, a politician who
symbolized the trust of no important political sectors, in
cluding the armed forces.
Although Goulart was legally entitled to succeed Quadros,
a fragmentation of opinion developed in the military hierarchy
over the question of his succession.

The moralists, led by

the War Ministers, feared Goulart's tendencies to condone
communist activity and wanted him set aside in favor of a
more suitable successor; the legalists, or legitimists, on
the other hand, favored constitutional succession, despite the
fact that many in this group did not care for Goulart person
ally.^'^

Neither group held a clear advantage and each remained

73
Although the reasons for Quadros’ resignation are not
clearly understood, it is generally believed that he resigned
because he felt by doing so he would present the people with
three alternatives; chaos, military rule or his return to
power on his own terms. He was confident the people would
choose the third alternative. This interpretation is expressed
in Skidmore, o p . cit., pp. 202-204 and Young, o p . cit., 291-92.
Some research definitely indicates the military did not pres
sure Quadros into resigning.
See Stepan, op. cit., p. 68fn,
^"^It is conceivable that members of this group may have
been so dedicated to principles that they could not block the
ascension of Goulart merely on the grounds of what he might do.
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passionately dedicated to its "principles."

Finally, the

deadlock was resolved when both factions of the hierarchy of
the armed forces agreed to accept a Congressional compromise
proposal, under which Brazil's presidential system was
scuttled in favor of a parliamentary system.

The solution

of the succession problem effected by the divided military
leadership (moralists vs. legitimists) was nothing short of
a major restructuring of the political system.

On September 7,

1961 Goulart assumed an office stripped of many of its tradi75
tional powers.
In assessing the consequences of the military's inter
vention, it seems apparent that no real political solution
was reached, at least as far as the military was concerned.
The legalist opinion that the Vice President, as constitutional
successor, should be allowed to fill the vacancy in the presi
dency was upheld, but it was tainted in the process.

The com

promise necessary to assure Goulart's accession, a constitu
tional amendment, only set a precedent that future legalists
would soon exploit.

The legitimists had not prevented Goulart':

rise to power and, obviously, the mere limitation of Goulart's
power could not have dispelled their fears of this man.

The terms "moralists" and "legitimists" are borrowed from
Robert Dervel Evans, "The Brazilian Revolution of 1964: Sur
gery Without Anaesthetics," International Affairs, XLIV
(April, 1968), 271.
75

For a list of the powers that the presidency lost,
see de Dubnic, op. cit., p. 32.
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After nearly fourteen months of deliberately promoting
inefficiency and confusion,

7A

Goulart convinced the Brazilian

electorate that the parliamentary system was unworkable ; as a
result, on January 6, 1963 a national referendum returned
Brazil to a presidential system.

The much disturbed Goulart

was now able to wield the full extent of the traditional powers
of his office, but, in the words of one author, "In trying to
please all, he pleased none . . .
uniting his opposition.

77

He did succeed in

The armed forces, already fearful

of Goulart’s reacquisition of the presidential powers, soon
began to close ranks in united opposition to the demagogic
president, especially when he attempted to bypass Congress
to secure passage of his "basic reforms" and attempted to
7R

divide and control the armed forces.
With the rate of infla7Q
tion exceeding 8 percent per month ' and the political process
in complete disarray, the armed forces, acting with the strong
support of proregime forces, forced Goulart from the presidential

^^Skidmore, op. cit., p. 221.
77
Phyllis Peterson, "Brazil; Institutionalized Confusion,"
in Political Systems of Latin America, ed. by Martin C. Need
ier (Princeton: D. Van NostraiicTandncoinpany, Inc., 1964), p. 476
78

Robert Dervel Evans discusses Goulart’s attempts to
undermine the officer’s ability to command their forces in his
work, "The Brazilian Revolution of 1964: Surgery Without
Anaesthetics," 273.
79

Cost of living figures were generally derived by observ
ing economic developments in the target city of Guanabara.
In
1962, the cost of living rose 55 percent and in 1963 it rose
81 percent.
See Skidmore, o p . cit., p. 257.
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palace and into exile in the "Revolution of 1964."

"The

arbitrator army had once again exercised its moderating power
to restore order to the political processes."

80

The events

that followed this "revolution" were anything but democratic.
The 1964 "revolution" and subsequent political develop
ments were culmination of forces that had been converging
since 1889 and 1945.

Having assumed the poder moderador in

1889, the armed forces set about to create a strong presi
dential regime that could exert better control over the polit
ical system than could a parliamentary regime.

A strong

presidency was institutionalized in the early days of the
republic and withstood the constitutional changes of 1934,
1937, and 1946, though the latter curtailed powers granted
by the first two.

As civilians persisted in the exploitation

of the office of the President, the armed forces assumed
greater responsibilities in an attempt to prevent the exces
sive abuse of those powers.

Military interpretations of the

extent of intervention necessary for the preservation of
"legality," or of law and order, grew increasingly more
liberal.
After receding from public view after 1945 the armed
forces appeared once again during the next decade to resolve
political problems in and around the office of the President.
80

Riordan Roett, "A Praetorian Army in Politics: The
Changing Role of the Brazilian Military," in Brazil in the
Sixties, ed. by Riordan Roett (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1972), p. 23.
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Vargas was removed from office in 1954 in the interest of
’’legality” and Filho was denied a return to his office in
the name of "legality.”

Each time the military responded

to civilian demands for action.

In 1961 the concept of

legality was expanded and it became necessary for the civil
ians to modify the basic rules of the political system in
order that the armed forces might defend the legality of that
system.

The armed forces had become more selective in their

defense of "legality;” the rules which they chose not to de
fend were either ignored or abolished and replaced with rules
that were more acceptable.

The 1955 intervention established

the psychological framework for the constitutional modifica
tion of August, 1961; this amendment set the precedent for
the drastic constitutional renovation after April, 1904.
The political developments between 1946 and 1964 seem
to substantiate Busey's observation that while democracy is
p1
extolled in Brazil, dictatorship is not rejected.
The
memory of Vargas’ dictatorial regime did not hinder his elec
tion in 1950; the strength of the PTB increased progressively
until 1964 by exploiting Vargas’ reputation and casting can
didates in his image.
Brazil has adhered to democracy only in a formal sense;
democracy, it appears, is accepted more as a convenience to
be maintained only if useful.

Between 1945 and 1964 there was

^^Busey, "Brazil’s Reputation,” 871
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a balance of five to four between the number of times presi
dents were forced from office and the number of presidential
elections held by popular elections.

82

In the instances of

direct military action against the President, they generally
had broad civilian support.

Because "democracy" was treated

as an expedient and not as a principle, it was easily super
seded by another system when conditions required political
experimentation.

Unlike in the past, the military acted

independently of civilian demands and used its forces to effect
"legalist" solutions.

The changes in the basic rules of the

political system did not reflect the changes originally en
visioned by either the proregime or anti-regime forces.
The "Revolution of 1964"
Revolution, as the term is employed in Latin America, does
not necessarily imply some violent convulsion of society or of
the state.

If revolution is defined as

fundamental change in the nature of the state,
the function of government, the principles of
economic production and distribution, the rela
tionship of the social classes, particularly as
regards the control of the government,

o

2

de Dubnic, op. cit., p. 18. There were presidential
elections in 1945, 195D1 1955, and 1960. Vargas was forced
from office on two occasions (1945 and 1954). Carlos Luz
was forced from office in 1955, Cafe Filho denied reinstallation as President, and Joao Goulart was forced from
office in 1964.
^^William S. Stokes, "The 'Cuban Revolution* and the
Presidential Elections of 1948," The Hispanic American His
torical Report, XXI (February, 1951), 37.
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then "revolutions" in Latin America are rare.

Rather a

"typical revolution" in Latin Ameri-ca is a change in the
executive leadership brought about "in a manner or on a
84
date not stipulated by the constitution."
It is an extralegal method of replacing one government by another which is
not accompanied by a fundamental change in the social order.
Although all the military governments have since referred to
the military action of March 31-April 1, 1964 as a "revolution,"
it was nonetheless a "typical revolution" and not a true revolu
tion.
The political intervention of the Brazilian military in
1964 was a direct, personal assault on President Goulart and
could be accurately called a golpe de estado, or a coup d'etat.

8S

It represented the seizure of power from within the political
system, but the manner in which the leadership was installed
did not represent an unconstitutional change in governmental
leadership, so much as it did represent a break with tradition.
Article 177 of the 1946 Constitution had long been the
legal basis on which the military based its withdrawal of sup
port for the President once it determined he was functioning
outside "the limits of the law."

After previous coups the

Brazilian armed forces had traditionally been content to endorse
the succession of a new or acting civilian President elected or
OA
Blanksten, "Revolutions," p. 119.
o r

Stokes, "Violence as a Power Factor," 456.
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appointed by Congress.
In 1964 such niceties were brushed aside and the military
demanded the ’’election’' of one of its own.

This demand came

only after Ranieri Mazzilli, the President of the Chamber of
Deputies, was sworn in as Provisional President and ordered
the election of a new President within thirty d a y s a s
specified by the 1946 Constitution.
One result of the 1964 intervention was "revolutionary”
or ’’represented a significant breaking with the past,"

87

in

that a former military officer was elected interim President
after the coup.

Castello Branco, the former Army Chief of

Staff who drafted the famous memorandum reminding the armed
forces of their traditional responsibilities during the crises
of Goulart’s final days,

88

was elected by an intimidated Con89
gress to fill the unexpired terms of Quadros and Goulart.
Only the Institutional Act decreed by the military to assure
the election of a military President made the move of force in
1964 a "revolution" in a very general sense.

90

86

"Washington Sends Warmest Wishes to Brazil’s Leader,"
New York Times, April 3, 1964, p. 1.
^^Stokes, "The ’Cuban Revolution'," 37.
88

For a complete reproduction of this memorandum, see
Octavio lanni. Crisis in Brazil, trans. by Phyllis B. Eleveth
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), pp. 136-38.
89

The specifics of the intimidation to which Congress was
subjected will be developed in Chapter II.
^^Ronald M. Schneider contends the military move could
not be accurately called a revolution or counterrevolution.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

37

In the period between April, 1964 and December, 1972
only an incremental development of structural changes and
revisions of socio-economic and political philosophies, that
have resulted in a shift of the distribution of power, have
transformed the move of force in 1964 into a revolution of
sorts.

Since the label ’•revolutionary” has been used in

public pronouncements and official documents, as well as by
students of Brazilian politics, it will be used in the follow
ing chapters to refer to the groups and individuals that sup
ported the 1964 coup and the subsequent military governments,
rather than in its more precise definition.
Definitions and Methods
Since 1945 Brazil has experienced rapid modernization,
a "multi-faceted process” involving, on one level, a funda
mental shift in values, attitudes and expectations and the
diffusion of man’s increased knowledge throughout society by
means of increased literacy, mass communications, and education, on another level.

92

One of the consequences of in

creased communications and urbanization has been social

The Political System of Brazil: Emergence of a "Modernizing”
Authoritarian Regime, 1964-1970 (New York; Columbia'University
Press, 1971), p. 109. Skidmore argues that only the subse
quent developments of the military governments have transformed
the 1964 into a revolution.
Politics in Brazil, pp. 308-309.
91

Schneider, op. cit., p. 109.

92

Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Developing
Societies (New Haven: Yale University“Press, 1963) , p p 52-33.
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mobilization, or "the process by which major clusters of old
social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded or
broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior."

93

Since non-traditional, advanced practices in political
and economic life were introduced and accepted on a consider
able scale, political participation, a form of social mobili
zation, increased dramatically in Brazil between 1945 and 1964,
The framework of the 1946 Constitution enhanced the emergence
of a multi-party system and, lacking any experience with any
kind of open, competitive party system, Brazil was soon
plagued by an imbalanced spectrum of political parties and
a maze of irresponsible political alliances.

The problem of

inexperience with a multi-party system was compounded by the
emergence for the first time of a mass electorate, which
placed a variety, of demands on the newly institutionalized
94
government.
Samuel Huntington's analysis of institutionalization is

93

Karl E. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political
Development," American Political Science Review, LV (Sep
tember, 1961), 494.
94
Roett, op^ cit., pp. 7-8. Robert M. Levine argues
that Getulio Vargas was largely responsible for beginning the
process of politicizing the masses during the Estado Novo.
See The Vargas Regime: The Critical Years, 19 54-195'8 (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1970), pp. 172 , 182- 83. Also
see Miguel Jorrin and John D. Martz, Latin American Political
Thought and Ideology (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1970), pp. 2 39-49.
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helpful for understanding the political stability of Brazil,
as a result of the emergence of a mass multi-party system and
the questionable capacity of the government's new institutions*
ability to adapt and to process complex demands.

Huntington's

proposition is that the stability of a given polity depends on
the relationship between the level of political participation
and the level of political institutionalization.^^

Due to an

accelerating rate of political participation and a correspond
ing low level of institutionalization after 1946, the Brazilian
political system became characteristic of a praetorian polity,
one in which groups become mobilized into politics without beQ6
coming socialized by politics.
Because participation in politics continued to outstrip
the institutionalization of politics between 1946 and 1964,
Brazil remained an unstable political system.

Since the polit

ical institutions seemed incapable of refining or mediating
group political interaction, the armed forces consequently
enlarged the functions of its poder moderador to fill the
institutional void: the War Ministers decided "to retain power
and to resist the expansion of political participation" after
the 1964 coup.^^

95
96

Huntington, Political Order, p. 79.
Ibid., p. 83.

97

Ibid., p. 235. The author labels the option of "re
taining power and resisting the expansion of political par
ticipation" as the "Gastello Branco Option."
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Historically, the Brazilian military has been what David
Easton would term a "politically relevant member" of the
Brazilian political system, or a member that shared in the
effective power of. that system.

98

Like other politically

relevant members the military placed certain demands on the
authorities, extended or withheld support for the regime and
responded*to the outputs of the political system, but it re
mained a special member of that system; because of its poder
moderador, the President was deterred somewhat from pursuing
goals that were unacceptable to the military.
Driven by a variety of forces, the military transcended
the boundaries of political intervention and assumed power in
This action resulted in a transformation of the political

1964.

role of Brazilian military from one of a politically relevant
member to one of an authority, in which it was to have the dayto-day responsibility for governing.

99

Easton develops three criteria for occupants of an au
thority role: they must engage in the daily affairs of the
system; they must be recognized by most of the members of the
system as having responsibility for these matters; and their

98

David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life
(New York: John Wiley and^Sons," Inc., 1965), p. 222,
99

Ibid., p. 39fn. Note: when referring to a political
role, one is usually referring to an individual and not an
institution. However, like many other writers I will refer
periodically to a "political role" of the military.
The
Brazilian military has been described as occupying a polit
ical role by Johnson, Military and Society, pp. 177-225.
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actions must be accepted as binding most of the time by most
of the members, "as long as they act within the limits of
their r o l e s . H a v i n g

exceeded the traditional limits of

its poder moderador, the military embarked on a new role that
lacked precise limits; in a sense, the military then became an
authority without limits, principally because after 1964 it
occupied a new role whose functions were in need of definition.
While seeking to determine the limits of its new role in
resisting the expansion of political participation, the mili
tary governments consciously altered the structures of authority
and "the procedures that are expected and accepted in the pro
cessing and implementation of d e m a n d s . I n i t i a l l y justified
as temporary and as necessary to restore order, these altera
tions persisted as permanent features of the political system.
As a result, the high level of support and legitimacy extended
to the military leaders at the time they assumed power in 1964
slowly dissipated.

102

As civilian support for the military govern

ments subsided, so too, it seems, did the military’s commitment

^^*^Easton, o p . cit., p. 212.
^^^Ibid., p. 193.
102

At the time the military assumed power with the issuance
of the Institution Acts it enjoyed a high level of support. The
major contenders for the presidential election, scheduled for
October, 1965, supported the "regime of exception" of Castello
Branco because they felt it was the only institution that could
guarantee those elections.
See Schneider, op. cit., p. 121.
In this regard the primary task of the military was seen to be
one of systems maintenance.
See Stepan, o p . cit ., p. 63.
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to democratic norms of government.
In order to demonstrate how the military governments'
policies of resisting political participation evolved over a
period of time, I have adopted the concept of political re
cruitment for Almond and Powell.

As the nature of the military

regime grew increasingly repressive, the function of political
recruitment, "which must be performed in all political systems
if its roles are to be manned and its structures are to func
tion," became more selective and restrictive.
The six and one-half years of the "revolution" under
study are divided into three distinct phases.

Chapter II

concentrates on the presidency of Castello Branco, which
lasted from April, 1964 to March, 1967.
on the presidency of Artur

Chapter-III focuses

da Costa e Silva from his inaug

uration (March, 1967) to December 15, 1968, when Institutional
Acts #5, granting the President near dictatorial powers, was
decreed.

Chapter IV reviews the remainder of the Costa e

Silva government and the presidency of General Gerrastazu
Medici through the end of 1970.

Chapter V serves as a con-

1n T

Gabriel Almond and Gingham Powell, Comparative Poli
tics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1966), p. 22. Huntington argues praetorian armies
that select the "Castello Branco Option" inevitably become
increasingly repressive. This repression carries over into
political recruitment.
lO^That the Brazilian "Revolution" may be divided into
distinct phases has been suggested by Schneider, o p . cit.,
p. 109; H. Jon Rosenbaum, "Brazil's Military Government," Cur
rent History, LVIII (February, 1970), 74; Robert M. Levine,
"Brazil at the C r o s s r o a d s C u r r e n t History, LXIII (February,
1973), S3.
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eluding chapter in which I summarize the major trends of the
first six and one-half years of the "revolution" and assess
the implications of these trends for the possible return to
civilian leadership and civilian participation in government
in Brazil in the near future.
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CHAPTER II
PHASE ONE OF THE "REVOLUTION":
THE ARMED FORCES ASSUME GOVERNMENTAL POWER
This chapter focuses on some of the operative forces which
may have led the armed forces to abandon in 1964 its function
of political moderator and to engage in one of political direc
tor.

The time frame under study extends from March, 1964 to

January, 1967, the approximate duration of the presidential
term of Castello Branco.

During his term the first of the

"revolution's" many institutional acts were decreed and the
political system was extensively renovated.
Factors Leading to the Assumption of Power
After assuming the poder moderador in 1889 the Brazilian
military generally applied it only when it had the support of
a significant portion of the civilian population.

Popularly-

sanctioned military action against a President acquired an'
aura of legitimacy.

Many argued that such actions could be

trusted "exactly because the military knew and resj^ected the
traditional limitations on military intervention that pre
vented them from assuming the powers of government."^

%
Stepan and Einaudi, o p . cit., p. 75
44
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to 1964 the majority of the military officers expressed little
interest in assuming the governing functions of Brazil; in 1964,
however, the military, encouraged by several developments, ex
ceeded the "traditional limitations" on military intervention
and assumed the powers of government.

The traditional concept

of civil-military relations had lost its viability.
Throughout the twentieth century the officer corps held
a relatively high degree of confidence in the ability of
civilians to govern and a correspondingly low appraisal of
2
its own political aptitude.
Periods of economic boom and
low levels of domestic conflict reinforced the notion that
the occasional necessity of military intervention to correct
political distress did not mean civilians were unable to rule
competently.

Few civilians or military personnel felt such

brief political encounters by the military qualified its
officers for political rule.

Command and General Staff courses,

after all, emphasized the improvement of military strategies and
military combat skills, not the techniques of public adminis
tration.

Except for a small group, most officers probably

envisioned military intervention as an infrequent necessity
to restore order in an otherwise stable political system.
With the creation of Escola Superior de Guerra (Superior
War College), commonly abbreviated as ESG, in 1949 and the
subsequent development of its positivistic curriculum, the

^Ibid., p. 76.
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balance of officer corps opinion swung in the direction of
sustained military intervention whenever the political system
experienced upheaval or dysfunction.

To the linha dura (hard

line) wing of the military, historically the minority opinion
within the armed forces which professed the bankruptcy of
civilian rule and the sanctity of military rule, was added
the so-called "Sorbonne" wing of the military, comprised pri
marily of the faculty and graduates of the ESG.

Because of

their training, members of the Sorbonne wing^ appreciated the
complexity of the problems of national development and under
stood the shortcomings of the solutions proposed by the civil
ian governments.

For this group, military intervention, of

necessity, would have to include the temporary imposition of
military rule in order to solve the nation's problems.

While

the condition "temporary” implied the assumption and retention
of power for a shorter period of time than that proposed by
the linha dura, it nonetheless exceeded the limit of time
prescribed by the poder moderador.
Where before the creation of the ESG, the officer corps
had had little but force to offer as an alternative to a weak
civilian government, recipients of ESG training developed

3
Throughout the remainder of this study, graduates of the
Escola Superior de Guerra will be referred to as members of the
Sorbonne wing, Sorbonnists, or soft liners. While my study con
cerns itself only with the military graduates of that school, it
is important to note that many of its graduates are civilians.
See Stepan, 0£^ cit., p. 177 for a classification of the grad
uates between 1949 and 1966.
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practical and operational alternatives to the strategies of
national development formulated by civilians.

The ESG ex

panded the political, social, and economic content of military
education.

As Stepan remarks;

The core of the courses consisted of lec
tures and seminars that attempted to determine
basic goals for Brazil, the obstacles to these
goals, and specific policies to achieve them.
The final task of the students at the school
was to participate in a civil-military team of
five or six students in the preparation of a
policy paper.4
It was in this context that the Sorbonne wing, or "soft liners,"
judged the performances of civilian government.
When civilian plans of action proved incapable of success
fully promoting economic development and ensuring domestic
peace, those with ESG training began to question the ability
of civilians to govern and grew increasingly confident of their
own political capabilities.

Their reliance on a strong central

government and efficient planning resulted in an orientation
to military intervention that was corrective in nature.

Accord

ing to the soft line assessment, the weak central government and
the confused, unproductive patterns of decision-making would
have to be modified and strengthened, if Brazil was to reach
its full potential.^

The ESG faculty and graduates felt that.

^Tbid., p. 178.
^The ESG shared the widely held opinion among Brazilians
that Brazil would inevitably become a world power, but it seems
they were convinced that this "inevitable" development needed
guidance and direction.
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given sufficient time, they could initiate these changes and
then restore civilian leadership.
The political and economic chaos of Goulart's final weeks
strengthened the determination, if not the confidence, of both
the hard line and Sorbonne wings.

Those in favor of permanent

political intervention justified their claims of civilian bank
ruptcy in terms of civil disorder and Goulart's attempts to
divide and control the military, while the adherents of the
ESG doctrine recognized the need for corrective measures, most
of which went far beyond the traditional functions of the poder
moderador.

The problem for the continuation of the traditional

patterns of civil-military relations was that, in addition to
exceeding the time limits imposed by the poder moderador on
military intervention, the character of military intervention
itself would be altered if either group was able to assert its
authority over the remainder of the armed forces.^

Rather than

intervening in order to uphold the rules of the political game
by acting as a corrective influence between conflicting forces.

Besides the linha dura and the Sorbonne wings of the Bra
zilian military, there was a large, third group known as the
"oscillating opinion" which fluctuated between the first two
groups on the question of military intervention in politics.
In certain circumstances its members favored prolonged military
involvement and in others they supported only the kind of mili
tary activity authorized by the poder moderador. Whichever
group, the hard line or the Sorbonnists, gaineïï control over
this group would obviously control the military and Brazil. For
a slight variation of this approach, see Jordan M. Young,
"Brazil," in Political Forces in Latin America, ed. by Ben G.
Burnett and Kenneth F Johnson (Belmont, California: Wadsworth
Publishing Company, I c., 1970), pp. 577-78.
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the military, acting under the guidance of either the linha
dura or Sorbonne wing, would be acting as an agent that would
seek to change those rules.
The military had become increasingly convinced that the
prolonged economic and political upheavals of the early nine
teen sixties were contributing to a security crisis.

Like many

of their Latin American counterparts, the Brazilian military
had come to envision national security "as entailing more than
conventional military operations.

Security came to be seen as

a part of a large economic, social, psychological, military
7

package."

By 1964 it appears the linha dura approached se

curity strictly in terms of restoring order by superimposing
O
military discipline on a chaotic, "hyperpoliticized" society.
Their simplistic argument was that the traditional social and
political structures could continue to function so long as the
newly mobilized political forces were brought under control.^
Order was extended the highest priority by the linha dura.
The Sorbonne wing, while stressing the need for order,
emphasized the necessity of viewing national security as a

7
Stepan and Einaudi, o p ♦ cit., p. 80.
O
Roett, op. cit., p. 21.
^Most of the goals desired by members of the linha dura
stressed order and the elimination of opposing forces. For
example, they felt if Congress impeded progress in restoring
order then Congress itself could be dissolved.
For a summary
of the goals of the linha dura, or authoritarian nationalists
as Stepan refers to them, see de Dubnic, o p . cit., p. 165 and
Stepan and Einaudi, op, cit., p. 115.
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matter of both maximizing the nation’s economic production and
minimizing all sources of cleavage and disunity within society.
To the Sorbonne, development and security were inseparable.
As a result, its members felt the old social and political in
stitutions had to be updated in order to deal with the threats
that underdevelopment and communism posed to the security of
Brazil.

Their rationale appears to have been that once the

political institutions had been wrested from the control of
the landed aristocracy and made responsive to the conditions
of underdevelopment, the military could then oversee a kind of
national development that would benefit most Brazilians, thereby
making communism a less attractive alternative.^^
So, by 1964 the majority of officers, whether of the hard
line or Sorbonne wing, who had been proud of their institution’s
ability to serve as a unifying force,

12

felt confident that their

It appears one may argue that the linha dura and the
Sorbonnists held contrasting interpretations of Brazil’s national
motto; Order and Progress.
For the linha dura, order received
priority over progress--progress was to take place only to the
extent order was assured. The Sorbonnists, on the other hand,
viewed order and progress as having a symbiotic relationship.
11

The Sorbonnists were concerned with communism.
Stepan
writes that during the height of the Cold War the ESG became
the center of counterrevolutionary strategies to meet the chal
lenges posed by the international ideological conflict.
Ini
tially, the Sorbonnists were not influential within the military
but as Brazil’s crisis deeped under Goulart, its doctrines of
total national planning and combatting internal warfare became
more relevant.
See Stepan and Einaudi, op. cit ., pp. 82, 84.
12

Johnson explains that with the fall of Pedro II there
were only two institutions that could serve to hold the nation
together: the church and the military. Because more factors
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institution could serve as a governing force.
This invigorated, although diversely based, confidence
on the part of the officers in their ability to govern was
supplemented by popular sentiment for the creation of a
"regime of exception" after the overthrow of Goulart.

Unlike

at any time in history before 1964, many significant political
sectors doubted the civilian regime enough to desire the in13
stallation of a military leader and a military regime.
Al
though such sentiments represented a radical departure from
traditional civil-military relations, it will be shown that
they were justified as "necessary to preserve the civilian
regime," a rather paradoxical bit of reasoning.
With the overthrow of Goulart the civilian consensus was
that only a prestigious military figure could carry out the
unpopular programs necessary to restore political and economic
stability and to guarantee the 1965 presidential elections.
Yet, in the final analysis public support for an interim mili
tary figure, who was to correct the political and economic
imbalances and then return the government to an elected civil
ian successor in 1965, was of limited significance.

Brazil

favored the military and it participated in Brazil’s national
development, most officers felt the military was the only insti
tution that could hold Brazil together. See Johnson, Military
and Society, p. 197. This confidence is clearly apparent in the
statement or one officer, who in speaking about the*military’s
ability to stave off civil war by confronting Goulart said, "What
we tried to do could only be done by the church or the military-and the church had no guns." "The Soldier as Reformer," News week, August 25, 1965, p. 45.
ISRichard Rose's definition and discussion of the concepts of
regime and authority are useful here.
See "Dynamic Tendencies in
the Authority of Regimes," World Politics, XXI (July,1969), p. 602.
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would most likely have had a military leader regardless of pub
lic opinion.

First, neither the linha dura nor the Sorbonne

wing any longer trusted the ability of civilians to solve the
problems confronting the n a t i o n . S e c o n d ,

sufficient time

remained in the unexpired term of former President Quadros
that the Constitution required Congress to elect an individual
to fulfill the unexpired portion.

In April, 1964 no presi

dential aspirant held a decisive edge on his competitors and
the military, already suspicious of the political allegiances
of some Congressmen, was uneasy over the prospect of a Congres
sional deadlock in trying to select a legal successor; such a
delay would have only tended to prolong Brazil's national
crisis.

Fortunately, public support for a military figure

made the forceful installation of such an individual unneces
sary; public support only rendered the military’s inevitable
assumption of power less illegitimate.
One of the most significant political sectors supporting
the election of a military man as interim President was a
group of seven state governors, including Magalhaes Pinto,
Adhemar de Barros, and Carlos Lacerda, all strong contenders
for the upcoming presidential elections.

15

Following Lacerda's

^'^Stepan, o p . cit. , p. 210.
^^These three men were described by Edward C. Burks as
the "prime candidates" for the presidential elections scheduled
for October 3, 1965. "Brazil's Red Hunt Aims at Congress,"
New York Times, April 7, 1964, p. 12.
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call for the election of a military man, these governors agreed
that a military man could be expected to govern with relative
impartiality while cleansing the political system of communists
and while presiding over the 1965 elections.

The governors

finally concurred that former Army Chief of Staff Marshall
Gastello Branco, an admired member of the Sorbonne Wing, could
best finish out the unexpired term of Quadros.
The governors’ selection of Gastello Branco was not founded
solely on selfless considerations.

In fact, one of their pri

mary considerations was that they felt that Gastello’s apolitical
character, which was repeatedly stressed by his proponents, would
be an adequate guarantee that the 1965 presidential elections
would be conducted as the constitution specified-

While there

is evidence to suggest the governors did not reach their deci
sion voluntarily or in i s o l a t i o n , o t h e r factors indicate that
at least two of these governors acted only to enhance their po
litical fortunes.

Both Pinto and de Barros had supported

Goulart, despite his policies which served to threaten civil
war, recognizing they had a vested interest in his remaining
in office as the best assurance that the elections would be
held as scheduled.

Only when it appeared that Goulart’s

actions might preclude their running for the presidency did

Edward G. Burks wrote that the governors’ meeting was
held under the threat that the military might clamp on a state
of seige if its anti-communist reforms were not enacted. This
threat had to have influenced the governors* decision to support
a military figure, even if only slightly.
’’Leaders of Coup
Press for Purge of Brazil’s Reds," New York Times, April 5,
1964, p. 1.
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they abandon him.

17

It is possible that the other governors

as well, with political ambitions of their own, may have con
cluded that further difficulties around a civilian president
might cause the military to intervene and cancel elections;
a disastrous development of this kind was probably viewed as
sufficient cause to support an "apolitical" military figure.
The 0 Estado de Sao Paulo, a leading Brazilian newspaper,
supported the inauguration of a military man because it claimed
18
Brazil needed a man with "no political connections."
The
Uni3^0 Carioca Femina (Union of Rio Women), instrumental in
organizing anti-Goulart rallies, specifically endorsed Gastello
for the presidency, because he was a general "without political
19
ties."
In addition, each of the foregoing endorsements in
cluded demands that the political system be cleansed of commu
nism and corruption.

After receiving assurances that the

October, 1965 elections would be held as scheduled, former
President Kubitschek supported the election of Gastello Branco.

20

With this broad basis of polixical support, Gastello’s
election by Gongress became a firm possibility.

Only a consti

tutional provision that prohibited a former military officer
1^Stepan, o p . cit., p. 200.
f^Editorial, 0 Estado de Sao Paulo, April 5, 1964 cited
in Stepan, op. cit., p. 211.
1^0 Estado de Sao Paulo, April 4, 1964 cited in Stepan,
op. cit., p. 212.
20see Schneider, Political System, p. 124 and Stepan,
op. cit., p. 220 for a supplementary description of Kubitschek's
part in supporting Gastello Branco.
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from becoming eligible for a political office for ninety days
following his retirement, had to be deleted or changed to make
Gastello "constitutionally” eligible for the presidency.

The

apparent spirit of cooperation between the military and civilian
sectors seemed to indicate that resistance to the removal of
such an obstacle would be minimal.
An Interim Military Regime is Assured
Just when it appeared that civilian support for a military
leader had heightened, the Revolutionary Supreme Command, created
by Marshall Costa e Silva in the early hours after Goulart's
departure, took steps which demonstrated that the military in
tended to cleanse the political system of all corrupt and sub
versive elements linked to the overthrown regime.

On April 7,

1964 the Ministers of War, Navy, and Air Force, who comprised
the Revolutionary Supreme Command, disclosed to congressional
leaders the broad outlines of an institutional act (ato
institucional) , which detailed how elected or appointed public
officials, suspected of corruption or subversion, might have
their political rights suspended for ten years by a process
called cassation Ccassacaol .

When leaders of the PTB, PSD,

and UDN demurred and responded with a mild, tentative congressional proposal,

21

the Revolutionary Command simply decreed the

21

Schneider argues that Congress favored a selective purg
ing given the mood and objectives of the revolution but it
did not favor the massive purge envisioned by the revolution.
Schneider, o p . cit., p. 125.
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First Institutional Act of April 9, 1964, leaving little doubt
that the Revolutionary Command, not Ranieri Mazzilli and Con
gress, was the body governing Brazil.

Largely the work of

Francisco Campos, the author of the 1937 Constitution, this
Act was to serve as the first sign that the military intended
to retain governmental power, with or without public support.
Institutional Act #1, by no means a new extra-constitutional
feature on the Brazilian legal landscape by which to wield po
litical power, boldly stated
. . . the Revolution does not seek to be legiti
mized by Congress.
It is the latter which re
ceives its legitimacy from this Institutional
Act, itself a result of the exercise of the Pop
ular Sovereignty inherent in all R e v o l u t i o n s . 22
Its authority derived from the moral force of the "revolution"
the Act contained nine major Articles:
I.

The Constitution of 1946 and its amendments ex
cept as modified by the Act', were "sustained."

II.

The President and Vice-President, whose man
dates were to terminate on January 31, 1966,
were to be elected by an absolute majority of
a roll call vote of the members of the National
Congress within two days of the promulgation of
the Act. To that end, this Article removed the
provision that military chiefs were ineligible
for the Presidency.

III. The President was given the power to initiate
Constitutional amendments; Congress was required

22

For a complete reprint of the First Institutional Act,
see E- Bradford Burns, A History of Brazil (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1970), pp. 390-93. William Busey explains
how "exceptional measures" quite like the Institutional Act
have been a part of Brazilian politics since the Regency (18311840).
"The Old and the New," pp. 61-63.
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to act on such proposals within thirty days
and to pass them by an absolute majority
rather than a two-thirds vote.
IV.

Congress was required to act within thirty
days on all legislation submitted by the Presi
dent. "If not so considered, such legislation
shall be deemed approved."

V.

The President was given exclusive authority to
initiate bills of finance, which the Congress
was not allowed to amend.

VI . The President was authorized by broadly ex
panded powers to declare a state of seige.
VII. Constitutional guarantees relating to job
security were suspended for six months; the
President and the State governors were ex
tended the power to dismiss public employees
who threatened the "security of the Nation,
the democratic way of life, and honesty in
public administration."
IX . The next regularly scheduled election was set
for October 3, 1965.
X.

The Supreme Command was empowered to suspend
the political rights of any citizen for ten
years and to cancel the mandates of elected
officials "in the interest of peace and national
honor." Upon assuming office, the President
was to inherit these powers which he could then
exercise for sixty d a y s . 23

This unilateral proclamation represented the first substantive
evidence that the military was more disposed to become a direc
tor of politics, instead of continuing to act as a moderator of
p o l i t i c s , A r t i c l e X was an obvious departure from the tradi
tional poder moderador because with it the military assumed a
political prerogative formerly exercised only by civilians.

25

23These are paraphrases of nine of the Act’s eleven articles.
2^Stepan, o p . cit., p. 124.
25The cancellation of mandates was common practice throughout
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Article II cleared the way for Gastello to become the "constitu
tionally" elected President of Brazil; once this formality was
passed he could assert a great deal of control over the decision
making process and the political activities of the political
system.
Institutional Act #1 had the effect of vastly strengthening
the powers of the chief executive, although Provisional Presi
dent Mazzilli did not exercise any of these powers.

Instead, for

several days the Supreme Command vigorously applied Article X
while most other governmental activities were held in abeyance.
The first list of cassations was issued on April 10; it con
tained the names of sixty persons, including former Presidents
Quadros and Goulart and more than forty members of Congress.
All of those whose political rights were "cassated" were denied
the right to vote (a provision of the 1946 Constitution that was
retained) or to hold an elective or appointive office for ten
years ; they were required, however, to pay taxes.
The primary objectives of the Supreme Command seemed to be
to "de-communize" and to "de-corruptize" the political system.

77

the Empire and more infrequently during the Republican era. Only
the selective nature of the Institutional Act was a departure from
tradition. See Busey, op. cit., pp. 77-78.
^^while it is generally agreed that 40 Congressmen were cas
sated, there is some disagreement as to the total number of indi
viduals whose rights were cancelled. Edward C. Burks wrote that
a total of 60 persons were cassated.
"Forty Congressmen Ousted
in Brazil," New York Times, April 11, 1964, p. 1. Dulles writes
there were one Hundred names on the first list of cassations.
See Unrest in Brazil, p. 358.
Z^These same words were used by the New York Times in assess-
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In applying the power of cassacao the Supreme Command acted as
both judge and jury.

The members of the Supreme Command estab

lished their own criteria in determining whose rights were to
be cassated and then ruled on the guilt or innocence of any
individual, but the exercise of these powers was not subject
to judicial review.

28

Under the guise of national security

many opponents or questionable supporters were either intimi
dated or removed from national political life.
On April 11, the day after the first round of cassations,
an intimidated Congress gave Castello Branco 361 of the 366
29
votes cast for the presidency; there were 72 abstentions. ‘
The fact that he was elected by a roll call vote was signifi
cant because the vote of each Congressman was placed in the
public record, thus enabling the Supreme Command to determine
which Deputies and Senators had abstained or had voted against
Castello.

These members could then be placed under close

scrutiny and perhaps later cassated for sufficient cause.

It

ing the intent of the Institutional Act. April 12, 1964, p. 4.
Later, the Castello Branco government announced that its aims
were to cleanse the nation of corruption and communism.
See
Ronald M. Schneider, James Daugherty, and James Rowe, eds.,
Brazil: Election Factbook, Number 2, o p . cit., p. 15.
2^0ne part of Article X reads: "The exercise of these
powers shall not be subject to judicial review." Burns, His
tory of Brazil, p. 393.
Z^The total number of votes totalled 438 (366 + 72 ab
stentions).
Since Congress was composed of 475 members at the
time of the revolution, apparently only 37 Congressmen were
cassated on April 10, instead of 40. Three ballots were cast
for Juarez Tavora and two for former President Dutra.
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seems this threat of cassation created a condition of deter
rence.

Many Congressmen probably voted for Castello only to

preserve their political rights.

For example, fifty-three

PTB Congressmen, who most likely would not have voted for
Castello in the absence of the threat of cassation, did vote
for him perhaps because they realized that as members of the
deposed President's party they would be highly suspect and
easily subject to cassation, if they appeared to be opposing
the military's efforts to end the persisting influence of
30
Vargas.
As Stepan suggests, the expulsion of a major group of
politicians from the political arena presented a dilemma to
the military.
On the one hand, if the military withdrew from
politics, these politicians could be expected to
re-enter politics strengthened by their years of
martyrdom and untarnished by the shortcomings of
those who had the responsibility for governing.
More importantly, the military assumed that these
men would be hostile to them. On the other hand,
if the military did not accept the inevitable re
turn of these politicians to politics and to
positions of power, the military would have to
retain power themselves or stay in readiness in
the wings to enforce their veto.31
The Supreme Command had perhaps unwittingly produced a situa
tion that would require prolonged, if not permanent, military
30

Schneider explains that the Revolutionary Supreme Com
mand was determined not to repeat the "mistake of 1954" when
the Vargas forces emerged scarcely weakened by the 1954 coup.
They wanted to remove all corrupt and subversive elements linked
to the overthrown regime.
Schneider, op. cit., p. 124.
31
* Stepan, o p . cit., p. 224.
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intervention.

It appears the intricacies of this dilemma

were not sufficiently appreciated by the Supreme Command,
otherwise they would not have permitted the election of
Castello Branco, a Sorbonnist dedicated to a swift return
to constitutional normalcy.

As the ramifications of the cassa

tions became more evident, a tension would develop between the
Sorbonne wing, led by Castello, and the linha dura.
With the cassations already posing potential problems,
the armed forces purged many high-ranking officers who had
hesitated to support the March 31 coup or who had remained
loyal to Goulart throughout his difficulties.

While the purge

affected only a small proportion of the officer corps, it was
to result in a built-in obstacle to military withdrawal from
politics.

In most instances middle level officers (captains

and majors) had acted vigorously to purge colonels and junior
generals by having them transferred from active duty to reserve
status, which was the equivalent of retirement.

If reinstated,

which probably would have been the case when a civilian govern
ment assumed power (ostensibly by the 1965 presidential elec
tions) , these purged officers would then pose a threat to the
very institutional unity the Supreme Command was trying to
restore; undoubtedly, many of the purged officers would seek
revenge against their lower ranking comrades, if given the

32

Ibid., p. 225. The author explains that any successful
extrication strategy required coming to terms with the politi
cal and military forces previously banned.
In the absence of
recognition of this problem, extrication would be difficult.
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opportunity.
The Revolutionary Supreme Command, in acting to consoli
date the new regime and to initiate a housecleaning of the
forces that rallied to or failed to confront Goulart, laid the
groundwork for long-term military involvement in politics,
something that it failed to understand or refused to admit.
Castello Branco: The First President o£ the "Revolution"
In the formative stages of the First Institutional Act
Castello Branco and other moderates had attempted to soften
the hard line views of Francisco Campos and Carlos Madeiro
da Silva, the two men who actually wrote the Act.

When the

Act was decreed, however, it was evident the hard line opin
ions had prevailed in most cases, especially in getting the
period of deprivation of political rights raised from five to
ten years.

Castello, who favored a strong but less authori

tarian position, inherited powers more suited to an advocate
of the hard line views.
As a graduate and former faculty member of the ESG and
a participant in the Brazilian Expeditionary Force in Italy

33

The group of purged officers posed another kind of
problem.
Being specialists in the art of violence, many of
these officers found themselves underemployed and often be
came available to movements attempting to disrupt the mili
tary regime. Their inability to transfer military skills,
along with their resentment, was to cause the regime problems
in succeeding years. See Stepan, o p . cit., p. 225.
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during World War

Castello Branco was generally regarded

as a "soft line" officer.

Like most Sorbonne officers, he

believed it was essential to come to grips with the structural
problems of Brazil's political and social system.

Unlike the

linha dura elements, who felt subversion and corruption were
the fundamental problems and who traced all social ills to
"bad" individuals, Gastello's background led him to believe
that institutional weaknesses were more responsible for polit
ical instability than was the absence of extraordinary public
f i g u r e s . P a r t s of his inaugural speech reflected his per
ception of military intervention as being more of a short-term
•tfi

corrective function than a protracted punitive function.
First, he acknowledged his doctrinal responsibilities:
"I will preserve with honor and loyalty the Constitution of

^ Stepan writes that the FEB's participation in World War
II provided its members with a powerful socialization exper
ience.- Because of that experience, its members tended to be
favorably inclined toward the United States and its example of
democracy. Another characteristic of its participants was that
they disliked anything that seemed to them to be narrow, un
realistic, emotional nationalism.
Ibid., pp. 242-44.
35

The linha dura argued that Brazil lacked this kind of
public figures and" that what was needed to fill the void were
disinterested, virtuous military leaders, not more selfseeking civilians.
Schneider, o p . cit., p. 143.
36it seems that Gastello's inaugural pledges have to be
understood as sincere promises and that primarily because of
subsequent confrontations with the linha ^ r a did it become
necessary to modify his positions.
His background and serious
disposition caused most observers to conclude that his term
would be marked by "unspectacular seriousness." None expected
him to develop political ambitions.
See New York Times, April
6, 1964, p. 11 and New York Times, April 13, 1964, p. 5.
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Brazil, including the Institutional Act that is a part of it.”
It seems that by professing his loyalty to both the Constitu
tion and the Institutional Act, Castello was accepting the
expanded executive powers with the understanding that some of
these powers were subject to time limitations and that when
these powers did expire he would revert to the powers extended
to his office by the Constitution.

With regard to his tenure

of office, as spelled out by the Institutional Act, and the
succession of office he said, "My behavior shall be that of
a head of State who will harbor no hesitations in the process
to elect a Brazilian to whom I shall transfer my office on
January 31, 1966."

This passage does not in any way indicate

Castello feared the prospect of a civilian succeeding him; it
has to be understood to mean that he would surrender his office
to the candidate receiving the most votes in a direct election
held on October 3, 1965.

The Institutional Act had done nothing

to modify the direct election of the President, provided for by
the Constitution, though it did entitle military personnel to
pursue elective office.

Therefore, it was conceivable that a

military officer might defeat his civilian rivals in the popular,
presidential elections, but such a victory would presumably be
the result of voter preference, not special advantage.
None of the preceding comments are meant to imply that
Castello had no reservations about the fitness of civilians
to govern.

His March 20, 1964 memorandum expressed his con

cern over the common practice of some politicians who sought
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to rebuke political parties and to substitute for them "juntas
dominated by communists and who, to the horror of the law,
insolently look to bring pressure on the powers of the Republie by union coercion through strikes and strike threats."

37

In order to avoid syndicalism and end the practice of faction
alism, which he felt resulted in the kind of divisiveness of
which communism thrived, Castello promised to be the President
of all Brazilians, "not the head of a faction."
His inaugural address rejected reactionary, right-wing
measures for dealing with communism.

Instead, he called for

"economic development through moral, educational, material
and political elevation."

It was not clear if the "moral

elevation" referred to by Castello was the same as the
"moralization of institutions," or the judging of corrupt
officials and the seizure of illicit gains, that War Minister'
?O
Costa e Silva had requested on April 11.
One thing was
clear: Castello, like the linha dura,

recognized that the

problems of corruption and subversion posed a special kind
of threat to the nation, but unlike the hard line's pleas for
punitive action, the new President apparently felt it was fund
amentally .more important to remove the conditions that facili
tated corruption and subversion.

While some public officials

37
lanni, o p . cit., p. 138.
^^See Edward C. Burks, "Castello Chosen in Brazil," New
York Times, April 12, 1964, p. 4.
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would have to be dismissed, he felt it was essential to en
courage officials to have a larger purpose in public office
than personal gain.
Upon his inauguration Castello enjoyed the confidence
of nearly all political sectors.

His Cabinet, although it

did not necessarily represent particular civilian or military
groups, has been labelled as "centrist conservative.""^^

The

members of the Cabinet (eleven civilians and five military
figures) as well as the Branco Administration in general,
shared the common attribute of holding an intellectual commit
ment to an ideal form of democracy.

As one author writes,

"though they tended to see political debate as an obstacle
rather than an intrinsic part of the process of democracy,
nonetheless they believed their goal was an ideal democracy.
At times the Administration's attachment to "ideal democracy"
resulted in the adoption of policies that tended to blur the
distinctions between themselves and the linha dura.
Perhaps feeling compelled to cleanse the political system
of subversive and corrupt figures in order to ensure that
steady progress toward the goal of "ideal democracy" was not
to be jeopardized, the Castello Branco government continued in

39

Castello tried to set an example for all public officials
to follow. He was the first President to ever declare all of
his personal wealth prior to entering the presidency.
See "The
Road Back," Time, April 24, 1964, p. 24.
^^Schneider, o p . cit., p. 132.
^^Stepan, o p . cit., p. 234.
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the direction indicated by the Revolutionary Supreme Command
and its Institutional Act.

Under Article X, which detailed

cassacao, some 400 people, including former President Kubits
chek, had their political rights suspended before Castello
allowed this discretionary power to expire on June 15, 1964.
All 400, with the exception of Kubitschek, who was the target
of an adverse publicity campaign orchestrated by the linha
dura to discredit him, were the victims of charges brought in
secret before a panel of officers and civilians, which pre
sented their recommendations to the President.

No defense was

p e r m i t t e d . B y June 15, 1964 forty-four Federal Deputies had
had their political rights cancelled, leaving about 8 percent
of the nation’s voters without congressional representation.
A newly created agency, Comissao Geral de Investigacoes
(General Investigations Commission), was authorized to conduct
investigations of governmental operations during the Goulart
era.

Reports of this commission's findings, which generally

reflected an anti-Vargas and anti-Goulart bias, were sent to
the President for final action.

When Article VII of the First

Institutional Act expired in October, 1964, nearly 9,000 pub-

^^Ronald M. Schneider, "Interim Regime in Brazil," Cur
rent History, XLIX (December, 1965), 352.
^^On this point the military regime was severely criti
cized. The Brazilian Council of Bishops issued a memorandum
that demanded that Brazilians be given the "sacred right of
defense." See "Seeds of Injustice?" Time, June 12, 1964, p. 50
'^^"Quest for Moderation," Newsweek, April 27, 1964, p. 59
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lie employees had been dismissed on charges of national security
violations or corruption.
In the months succeeding the March 31 coup some extremes
were notable, but Gastello's demands for moderation and ra
tionality prevented widespread abuse of governmental power.
The new President was deeply committed to moderate reforms,
and not to reactionary measures, within the limits of the Con
stitution and the Institutional Act.

To the chagrin of the

linha dura he dutifully permitted Article VII and Article X
to lapse on their specified dates despite demands by the hard
line that they be extended.

Succumbing to the realization that

his government could not complete its economic and electoral
reforms in the time allotted by the Institutional Act, Castello
did, however, allow his term of office to be extended from
January 31, 1966 to March 15, 1967 by a Constitutional amend
ment of July 22, 1964.^^

It is significant to note that it

was Congress, not Castello Branco or the military, which pro
posed this amendment; it was attached by conservative Congressmen to an electoral reform bill initiated by the President.

47

‘‘
^^Schneider, "Interim Regime," 352.
46xhis development seems to have represented a partial
triumph for that part of the military command which felt the
revolutionary command should have staked out a five year period
of office rather than the 22-month term the Institutional Act
outlined. Juan de Onis, "Brazilian Regime Rebuke Lacerda,"
New York Times, April 19, 1964, p. 24. Shortly after his term
was extended", Castello began to use a familiar analogy: that
Brazil was in a long, dark tunnel and needed to move as quickly
as possible toward the light. See "A View from the Tunnel,"
The Economist, October 17, 1964, p. 254.
47"More Time: Election Postponed," Time, July 24, 1964,
p. 36.
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In public Castello only very reluctantly accepted the fourteen
month addition to his term; most Brazilians, except the major
presidential contenders, accepted the postponement of the
presidential elections with indifference.

48

With the Castello Branco Administration displaying little
interest in public opinion and more concern with balancing the
extreme proposals of the linha dura, 1964 closed without much
sign of renovation or reform.

The government was beginning to

experience an erosion of public support.

The anti-inflation

economic policies began to evoke hostile reactions once their
effects were felt.

Federal interventores, sent by the govern

ment to replace state and local officials who had been dis
missed under Article VII, were a constant source of tension.
It was not until the middle of 1965, when the government im
posed restrictions on political party activities, that the
strongest supporters of the "revolution" turned against it.
Acts of Political Reform: Signs of Tension
Throughout 1964 Castello Branco had frequently expressed
his dissatisfaction over the manifest weaknesses of the polit
ical party system and the defects in the electoral process.
As early as May, 1964 he called for, but did not initiate,
legislation establishing strict controls over the influences
of economic power and political patronage on the electoral

48
de Dubnic, o p . cit., p. 18.
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process.

49

It was not until July 15, 1965 that these reforms

became law in the form of the Ineligibilities Act, the Polit
ical Party Statute, and the Electoral Code.

Despite initial

assessments that the reforms would favor wider and more effec
tive political participation,^^ these laws tended to resist
such an expansion.

All of these reforms permitted more effec

tive, centralized control over the electoral process.
ing to Roett:

Accord

"These represented the first substantive revisions

of the pre-1964 political rules of the game.
The Electoral Code, which automatically became law when
Congress failed to consider it within the thirty day deadline
specified by the First Institutional Act, attempted to reduce
the number of political parties by fashioning exacting stan
dards that the parties had to maintain if they were to retain
legal status.

5

2

'

It attempted to increase party responsibility

by abolishing party alliances and to improve party discipline
by requiring voters to select legislators from the same party.
Politicians were now required to be residents of the state

For a discussion of one dimension of Brazil's political
patronage, see Lawrence S. Graham, Civil Service Reform in
Brazil : Principles vs. Practice (Austin: University of Texas
Press, monograph #l3, 1968), pp. 125-39.
^^Schneider, "Interim Regime," 353.
^^Roett, op. cit., p. 31.
c2

For a list of the requirements the political parties werî
expected to maintain, see "Detribalizing Politics," Time,
July 23, 1965, p. 32.
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they sought to represent.

The running mates of successful

gubernatorial and presidential candidates were automatically
elected, thereby making it impossible for a President, say
of the UDN, to be elected with a Vice-President of the PTB
as had happened in 1960.

Consistent with the ESG analysis

of the old multi-party system, regarding its detrimental
defects, this code ensured greater order in the electoral
process and gave electoral courts expanded supervisory powers
over internal party affairs.

The possible abuse of such ex

panded supervision was not to become apparent until the
gubernatorial elections in October, 1965.
The Political Party Statute, passed by Congress but
restored to almost its original form by the President,

55

es

tablished procedures for the organization of new political
parties.

It included residency requirements and a provision

prohibiting an individual from running for more than one of
fice; both were intended to tie a candidate more closely to
his constituency.

Other provisions were designed in theory

to abolish the practice of favoritism and nepotism by the
party hierarchy and to permit the infusion of individuals who
had been discriminated against by party leaders.

On this point,

it appears this statute attempted to foster wider participation.
While a great deal of importance was attached to grass roots
politics and civil education to free the parties of traditional

S5

For a discussion of how the President exercised a kind of
item veto, see Schneider, Political System, p. 158.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

72

party control, no adequate mechanisms of implementation were
provided.As

a result, old party leaders would continue

as dominant forces in local politics.
The Ineligibilities Act, like the Electoral Code, auto
matically became law due to Congressional inaction.

Somewhat

unlike the other two measures, this act contained reactionary
overtones: several of its provisions aimed to deny candidacy
to former Cabinet Ministers of the Goulart Administration, as
well as leading anti-regime politicians.^^

Those who had

heretofore sided with the "revolution" in the pursuit of its
political reform goals strenuously objected.
Upon the Act's submission for congressional approval,
Carlos Lacerda, whose support had been instrumental in Castello's election, denounced the bill as "bad, narrow, hypo
critical, judicially wrong, politically wrong, morally wrong-another error of the r e v o l u t i o n . T h e s e caustic remarks,
the first sign of estrangement between Lacerda and the "rev
olutionary government," were typical of the protests that
erupted in response to the provision that denied candidacy
to those who had allegedly compromised "the normalcy of an

It is possible that since this was the only statute
passed by Congress that the exclusion of an implementary mech
anism was a deliberate oversight by that body, since many of
its members stood to lose their strong party positions if
such a device had been provided.
55
Roett, op. cit., p. 31.
^^"Laying the Ground Rules," Time, July 2, 1965, p. 31.
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élection through abuse of economic power, act of corruption,
or improper use of the powers of public office."

57

Former

Minister of Transportation, Helio de Almeida, and ex-Finance
Minister, Sebastiao Paes de Almeida, both leading contenders
in the gubernatorial races in their states, were specifically
singled out by the Act and denied candidacy by the electoral
courts.
Unpopular decisions handed down by the newly empowered
electoral courts only tended to heighten the mounting protests
against federal intervention in state and local government.
Federal intervention, in the form of military tribunals which
judged the fitness of politicians and administrators in the
states of Ceara and Goias in late 1964, drew widespread
criticism, especially toward Gastello Branco.
In the case of Ceara, four legislators were arrested by
a general of the linha dura on charges of communist subversion;
when Gastello ordered that they be released, the general, who
now had the backing of War Minister Costa e Silva, refused and
a stalemate ensued.

There were open discussions amongst offi

cers about a coup against the President until the state legis
lature revoked the legislators* immunity, thus making it legal
58
for the military to arrest them. ,

c

Act.

Many began to ask who was

n

This is a translated excerpt from the Ineligibilities
See Schneider, Political System, p. 180.
CO

y

For a brief explanation of the events in Ceara, see
"A Hard Line," Time, December 4, 1964, p. 40.
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in charge, the moderate Gastello or the linha dura?

If Gas

tello was in charge, they wondered, why had he not prevented
such an abuse of power against democracy.
In the state of Goias the Supreme Court granted a writ
of habeas corpus to governor Mauro Borges, who had been
imprisoned in the wake of what had come to be called "the
Ceara Solution."

His crime had been his refusal to dismiss

members of his staff whom the military tribunals had denounced
as communists.

Gastello, sworn to uphold the Constitution but

perhaps realizing his political life depended on reaching a
compromise with the linha dura, ordered the officers concerned
to obey the Court's decision but sustained Borges’ removal
from office, which was precisely what the linha dura wanted.
On the surface it appeared Gastello was deviating from his
pledge not to rely on reactionary, right-wing reforms; more
epithets were hurled in his direction.
In May, 1965 Gastello once again upheld a Supreme Court
decision when he ordered the release of Miguel Arraes, the
governor of Pernambuco who had been arrested thirteen months
earlier on charges of subversion.

59

Seeming to proclaim his

dominance over the right-wing investigating commissions and
the linha dura, he ordered all inquiries into the Goulart
Administration completed as soon as possible.

Arrests imme

diately tapered off but the damage to Gastello’s credibility

^^’’A Hard Blow to the Hard Line," Time, April 30, 1965 ,
p. 46.
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was already done: even while expressing his determination to
promote a swift return to d e m o c r a c y , m a n y Brazilians regarded
him as indecisive and as incapable of controlling the linha
dura.
Inevitably, Gastello’s policy decisions pleased no one-neither the moderates and leftists, who complained about his
muffling of politics, nor the conservative civilians and the
linha dura which scoffed at his loyalty to democracy.

The

austere economic-recovery policies of Finance Minister Roberto
Campos continually served as a cause of government unpopularity,
In fact, de Dubnic suggests that much of the anti-government
activity during this time stemmed more from dissatisfaction
with economic policies than from political repression.
Campos' diagnosis of Brazil's economic woes was similar
to those of the Goulart Administration, but the new team's
steadfast determination to fully implement its essentially
technocratic solutions offered a sharp contrast to its prede
cessors.

The new finance team's policies of restoring a high

economic growth rate by encouraging international financial
assistance was opposed by those deeply committed to economic
nationalism; efforts to reduce inflation by freezing wages

Gastello consistently expressed his intention to re
tain the participant-representative institutions of Brazil
despite demands by the hard line that they be closed. He was
on record on numerous occasions as being opposed to any moves
that smacked of police-statism.
See Milan J. Kubic, "Brazil's
Adroit New Leader," The Reporter, December 17, 1964, p. 22.
bide Dubnic, o p . cit., p. 165.
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and by controlling credit met with opposition from both labor
and the producing sectors.

As one presidential aide was

quoted as saying to an American scholar, "Now we know how your
State Department people felt after the first year of the Alli
ance for Progress.

All we've earned for a year of hard work

are brickbats and h o w l s . T h e

effectiveness and the corres

ponding unpopularity of his administration’s economic policies
seemed to substantiate claims that Gastello Branco appeared
more concerned with solutions than with public opinion and
"theatricized results
Reviewing the first year of the "revolution," the Diario
de Noticias observed:
. . . The Revolution’s Institutional Act has
been used, sometimes rather indiscriminately,
for punitive aims. The President said in one
of his speeches that the revolution was not
exclusively for punishing. But this is the
impression some observers have. The visible
aspect of the revolution has been a nearly
daily spectacle of purges and sanctions.
Suspension of some Constitutional guarantees
gave rise to demonstrations of hate, to small
personal revenges inspired by envy and resent
ments
62por a brief explanation of President Branco’s policies
of economic austerity and their effect on the various economic
sectors,see Schneider, Political System, pp. 149-72.
63"Year End Report," Newsweek, April 12, 1965, p. 63.
his eulogy to Gastello Branco, Roberto Gampos said of
him: "He had an aversion to easy promises and theatricized re
sults. He deeply dreaded creating false hopes in the people. He
preferred to accustom the people to the discipline of truth."
Also see "Brazil: The Price of Unpopularity," Time, July 28,
1967, p. 30.
65Editorial, Diario de Noticias cited by Leonard Gross in
"South America’s Moment of Truth," Look, March 23, 1965, p. 42.
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While the reference to "a nearly daily spectacle of purges"
might overstate the case against political repression, this
summary draws attention to the increased middle-class disen
chantment with the "revolution."

Economic and political

recovery under the direction of the military had become in
creasingly difficult to tolerate as time progressed.
The Elections of October, 1965: Pursuit of Electoral "Normalcy"
Encouraged by the victory of a pro-government candidate
in the mayoral election in Sao Paulo in March, 1965, Gastello
Branco decided to push forth in his campaign to guarantee
scheduled elections as a step toward the maintenance of the
participant-representative features of the regime.
Despite references by the linha dura to several violent
uprisings which this group claimed were indicative of a largescale, subversive threat to national s e c u r i t y , G a s t e l l o and
his Cabinet continued to assure the nation that the October,
1965 gubernatorial elections would be held, in spite of the
dangers to which the government might be exposed.

Justice

Minister Milton Campos assured Brazil, "The government wants
elections.

It wants them clean, authentic, democratic and it

will promote them with full guarantees of liberty."

f\ A

The fact that one of these
an ex-officer who had been purged
tizes what Stepan has .referred to
military skills" (see footnote 33

f\7

The

violent uprisings was led by
by the military in 1964 drama
as the "nontransferability of
of this chapter).

Year After," Time, April 2, 1965, p. 36.
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President appeared a bit more appreciative of the dangers in
herent in conducting elections in the midst of the widespread
government unpopularity.

With reference to the gubernatorial

elections he stated, "Democracy always takes a c h a n c e . O n
another occasion he was quoted as saying that the revolution
was "not afraid of the ballot box.

But just to make certain

the possibility of a major government defeat was minimized,
Branco had earlier secured the passage of a constitutional
amendment that would more fully guarantee that "corrupt" or
"subversive" elements would be prevented from returning to
power.

Congress, apparently convinced of the chief executive’s

commitment to democratic procedures, overwhelmingly approved
70
the amendment.
Armed with this constitutional amendment, the
Ineligibilities Act, and control over the electoral courts, the
government sought to deny candidacy to individuals that the
President found undesirable.
It soon became evident that in the major states, where the
elections were of national significance, the initial nominees,
of the PTB and the PSD, the parties identified with Vargas and
Goulart (and therefore corruption and communism), were undesir
able.

First, the PTB nominee for the governorship of Guanabara,

^^"The Soldier as Reformer," Newsweek, August 23, 1965,
p. 45.
69»'Eyeing A New System," Time, September 3, 1965, p. 41.
70por a breakdown of the voting on the military’s pro
posal to curb political opposition, see Schneider, Political
System, p. 154.
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Helio de Almeida, was denied candidacy under the Ineligibilities
Act.

Then, retired Army Marshall

Texeira Lott was denied the

same nomination for failing to meet the residency requirements
71
set forth in the reform acts.
Frustrated and perhaps aware
of the strong possibility of the PTB-PSD victory, the PTB
joined with the PSD in supporting Francisco Negrao de Lima.
Next, Sebasiâ'o Paes de Almeida, nominated for the governor
ship of Minas Gerais by the PSD, was charged with "abuse of
economic power" and his candidacy cancelled under the Ineligi
bilities Act.

Israel Pinheiro, a Kubitschek protege, succeeded

Almeida for the, PSD nomination.
In the other nine states holding gubernatorial elections
the government exercised less discretion in determining the
candidacy of its opponents.

But governmental interference in

Guanabara had caused a further erosion of popular support
throughout Brazil.

Rising unemployment, increased taxes, the

government’s harsh treatment of its opponents became important
election issues.

72

The October 3 elections demonstrated that direct elections
are extremely hazardous for a "revolutionary" government which

71

Because Lott had become disenchanted with the "revolu
tion" and had labelled it on many occasions as being "undemo
cratic," many felt the military would have to trump up some
charges to deny his candidacy. But this became unnecessary when
it was discovered Lott was in violation of residency require
ments.
See "Eyeing a New System," Time, o p . cit., p. 41.
72
Schneider, Political System, p. 164. Also, see Brazil;
Election Factbook, Ho. 2, o p . ciTJ, pp. 24-25.
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tries to wrench political power away from traditional ruling
elites while it is advancing the cause of economic austerity
and political reform.

In Guanabara, Negrao de Lima received

nearly 52 percent of the vote,

71

dealing a crushing blow to

both his UDN opponent, Flexa Ribeiro, and Carlos Lacerda,
who had staked his presidential ambitions on a victory by
Ribeiro.

Immediately after the election Lacerda resigned his

UDN presidential nomination.

In Minas Gerais, Israel Pinheiro

defeated his UDN rival with 55 percent of the vote and under
mined the political fortunes of yet another presidential aspi
rant, Magalhaes Pinto.

In both instances the influence of

Juscelino Kubitschek, whose cassacao had proved to be an
unpopular move, was regarded as decisive.
Of the eleven states that held elections, pro-government
candidates, usually members of the UDN, emerged victorious in
five s t a t e s . C o n s i d e r i n g the adverse circumstances under
which the elections were conducted, supporters of the regime
tried to make the case that government-sponsored candidates
had not fared too badly.

The linha dura, on the other hand,

interpreted the victory of candidates identified with Kubits
chek as a defeat of the ideals of the 1964 election.

Its

73

For a summary of the election results for all eleven
states, see Brazil: Election Factbook, No. 2, op. cit., pp.
90-91.
^^The government's candidates won governorships in the
states of Goias, Maranhao, Para, Paraiba, and Parana. The
ubernatorial election in the state of Algoas was so close
here had to be a run-off election, which the pro-government
candidate finally won.

f
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members had opposed these elections from the beginning on the
ground that the antagonisms caused by Gastello’s policies of
economic austerity would result in the election of non
revolutionary or anti-revolutionary politicians who would
75
threaten the advance of the "revolution."
The results in
Guanabara and Minas Gerais tended to confirm these fears.
Hard line fears over the symbolic resurrection of pre
revolutionary politics were compounded when Kubitschek ended
his self-imposed, sixteen-month exile and returned to Brazil
to a hero's welcome.

Their fears turned to anger when Gastello

announced his intention to uphold the elections, despite his
administration's and the "revolution's" apparent setbacks.

7A

Fearing the President had abandoned the "revolution," on
October 5 members of the linha dura placed the First Army,
stationed outside Rio de Janeiro, on alert to move against him.
Talk of a coup against Gastello abounded.

Into this super

charged atmosphere stepped War Minister Costa e Silva, who
reassured the officers of the First Army; "You must trust
your commanders.

They are as revolutionary as you are."

77

He

7Sxjiis is Stepan's analysis of the hard line's objection to
the elections. If correct, it reflects a curious bit of reason
ing by the linha dura because it tends to ignore the impact that
the revolution's policies of political repression may have had
on the elections.
Cassations alone were nearly as unpopular as
the revolution's economic policies. See Stepan, op. cit., p. 225
and Schneider, Political System, p. 161.
76The
tories and
with voter
tion. See

Gastello Branco Administration maintained that PSD vic
UDN defeats at the state level should not be equated
endorsement or repudiation of the national administra
Brazil: Election Factbook, No. 2, op. cit., p. 91.

77"The Other Barrel," Time, November 12, 1965, p. 46.
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did not specify whether by "commanders" he was referring to
the members of the Revolutionary Supreme Command, of which the
President was not a member, or to the military hierarchy in
general, of which Gastello was the commander-in-chief.

The

distinction is important because, it will be recalled, in the
exercise of the poder moderador historically it had been the
War Ministers who had judged the legality of presidential acts;
in this case, if the three Ministers, who had become members of
the Supreme Command, decided a presidential action was not con
sistent with "revolutionary" principles, they could direct the
armed forces to oust Gastello Branco.

78

The situation was

further confused by the fact that Gastello had acquired wide
spread respect as an officer and so there was a question of
how many officers would remain loyal to him regardless of the
War Ministers’ judgment.

Unity within the armed forces was

essential, if action against a President was to be successful.
After meeting with President Gastello Branco, presumably
to judge the President’s dedication to "revolutionary" prin
ciples, Costa e Silva emerged and announced to the younger,
more conservative officers;
I guarantee to you, my young commanders,
that we know where we are going. The present

78

It appears the President was no longer required to act
"within the limits of the law" because it is not clear that by
assuming power the military as an institution was acting within
the law. Legality was secondary to the principles of the "rev
olution."
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chiefs are as revolutionary as the young com
manders.
I guarantee to you we will not turn
back.79
The reference to *'we” seems to indicate that Costa e Silva had
concluded that Gastello was sufficiently revolutionary to con
tinue to lead the "revolution" along with the Supreme Command.
There is no evidence the other two Ministers of the Supreme
Command participated in the assessment of Gastello’s "revolu
tionary" character, suggesting Costa e Silva alone acted as the
QQ

pivotal force that saved the President from expulsion.
Besides expressing ideals that must have coincided with
Costa e Silva's perception of "revolutionary" ideals. Presi
dent Branco agreed to strengthen the powers of the executive
office in order to reinvigorate the "revolution" by decreeing
a second institutional act, if necessary.

81

With this assur-

79

Stepan, op. cit ., p. 256. Costa e Silva had never been
regarded as an advocate of the linha dura opinion, but rather
as a mediator between the hard line and the Sorbonnists. His
activities in this crisis seemed to indicate he was moving
progressively toward the hard line. Ronald Chilcotte deftly
anticipated this development.
See "Suppressing the Future,"
Nation, November 23, 1964, p. 370.
80

This is significant because it represented a vast con
centration of power in determining the application of the poder
moderador, itself a dangerous precedent. Stepan suggests that
while Costa e Silva could have undoubtedly led a coup against
Gastello Branco, the Marshall preferred another route to the
presidency.
Stepan, op. cit., p. 257.
^^After this arrangement was made, it became necessary to
decree such an act. Several authors have suggested that had
Gastello failed to issue the Second Institutional Act, it may
well have cost him the presidency.
See Brazil: Election Factbook Supplement, No. 2, edited by Ronald Schneider (Washington,
D.C.: Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems,
November, 1966), p. 3.
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ance, continued military obedience of the President was guaran
teed, but Gastello still faced civilian opposition to his
decision to uphold the.elections.
Carlos Lacerda, the bête noire of Brazilian politics,
demanded the elections be annulled.

His support for the

’’revolution" had previously been tempered by what he felt
would most fully benefit his own political advantages.

As

soon as the Branco government acted in a manner that endan
gered his chances of being elected President, Lacerda first
criticized and then condemned the "revolution."

His guberna

torial candidate soundly defeated and the momentum of public
sentiment now squarely behind Kubitschek, Lacerda lashed out
when he learned the election results would be enforced:
The army should declare that the revolution
has ended. The revolution no longer exists.
It doesn’t exist because it was betrayed.
President Gastello Branco assumed power in the
name of the army.
I ask if the army agrees
with what he has done and what he is d o i n g .
The implication of these remarks was that because the Supreme
Command, of course, did not agree with the President’s decision
regarding the called elections it should instruct the armed
forces to remove Gastello and replace him with an individual
who would annul the elections.

This done, Lacerda’s political

fortunes would have been restored to their pre-election levels.
However, his call for action against the President received
little serious attention.

One result was that Lacerda was forced

^^’’Answer for a Critic," Time, October 22, 1965 , p. S3
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into the opposition camp and no longer remained a troublesome
critic within the "revolution."
Schneider suggests that the Gastello Branco government
actually preferred the defeat of Lacerda's and Pinto's handpicked candidates.

His argument is that both men had become

liabilities to the revolution and that the government forces
felt individuals of the opposition could be counted on to seek
an accommodation with the regime and cause fewer problems than
83
the politically ambitious, "revolutionary" governors.
If
this was the case, it appears the Branco forces badly misjudged
the impact that such opposition victories would have on the
linha dura.
Having promised Costa e Silva that he would initiate inter
nal control legislation, Gastello requested that Congress adopt
measures that called for (1) the institution of a parliamentary
system or a hybrid system greatly enhancing the powers of the
executive, (2) the incorporation into the Constitution of those
provisions of the Institutional Act requiring prompt Congressional
action on presidential proposals and those granting the President
expanded legislative discretion, and (3) the expansion of the
jurisdiction of military courts in matters of national security.
He also proposed that the membership of the Supreme Court be
raised from eleven to sixteen justices and called for the re
establishment of the government's right to suspend political

^^See Schneider, Political System, pp. 163, 169.
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rights.

Congress refused to ’’consider" these groposals despite

pleas by the new Justice Minister, Juracy Magalhaes, to adopt
"such apparently undemocratic measures to save democracy."

84

On October 27, 1965, less than a month after the guberna
torial elections, Brazil awoke to the promulgation of the
Second Institutional Act.

Its contents seemed to make it

clear that the linha dura had exacted a high price for permit
ting Gastello Branco to remain in office, but as Schneider
points out:
. . . Although the issuance of such an act was
forced upon Gastello by the hard liners, he had
retained substantial control over its specific
content, and would determine its applications.®^
Institutional Act #2 sustained the 1946 Gonstitution and
its amendments, except as modified by the Act.

The general

outlines of all the measures earlier proposed to Gongress found
expression.

The Supreme Gourt, which had served as the last

holdout against the more flagrant unconstitutional actions of
the revolution, was revitalized: the membership was increased
and the President was empowered to dismiss and appoint members
at will, thus offsetting the existing majority of judges ap
pointed by Kubitschek and Goulart and assuring the regime of
a reliable majority in all cases.

Military courts were extended

84

ibid., p. 171.
It is significant to note that Magalheas
became Justice Minister only after Roberto Campos resigned
because of his opposition to the increased prospects of uncon
stitutional moves by the military regime.
^^Ibid., p. 172.
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exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving national security.
The power of cassation was renewed and further restrictions
were placed on those whose rights had been cancelled.

When

deemed ’'necessary to preserve the social and political order,"
one of these individuals could be placed under house arrest
or prohibited from visiting certain places.

They were pro

hibited from participating in union elections and "political
activity.
The other, more significant, measures of the Act included:
1. Article IX provided for the election of the
President. "The National Congress meeting in
public session shall elect the President and
Vice-President by roll call vote. The candi
date who receives an absolute majority of the
votes cast shall win the election.
2. Article XIII authorized the President to de
clare a state of seige for up to 180 days in
order "to prevent or subdue the subversion of
the internal order."
3. Article XVIII stated: "Present political parties
are hereby abolished and their respective slates
of candidates cancelled."
4. Article XIX excluded from judicial competence
all of the acts of the Supreme Command and of
tl\e federal government in the First and Second
Institutional Acts, as well as all resolutions
passed since March 31, 1964 regarding the can
cellation of legislators’ mandates.
In addi
tion, complementary acts designed to implement
or elaborate institutional acts, were to be
free of judicial review. Decreed laws were also
extended this judicial immunity.
5. Article XXXI empowered the President to recess Con
gress by decree or by complementary act.

Direct quotes from Article XVI of the Act.
For a com-,
plete English reprint of the Act, see Burns, History of Brazil,
pp. 394-98.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

88

Under the announced intention of restoring political order,
this Act abruptly concluded the relatively smooth departure
from political traditions that had been underway since April,
1964.

Tutelage moved more toward direct control.
The emasculated and carefully supervised political parties,

having failed to yield the desired results, were abolished.
Fearing the resurgence of pre-revolutionary politics despite
the widespread application of cassacd'o and the laws of ineli
gibility, the government snatched the election of the President
from the people and foisted it upon Congress, a more easily
intimidated body which could be counted on to produce the de
sired electoral results.

The patterns of political recruit

ment and the procedures that are expected and accepted in the
processing and implementation of demands had undergone further
modification--modifications which no longer seemed temporary.
The Second Institutional Act seemed to indicate that Gas
tello Branco's commitment to tutelary democracy had been aban
doned.

In his speech accompanying this Act he left no doubt

that his devotion to the re-establishment of constitutional
normalcy had been misplaced.
The revolution is alive.
It will not retreat.
It has promoted reforms and will continue to
undertake them. However, agitators are menacing
the new order precisely when the revolution is
trying to give the people practice in the discip
line of exercising democracy.87

"The Hard Line," Time, November 5, 1965, p. 56. The
speech’s reference to "practice of the discipline" seems to
imply the Branco Administration could envision a kind of demo-
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The essence of the last sentence is that the people had not
learned their lessons of discipline well enough, for they had
not voted for revolutionary candidates.

What was apparently

needed was more discipline and the elimination of so-called
’’agitators.’* These goals would be provided by Institutional
Act #2.
The reference in Gastello’s speech to a kind of conspir
atorial force represented a hard-line interpretation of the
body politic.

Only in September the President had insisted

on conducting elections despite linha dura opposition, but by
the end of October his position appeared completely inverted,
or substantially compromised toward hard line persuasions.
Why Gastello Branco altered or otherwise abandoned his earl
ier positions can be explained, in part, by his realization
that a prolonged crisis with the linha dura might have been
culminated with his ouster as President; so in order to retain
office, Gastello succumbed to the same hard line demands that
he had resisted for so long.

88

cratic society and all they had to do was train the masses
accordingly.
QO
Numerous scholars suggest this motive. That Gastello
may have acted out of this kind of consideration is quite
probable if one accepts Stepan’s proposition that the military
is more prone to overthrow a military government than a con
stitutional government for at least two reasons: the disincen
tives, i.e., the fear or reluctance to overthrow an electorally
legitimated government, are decreased; and because the military
feels an increased responsibility for the performance and suc
cess of the government, it may be more intolerant of slowness
in reform and compromise.
See Stepan, op. cit., pp. 253-54.
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There are other forces which may have caused Gastello's .
apparent surrender to hard line pressures.

Stepan points out

that it is possible that Gastello felt hard line demands, if
unfulfilled, would have eventually resulted in the implemen
tation of a "naked dictatorship."

Rather than continue to

oppose these demands and possibly be removed from office and
replaced by a member of the linha dura, Gastello may have felt
it best to institutionalize a much stronger government, so that
his successor, while exercising more authoritarian powers,
would be required to govern within the confines of law, not
89
according to the whims of the linha dura.

This explanation

is, of course, problematical: in the process of institutional
izing a stronger executive office, Gastello was actually
yielding to the caprice of the hard line.
Roett sujggests that Gastello felt the future development
of Brazil depended more on military unity than on the constitu
tional principle of direct e l e c t i o n s . W h i l e this observation
recognizes that Gastello’s military education and training
emphasized national development, it seems to distort the im
portance Gastello placed on military unity vis à vis tutelary
democracy.

His subsequent application of the Second Institu-.

tional Act made it clear that military unity would not be pur
sued at the expense of Brazil's practice in democracy.

Gas

tello’s complete submission to the linha dura was more apparent

89ibid., p. 256.
^Opoett, op. cit., p. 32
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than real.
One result of the October, 1965 crisis was that public
support for the military regime continued to decline, perhaps
because many Brazilians felt betrayed by Gastello Branco, the
man who had promised moderation in all reforms.

Institutional

Act #2 seemed to violate the spirit of this promise.

Yet the

President used his increased discretionary powers against the
linha dura, instead of initiating further purges of the civilian
ranks as had been expected.

He closed down a far-rightist mili

tary group knows as LIDER (The Radical Democratic League), es
tablished and supported by the more extreme elements of the
linha dura.

He reassigned many of the officers who had plotted

against him in the post-election crisis ; he placed one of his
most trusted generals in command of the First Army outside Rio.
Finally, he guaranteed the inauguration of both Negrao de Lima
and Israel P i n h e i r o . U n d e r the Second Institutional Act, a
kind of military unity not anticipated by the linha dura was
achieved and the popularly-elected candidates were sworn into
office.
Having regained the initiative and reasserted his domi
nance over the military, Gastello then sought to fill the po
litical vacuum created in October, when all political parties
had been abolished.

For a description of the events surrounding Negrao de
Lima’s inauguration, see ’’Riding the Tiger,” Newsweek, Decem
ber 20, 3965, p. 50.
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Complementary Act #4 of November 20, 1965 provided for
the provisional registration of political organizations that
had the support of 120 federal deputies and 20 federal sena
tors.

Nearly 250 deputies and more than 40 senators joined

the government-sponsored Alianca Renovadora Nacional (The
National Renovating Alliance, or ARENA).

Those joining ARENA

were generally former members of the UDN and the more conserva
tive wing of the PSD, who had formed the Revolutionary Parlia
mentary Bloc prior to the promulgation of the Second Institu
tional Act.

In this regard, the Complementary Act only

legitimized the institutionalization of political alliances
that had existed under the old party system, except there were
now to be only two parties.
The opposition forces formed the Movimento Democratico
Brasileiro (Brazilian Democratic Movement, or MDB).

The ranks

of the MDB were composed primarily of the ex-PTB and liberal
PSD congressional representation.

92

Where there had been four

teen political parties there were now only two, brand new par
ties, resulting in a profound simplification of Brazil's
political party system.

No longer would there be confusing

divisions within parties with regard to support for the revolu
tion and its policies.

While legally only transitional political

92

For a discussion of the members of both parties and the
resulting chances in the composition of Congress, see Brazil :
Election Factbook Supplement, No. 2, pp. 18-19 and Roett, o p .
cit., p. 361
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groupings,

93

ARENA and MDB forced politicians into a position

where they had to identify themselves as "for" or "against" the
revolution.

Democracy in form had been retained but it was not

clear how Brazil would evolve from this condition to the "ideal
democracy" envisioned by the Branco Administration.
On February 5, 1966 Institutional Act #3 was issued; the
rules of the political game were more extensively modified.
Among other changes, the Act replaced the direct election of
governors with their selection by state legislatures by an
absolute majority vote, replaced the election of the mayors
of capital cities with their appointment by the governors of
the states, and scheduled federal legislative elections for
November 15, 1966, a little over a month after the October
presidential election.

It is significant to note that this

Act, unlike the first two, did not directly extend any new
powers to the President, although its effect was to centralize
power further: it established a system under which "revolutionary"
candidates could not lose an election at any level, no matter how
unpopular the "revolution."

Because of this Act the government

only had to concern itself with the election of state and fed
eral legislative representatives.

With major restrictions

already placed on such elections by Institutional Acts and
political party statutes-, the military regime could eliminate
any formidable MDB opposition and nearly assure itself (through

^^Brazil: Election Factbook Supplement, p. 18.
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ARENA) a majority of the seats in federal and state legisla
tures.

The National Congress would then elect the ARENA can

didate for President; the* state legislatures would elect the
ARENA candidates for governor, who would in turn appoint the
mayors (presumably ARENA members) of the capital cities.
It seems Institutional Act #3 represented one response of
an administration that had thought through the ramifications of
Complementary Act #4.

By forcing the opposition into an iden

tifiable group, the government had unwittingly raised the stakes
of the political game.

While the government could deny candi

dacy to some opposition candidates, it could not deny candidacy
to all of them and still win even limited support for its show
case d e m o c r a c y . G i v e n the widespread animosity toward the
military regime, an opposition candidate could well have ex
ploited this unpopularity and ridden its victory.

In such a

case it would be difficult for the government to deny that such
a victory represented a repudiation of the nation administra
tion.^^

This gradual encroachment by the military regime into the
electoral process seems to substantiate Frances Poland's con
tention that democratic procedures and liberties were decimated
in "bits and pieces" and not in large "chunks." See "The Pros
pects for Brazil: Costa e Silva's Military Dictatorship," New
Leader, LII (January 20, 1969), 7.
^^There was no indication that the Branco Administration
intended to pursue this kind of policy, principally because of
its concern for world opinion and its commitment to tutelary
democracy.
^^See fn. 76 of this chapter. The government utilized this
argument after its October, 1965 defeats.
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If, for example, an MDB gubernatorial candidate and a
slate of opposition, legislative candidates were elected in
their respective elections, they would serve as a rough indi
cator of how unpopular the military government was.

If voters

concluded that the MDB was a strong opposition, in succeeding
elections they may have voted for MDB candidates to express
their opposition to the military government, thus further erod
ing the dominance of ARENA and dramatizing the effects of a
self-fulfilling prophesy.

If unchecked, this kind of develop

ment could have resulted eventually in the MDB becoming the
97
"in" party and ARENA becoming the "out" party.
Institutional
Act #3 would serve as a check against the MDB gaining any
electoral momentum.
The "Revolution" Solves the Problem of Succession
As the October, 1966 presidential elections neared, specu
lation turned to whom would succeed Gastello Branco.

Under

Article XXVI of Institutional Act #2 the President was ineligible
to succeed himself, though this was not a serious obstacle.

Only

three months after issuing Institutional Act #1 the government
deviated from the election schedule the Act provided.

Elections

still had not become a routine constitutional procedure.

After the 1964 "revolution" the UDN replaced the PTB-PSD
as the "in" party, or that party which controlled the President's
office. Perhaps the UDN was only the "in" party because neither
the PTB nor the PSD was the "in" party and not because the Presi
dent was a member of its party. When the new party system was
established, ARENA automatically became the "in" party.
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Reluctantly, Gastello Branco allowed Marshall Costa e Silva
to be nominated as ARENA'S presidential candidate but only after
the War Minister promised to continue Gastello’s economic and
political policies.

This promise was only a formality, however,

because Costa e Silva would have been the ARENA candidate even
in the absence of such a pledge; implicit in the hard line’s
acceptance for his call for discipline during the October, 1965
crisis was that he would be Gastello’s successor.

98

Had the

President denied Gosta e Silva the nomination, it was possible
that another military crisis would have erupted.

Faced with

this real possibility, Gastello really had no choice: the
promise he evoked from Costa e Silva appears to have been an
attempt to clear his conscience of the reservations he had
about a member of the linha dura assuming the greatly expanded
powers of the presidency.
Gastello was described as being more concerned with the
continuity of ideas and structures, not people.

99

While one

author suggests Gastello was interested in a civilian succes
s o r , b y

June, 1966 there were few prominent civilians who

had not fallen into disfavor with the "revolution” or who had
not had their political rights suspended.

When Adhemar de

^^Schneider, Political System, p. 170.
99

Interview with Roberto Campos cited in Stepan, op. cit.,

p. 219.
100
^^*^Milan J. Kubic, "Top Brass in Brazil," New Republic,

September 10, 1966, p. 11.
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Barros was removed as governor of Sao Paulo, he joined Magalh#es Pinto, Carlos Lacerda and Juscelino Kubitschek as former
presidential contenders who no longer warranted serious atten
tion as Gastello's possible s u c c e s s o r . F o r a time, there
were fears that Gastello would opt for continuismo, or simply
suspend the election and retain power himself.

But his aversion

to the continuity of men included the extension of his own rule.
Gosta e Silva’s election, which was never really in doubt,
became a foregone conclusion when the MDB refused to dignify
what it called a "fraudulent" election by running a candidate.
Governmental interference in the September 3, 1966 gubernatorial
elections, tended to compound MDB suspicions that the government
would interfere in the presidential elections to the extent that
opposition would be useless.
In the state of Rio Grande do Sul a large number of ARENA
politicians refused to endorse the ARENA candidate for governor
and joined with the MDB in supporting another candidate, a man
who was respected by the military.

The government responded by

cancelling the mandates of four deputies who had joined with
the MDB in this case and issued a list of cassations against
deputies in other states in order to guarantee conformity with

In a public opinion poll conducted by Jornal do Brasil
71 percent of the respondants said they would vote tor either
Kubitschek or Lacerda for President, whereas only 12 percent
replied they would vote for Gosta e Silva.
So while the first
two individuals were clearly the most popular candidates, they
could not be seriously considered as Gastello’s successor be
cause they were at odds with the regime.
See Stepan, op. cit.,
p. 257.
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ARENA nominees.

102

- On July 18, 1966 the government decreed

Complementary Act #14 which made it more difficult for the MDB
to nominate an alternate to succeed a candidate whose candidacy
had been denied.

This was one overt sign the government wanted

no opposition where p o s s i b l e j u s t as it had interfered in the
October, 1965 gubernatorial elections, the government could be
expected to deny candidacy to some individuals, but unlike in
1965, in 1966 once the MDB lost a candidate it could not re
place him.

As a result, the ARENA nominee would run unopposed.

On July 22, 1966 Complementary Act #16 made it illegal for
an ARENA legislator to switch to the MDB or to vote for an MDB
candidate in a gubernatorial or presidential election.

Faced

with certain.defeat, the MDB contemplated self-dissolution or
abstention in the September elections as a sign of protest.
The government, however, responded by decreeing Complementary
Act #17, which authorized cassac'âo for any legislator who might
resign for such motives.

As a prelude to the presidential elec

tions, the MDB was forced to participate in the government's
showcase democracy.

Abstention was presumably conceived by the

government as being detrimental, for it might have tended to
underscore the absence of substance in the government's "demo
cratic elections."

10 2

The individual in question was Rui Cirne Lima, a juri
the regime was considering for appointment to the Supreme Cou 1
It seems in this instance the government placed principle over
expediency: ARENA candidates were supposed to win, even though
the MDB candidate was perfectly acceptable to the government.
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By forcing practice in the discipline of exercising
democracy, however, the government only exposed the facade
of democracy it had constructed.

On September 3 all twelve

ARENA candidates for governorships were elected by state
legislatures throughout Brazil, a dramatic improvement over
the "revolution’s” performance in October, 1965.

With the

presidential elections only one month away, the futility of
the MDB was apparent.

If the government's party was able to

win twelve out of twelve gubernatorial elections, what chance
would the MDB candida,te have in the election of the President?
In light of the government’s improprieties prior to the guber
natorial elections, the MDB leadership decided opposition to
the government was hopeless and dangerous.

As one MDB spokes

man explained his party’s decision not to nominate a presidential
candidate: "Any sort of opposition candidate would help the
government present itself, particularly abroad, as what it is
not."103
Following his resignation as War Minister in July, Costa
e Silva embarked upon a three month, nationwide campaign, which
he continued even after the MDB refused to oppose h i m . I t
appears he tried to play down his political aptitude, ostensibly

1n ?
"Unwilling Opposition," Time, August 19, 1966, p. 34.
^^^Schneider contends Costa e Silva’s campaign, even under
these circumstances, was not without some value.
It permitted
him to learn more about the country and the people he would be
governing and it presented him to the people in a non-military
context for the first time. See Political System, p. 182.
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to preserve the image of a soldier-above-politics he had pro
jected during the October, 1965 crisis.

In surely the under

statement of the decade in Brazilian politics, he said, "I
may be weak politically, but ray party is the army, and it is
strong."

105

Ambiguity shrouded his campaign; be continually

referred to vague programs that were still in the formative
stages.

He stressed the need to "humanize” the revolution’s

economic policies, but just how this was to be done was said
to be under study.

By evading searching questions, Costa e

Silva did little to comfort the middle class which had borne
the brunt of the revolution's policies of economic austerity
yet many Brazilians were optimistic that political repression
and economic revitalization would be relaxed under Costa e
SilvaL..

Campaign oratory was fraught with promises to establish
"dialogues with the people" in order to be the President of
all Brazilians (just as Castello had promised).

On one occa

sion he explained:
The big historical role of ray government will
be to consolidate the 1964 revolution. Return
of full democracy . . . . Redemocratization of
the country without new overthrows, without vio
lence .107
Despite Costa e Silva’s attempts to promote an image of himself

^^^Kubic, "Top Brass in Brazil," p. 12.
^^^See "Brazil's New Leader-Inheri ts Old Woes," U.S.. News
and World Report, October 17, 1966, p. 24.
^^^Kubic, "Top Brass in Brazil," p. 12.
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as a defender of democracy, Brazilians beheld his campaign
with indifference and boredom.

10ft

Simply stated, there was

no reason for them to believe that the "showcase democracy"
would not endure, for while Costa e Silva could attempt to
promote different personal images, he could not change the
fact that his election was hardly democratic.
On October 3, 1966 Costa e Silva received the votes of
25 2 ARENA federal deputies and 40 ARENA federal senators, as
well as the votes of three unaffiliated and MDB deputies.
majority of the MDB representation abstained.

The

Of the 475 total

votes Costa e Silva could have received, he received only 295;
the remaining 180 votes were listed as a b s t e n t i o n s . M e m b e r s
of the ARENA bloc abided by the restrictions of Complementary
Act #16 which prevented them from changing parties, although
this was an obscure triumph because there would have been no
MDB candidate to have voted for if they had changed parties.

111

^ p . 13. One observer quipped, "We're bored by
their campaign. We care for them about as much as they care
for us."
lOGcosta e Silva promised that, if elected, he would gov
ern the country within a "strictly democratic" regime.
If the
procedure by which, he was to be elected was to serve as any in
dication as to how he interpreted "strictly democratic," it
appears Brazilian democracy was in for even more modifications.
See Schneider, Political System, p. 175.
H^After Institutional Act #2 (Complementary Act #4) was
decreed ARENA controlled 297 congressional seats and MDB and an
unaffiliated group known as Sem Legenda controlled a total of
178 seats. Two MDB deputies voted for Costa e Silva, but 178
MDB, two ARENA and two Sem Legenda congressmen abstained.
See
Schneider, Political System, p. 178 and Roett, op. cit.
H^This Act perhaps only tended to hold down the number of
ARENA party members who abstained.
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The result of the presidential election was received with
little surprise or fanfare.

As one commentator wryly observed,

"In the U.S. the results of an election are known six hours
112
later. In Brazil, six months before."
By first solidifying
its decisive electoral vote in Congress with its Sixteenth Com
plementary Act and then intimidating its opposition to the ex
tent it offered no candidate, the "revolution" had created an
environment that was conducive to winning elections but not to
the acquisition of popular support.

Subsequent events were to

indicate that Castello Branco, now a lame duck President, was
more concerned with institutionalizing the "revolution" than
with public opinion.
Institutional Act #4: Institutionalizing the "Revolution"
By October, 1966 the new Constitution, which had been pro
posed by the President in April, was ready for congressional
consideration and approval.

Part of the ARENA delegation sug

gested that the government perform one more purge on Congress
before that body undertook consideration of the new constitu
tion because they felt the MDB would effectively obstruct its
adoption.

The President, seriously dedicated to the swift

approval of the document for which he claimed a great deal of
responsibility, responded by cancelling the political rights
of six MDB congressmen; when the President of the Chamber of
112

Frances Poland, op. cit., p. 6.

^^^See Schneider, Political System, p. 184.
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Deputies refused to honor these cassations, the government de
creed Complementary Act #23 of October 20, 1966.
The latest Complementary Act ordeTred Congress recessed
until November 22, 1966, because, as it stated, there existed
in Congress
. . . a group of counter-revolutionary elements
whose objective it was to disturb the public order
and upset the coming elections of November IS, thus
compromising the prestige and authority of the leg
islative power.
Article XIII of the Second Institutional Act authorized the
President to declare a state of seige for up to 180 days in
order to prevent the "subversion of,the internal order," but
why he had decided on thirty days was confusing.
not the government felt that

Whether or

by having Congress in recess

during the national legislative elections

ARENA'S electoral

prospects would be improved (thus helping to assure swift
action on the new Constitution) was not clear.
This Complementary Act has two important effects.

First,

it established the precedent of allowing the executive to
silence the legislative branch whenever it suited the govern
ment’s needs.

Since becoming President, Castello had repeatedly

resisted efforts to close Congress,

115

but now, apparently with

ll^Direct quote from the Complementary Act cited in Roett,
op. cit., p . 34.
ll^On one occasion Castello Branco said, "You have heard de
mands that Congress be subjugated and even eliminated so that the
’revolution would have a free hand to be arbitrary. The fact is
that had this not been prevented , . ^ the consequences would
have been most serious . . . . Soon we would have reached the
stage of police system fencing the country by a circle of force
and oppression." See Kubic, "Brazil’s Adroit New Leader," p. 22.
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the Constitution in the balance, he was willing to close a
recalcitrant Congress lest its activities and opinions influ
ence the Brazilian voter.

In addition, this Act had the ef

fect of placing further strains on the relationship between
the military regime and ARENA.

In the controversy over the

cassation of the six federal deputies many pro-administration
legislators felt compelled to oppose the regime.

As the con

troversy unfolded and relations continued to decline, the
Branco Administration must have decided it would be better to
obscure these "inter-revolution" problems by closing Congress
instead of allowing further deterioration in public.

Such a

development would have only tended to strengthen the MDB.
Whatever the government's motivations for closing Congress,
the direct elections on November 15, 1966 consolidated ARENA's
control in Congress.

It increased its membership in the Chamber

from 254 to 277 seats and from 43 to 47 seats in the Senate.

On

the other hand, the MDB lost ground in both bodies; its member
ship in the Chamber dropped from 150 to 132 seats and from 21 to
19 seats in the S e n a t e . Y e t ,

while ARENA was stronger as a

result of the election, the "revolution" had not thereby neces
sarily increased its influence in Congress.

As Schneider points

out, during their campaigns many ARENA candidates had tried to
establish their independence from the national regime and, given
the government's unpopularity, many such candidates were un-

^^^See Roett, op. cit., p. 37
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doubtedly elected.

117

The question now was whether ARENA'S

decisive numerical superiority could be translated into an
advantage for the "revolution,” especially with regard to the
new Constitution.
By December, 1966 Castello appeared intent on eliminating
debate and altering the procedures of decision-making in order
to secure the passage of the new Constitution.
a r e n a ’s

Apparently,

majority was not regarded as a reliable majority.

On

December 7, 1966 the President decreed Institutional Act #4,
which convoked an "extraordinary" session of Congress to "vote"
and "promulgate" a new Constitution.

US
'

Although the Act pro

vided procedures to determine a Mixed Commission, that was to
consider the original draft, and set strict time limitations
for the constitution’s ratification, the Act empowered the
President to decree the new Constitution if Congress failed
to approve it.

Even though some 1500 amendments were pro

posed, Congress finally adopted a version that varied very
little from the original draft.

(The 1967 Constitution is

presented in Chapter III.)
As on so many previous occasions, the adoption of the new

117

For a discussion of these elections and the strategies
employed by both parties, see Schneider, Political System,
pp. 185-87. One indication that ARENA'S showing on the national
level was deceptive was the aggregate result of the state elec
tions: the MDB realized a net gain of 43 seats nationwide.
118 See Burns, History of Brazil, p. 400.
119por excerpts from the Fourth Institutional Act, see
ibid., pp. 400-401,
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Constitution made it evident that behind the facade of demo
cratic procedures there was very little substance to the
"revolution's” style of democracy.

Stemming from a wide

spread feeling within the "revolution” that the objectives
and principles o f the Institutional Acts should be more perm
anently institutionalized, the implementation of the new Con
stitution represented an attempt to align the "written" con
stitution with the "real" constitution.

Deviation from the

1946 Constitution was so common that that document had become
inoperative.
The First Phase of the "Revolution": An Assessment
In the interest of public order and national security
Brazilians were subjected to cassac'ao, loss of elective and
appointive office, and a gradual curtailment of political pre
rogatives during the first phase of the "revolution."

The

character of the military's expanded doctrine of internal
national security slowly evolved from one of a temporary,
corrective nature, that sought to restrain the continuation
of demagogic, populist politics, to one of a more permanent
nature, that by 1967 was attempted to institutionalize the
principles and objectives of the "revolution," however they
might be interpreted.

The military did not necessarily intend

that this transition should take place, although an unfortunate
combination of factors tended to minimize the differences of
opinion within the military and make such a development almost
inevitable.
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Castello Branco's military training at the Escola Superior
de Guerra had emphasized that the relationship between national
security and national development was one of mutual causality.
But because of the President's favorable inclination toward an
ideal form of democracy, which saw debate as an obstacle rather
than an intrinsic part, he had a latent bias for order somewhat
like that of the linha dura.

Originally, he had intended to

implement policies designed to control the Vargas and Goulart
forces, but when these proved ineffective, Castello was forced
by considerations of political expediency to retreat from his
pledges of moderation and to adopt a more extreme position on
political reform.

Each concession he made to the linha dura

resulted in the gradual erosion of political prerogatives open
to civilian politicians and in the concentration of vast powers
in the office of the executive.
The President's apolitical character, which was hailed
as the best guarantee that true "democracy" would be restored
during his "caretaker" regime, seems to have been partially
responsible for the undemocratic developments between 1964 and
1967.

His feeling that any attempt to win support for his

plans was a form of demagoguery placed him in a precarious
position when the linha dura issued its frequent ultimatums:
lacking substantial civilian or military support for his causes,
he was forced to comply or face expulsion;

His distaste for

political persuasion became a liability for the cause of democ
racy because, had he attempted to cultivate military support for

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

108

his decision to uphold the October, 1965 gubernatorial elections,
he may have been able to resist the hard line's demands and the
Second and Third Institutional Acts might have never been de-

creed/^°
The patterns of political recruitment were most affected
by the changes in Gastello's political reform policies.

At

first some politicians and civil servants were forced from
office; then standards were established by which to declare
candidates ineligible for election.

Political parties were

forced to undergo modifications and finally abolished; when
ARENA and MDB were created, numerous restrictions were placed
on the ability of the MDB to compete with the "revolution's**
party.

It is apparent that these alterations were implemented

in part because of the voters' failure to support the "revolu
tion.'*

When the government realized the electoral system was

not functioning according to its expectations, it simply im
posed controls that made its experiment in tutelary democracy
yield the desired results.

In many cases these controls were

justified as essential to the public order but their real
effect was to permit the military "carte blanche" to intervene
against its political enemies and other perceived threats.
By the middle of March, 1967 there was no question that
the military had the day-to-day responsibility for governing

170

Stepan suggests some of the problems growing out of
the President's apolitical character. See Stepan and Einaudi,
op. cit., pp. 94 and 111.
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Brazil.

The relatively minor changes in the norms and procedures

of the decision-making process that had been instituted by the
First Institutional Act were finally replaced by an abandonment
of those processes by the end of Castello Branco’s term.

Decreed

laws, an irregularity in Brazil’s post-war "democratic exper
ience," were adopted as a regular mechanism of decision-making
after the success the government realized with Institutional
Act #4.
The elections of October, 1965 represented a crucial junc
ture in the course the "revolution" took.

Had Castello Branco

resisted the linha dura, a kind of democratic normalcy would
have been re-established.

But because the linha dura success

fully elicited a major concession from the President, in the
form of the Second Institutional Act, only the amenities of a
democratic system, such as a legislative body and a free press,
were preserved and only to the extent they did not interfere
with the "revolution’s" pursuit of its objectives and princi
ples.
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CHAPTER III

PHASE TWO OF THE "REVOLUTION":
DISILLUSIONMENT AND POLARIZATION
Carminhando
There are soldiers who are
armed but not loved
Mostly lost with their
weapons in their hands.
In the barracks they
learn the old lesson
Of dying for the country
and living for nothing.
There is hunger on the
great plantations
And desperation marching
through the streets.
But still they take the flower
as their strongest refrain
And believe that the flowers
can overcome the cannon.
Geraldo Vandre, Brazilian poet,
circa September, 1968
Artur da Costa e Silva entered the presidency in March,
1967 pledging to "humanize the revolution."

Many Brazilians

interpreted this pledge presaged a significant liberalization
of the "revolution’s" social and political policies.

Their

expectations severely disappointed, many Brazilians began to
openly oppose the military regime.

The regime's repressive

response toward increasing manifestations of opposition led
110
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to further polarization and by December, 1968 it was apparent
a more rigorous renovation of the political system was neces
sary.
Castello Branco’s "Revolutionary" Legacy
The final weeks of the Castello Branco government were
marked by a renewed intensification of its ’’mood of puritanism”
begun in April, 1964.^

In concluding his drive to transform

Brazil into a disciplined society, capable of exercising de
mocracy, President Branco decreed what has been termed an
’’orgy of Calvinistic legislation" during the first months of
1967, thereby retaining the reformist image of his government
to the end.

As a result of these laws, the new Constitutiqn

promulgated January 24, 1967 and scheduled to go into effect
on March 15, 1967, and other carefully devised presidential
strategies, Castello Branco left his successor, Artur da Costa
e Silva, a political arena that was more orderly and more dis
ciplined than it was when he inherited it in 1964.
Between October, 1965 and March, 1967 nearly 250 individuals
were cassated under the provisions of Institutional Act #2; but
ninety of these cassations were decreed between February 8 and
March 15, 1967, suggesting there was a final attempt on the
part of Castello to finish purifying the political system before

For a further discussion of the puritan-like style of the
Branco government, see Mary Charlesworth, "The New Regime," New
Statesman, May 8, 1964, p. 712 and "Brazil; Some Unpleasant
Business," Time, January 13, 1967, p. 30.
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the power of cassation expired on March 15.

2

This drive for

purification was accompanied by a preference for unobstructed
reforms.

On the last three days of February, 1967 151 laws

were decreed, bringing the total to 312 in a little over a
year and 191 in less than three months.

When resistance to

reform measures was anticipated, Castello simply decreed the
desired reforms.

For example, rather than confront the en

trenched interests in Congress on the vital issue of currency
reform, Castello legislated by executive decree a substantial
devaluation with the introduction of a "new cruzeiro" worth
1000 old cruzeiros.

While most decrees of this period did not

implement such fundamental changes as the currency reform, they
nonetheless brought about a radical modification of the decision
making process.

The facade of participant democracy that had

been so precariously preserved throughout the Branco government,
appeared to be on the verge of complete dissolution by the end
of Branco’s term.

Decree laws had become the rule and popularly

legislated measures the exception.
Although Brazil had witnessed an erosion of civil liberties
during the first phase of the "revolution," freedom of the press,
was not restricted in a highly authoritarian manner during that
phase, although it was restrained somewhat.

In fact, sufficient

freedom of the press existed to enable the news media to un
cover and publicize fraudulent practices during the October,

^See Schneider, Political System, p. 199
^Ibid., pp. 195, 200.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

113

1965 elections, the government saw to it that these situations
were corrected.

In light of such evidence Busey argues that

the Castello Branco government can be legitimately described
as "quasi-democratic" and "semi-authoritarian."^

Yet, with the

passage of the Press Law by Congress it appears that the Branco
government, with congressional backing, created the machinery
through which succeeding governments might more easily estab
lish themselves as more authoritarian and less democratic.
The Press Law provided for the punishment (for up to four
years) of anyone publishing or broadcasting anything "prejudicial
to national security" or "any news or information of a secret
matter," regardless of whether the secrecy had been declared
by government directive or judged so by the courts.^

This law,

which did not go into effect until March 15, 1967, had the effect
of increasing government supervision over and of imposing poten
tial censorship of the communications media. -While it is true
that the Branco government did not exercise the powers of the
Press Law, it is also true that by proposing and securing congres7*
sional approval for such a reform,
it created an additional

4de Dubnic, op. cit., p. 23^Busey, "The Old and the New," p. 68.
^See "Brazil: Some Unpleasant Business," p. 30, and Lester
A. Sobel, ed., -Facts on File Yearbook, Vol. XXVII (New York:
Facts on File, Inc., 1967) , p . 40.
^It is not clear why Congress passed this law (304 to 168)
while it opposed so many of Gastello's proposals and forced him
to decree them.
Perhaps, as with the Constitution, Congress re
served the right to seek fundamental changes in this law with
the Costa e Silva government.
See Schneider, Political System,
pp. 198-99.
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weapon for the "revolution" to use in dealing with its adver
saries: it legitimized the censorship of opposing viewpoints
under the guise of national security.

Under the law not only

would the government no longer be expected to answer charges
of its abuses and shortcomings, but also the media would
now be required to prove that their disclosures did not vio
late the national security.

(See Chapter IV).

Perhaps Gastello’s single most important contribution to
the "revolution" was the 1967 Constitution.

This document im

parted legal permanence to the major provisions of the first
four institutional acts and provided for further centraliza
tion of power in the national government.

About the 1967 Con

stitution Peter Ranis has written:
Perhaps the most paternalistic of the Latin
American constitutions, it purports to seriously
regulate the political sector while increasing
the prerogatives of the national government over
the state and municipal constituent authorities.°
During congressional deliberations on the proposed constitution
one of the proposals drawing the most strenuous objections was
one calling for the deletion of "United States" from the name
of the country.

Many congressmen felt that such a change would

only legitimize the further centralization of power, but, be
cause of the "rubber stamp role," that had been imposed on it.
Congress was unable to prevent this and other changes.^

^Peter Ranis, Five Latin American Nations: A Comparative
Political Sdudy (New York: The Macmillan Company, 19 71), p. 190.
^See "Institutional Act #4 : Institutionalizing the ’Revolu
tion’," Chapter II.
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Just as it was proposed, the approved constitution repre
sented the principles of the "revolution.*'

Under Article 76

the President and Vice-President, who were required to run on
the same ticket, were to be elected by an electoral college
composed of members of the National Congress and delegates
named by the legislative assemblies of the states.

Article 83

assigned the executive branch exclusive power to initiate leg
islation in budgetary, fiscal, and security matters.

The

national government was given the exclusive right to collect
all taxes (except those on real estate), which were then to
be distributed on an equitable basis.

The executive ivas

authorized to issue decrees in the areas of national security
and public finance, to decree a state of seige, and to order
federal intervention in the affairs of state and local gov10

ernments.

The Chamber of Deputies and the Senate were each permitted
forty-five total days to act on an executive measure unless such
a measure was declared "urgent."

In such a case, a joint ses

sion of Congress was required to consider the legislation within
forty days.

Legislators were prohibited from holding any other

elective post and each legislator was subject to the loss of
his mandate if he failed to attend more than half of his chamber's

For translated excerpts of the 1967 Constitution, see
Burns, History of Brazil, pp. 402-10.
For a general discussion
of this constitution, see Ranis, op. cit., pp. 190-92 and "All
Wrapped Up," The Economist, CCXXII (January 7, 1967), 35.
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ordinary sessions during each legislative period.

The members

of the National Congress were still to be elected by "direct
and secret" elections.
Obviously, many of these provisions were direct adapta
tions of the "revolution's" institutional acts but with an
important qualification: there were no longer any expiration
dates for the expanded powers of the executive nor was the
indirect election of the President any longer a temporary
electoral device.

These modifications had been institution

alized as permanent components of Brazil's constitutional
framework.
If one accepts Peterson's proposition that Castello Branco
pushed through the new constitution because he felt Costa e
Silva might give way to pressures to "soften" the line of the
"revolution" once he assumed p o w e r , t h e n it might also be
argued that the outgoing President pursued a strategy of mili
tary promotions designed to insulate the succeeding government
from the pressures of the linha dura.

Due to an unusually large

number of vacancies in the upper ranks of the armed forces,

12

Castello was afforded the opportunity to promote a large number
of officers to strategic positions.

During the final three

months of 1966 seven new full generals were named; all of them

^^Peterson, op. cit., p. 555.
1?

T h e s e vacancies were created when high-ranking officers
retired in order to take advantage of the military's retirement
benefits which were scheduled to be terminated by Castello.
See Schneider, Political System, p. 210.
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shared Gastello's general military and political philosophies.
In several cases officers more closely associated with Castello
were promoted over those associated with the linha dura.
Just as the new Constitution initially limited Costa e
Silva's freedom to deviate from the course the "revolution"
had followed under Castello, so too by promoting officers
loyal to the Sorbonne ideology was Castello able to strengthen
the influence of the "soft line" in the hierarchy of the mili
tary.

Ostensibly, these officers would serve as a safeguard

against pressures by the linha dura to force the "revolution"
in an even more repressive direction.

Ideally, Costa e Silva

would move neither in the direction of popular opinion nor in
a direction dictated by the linha dura as a result of the new
Constitution and Gastello's military promotions.
Whereas many Brazilians had welcomed the 1964 coup with
either popular support or indifference,

13

by the beginning of

1967 just as many were turning against the revolutionary gov
ernment.

Gastello's austere economic and political policies,

according to one author, combined to make his "one of the most
unpopular regimes in Brazilian political history.
It appears Gastello's unpopularity in the sphere of eco
nomics stemmed directly from the success of his policies;
13

See Nicholas Raymond and Winthrop P. Carty, "Elections
in Brazil: The Revolution Digs In," The Reporter, September 8,
1968, p. 44 and "Brazil: Government by the Consent of the
Governed," New Republic, April 16, 1966, p. 17.
^^Peterson, o p . cit., p. 533.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

118

inflation had been reduced from an annual rate of 144 percent
in 1964 to 41 percent in 1966.^^

One of the prices for cool

ing of the economy, which required wage, price, and credit
controls, was unpopularity.

In the sphere of politics his

unpopularity apparently stemmed from unfulfilled promises.
Castello had failed to prevent the ’’revolution” from taking
on a reactionary character and had failed in his attempts
to facilitate a swift return to democratic normalcy as he had
promised.

If anything, by the end of Gastello’s term Brazil

indeed seemed headed in the opposite direction.
Costa e Silva: Humanizing the "Revolution”
As the inauguration of Costa e Silva neared, Brazilians
became hopeful that his government would transform campaign
pledges to "humanize the revolution” into liberal policies
that would relax the austere measures of his predecessor.

As

Schneider explains, upon his inauguration
. . . Costa e Silva enjoyed the advantage that
almost all important segments of public opinion
expected his administration to be a relief from
the increasing authoritarian trend of the first
revolutionary regime.
While most were not optimistic that full-scale changes in the
revolutionary order were forthcoming,

X7

those with the highest

^^’’Brazil; The Price of Unpopularity,” Time, July 28,
1967, p. 30.
^^Schneider, Political System, p. 20 3.
l^According to a public opinion poll conducted by the
journal, Manchete, prior to Costa's inauguration, nearly half
the respondants expected Costa’s government to be ’’better” and
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expectations that the ''revolution" would be liberalized under
Costa e Silva were to be the most bitterly disappointed.
Even though he graduated from the Escola Superior de
Guerra, Costa e Silva's political and military philosophies
only superficially resembled those of Castello Branco.

But

despite his differences with the Sorbonne ideology, Costa e
Silva could not be accurately labelled as a member of the
linha dura.

Where Castello had come to act as a kind of

mediator between the soft line and the linha dura by the end
of his term, Costa e Silva's position relative to both of
those groups was more obscure.
His actions during the October, 1965 military crisis
had won him the support of the linha dura, but since then
he had retreated, at least publicly, from, his close associa
tion with that group.

Instead of opposing the linha dura in

defense of stated principles (as Castello had done in defense
of his "ideal democracy"), Costa e Silva appeared more amenable
to reaching compromises with it.

18

The compromise Costa e

Silva struck with that conservative military faction resulted

only 3 percent felt it would be worse. The expectation for
major changes remained relatively limited. See Schneider,
Political System, p. 20 3 fn.
^Scosta's first concession to the linha dura was in the
appointment of his Cabinet officers. All of the military per
sonnel ranged from either "strong" to "moderate" in their affil
iation with the hard line, according to Schneider.
Ibid., pp.
207-208. Rosebaum writes that Costa, "while not identified as
a hard-liner, was not an opponent of their policies and values,
but a skillful conciliator of conflicting military positions."
See "Brazil's Military Regime," Current History, LVIII (Febru
ary, 1970), 74.
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in an increase of hard line influence in governmental matters
during the second phase of the revolution, especially after
Costa e Silva’s policies proved incapable of subduing his
government's opposition.
Costa e Silva's "campaign” for the presidency had demon
strated that he was favorably disposed toward influencing
public opinion, both at home and abroad.

Faced with no oppo

sition and, therefore, his election guaranteed, there was no
reason for Costa e Silva to have pledged to "humanize the
revolution" and to establish dialogues with the people except
to encourage popular backing for his administration.

This in

itself was at variance with the Sorbonne's disdain for public
opinion.

19

Even after his election he appeared determined to

project an image of himself as a strong leader of reform, who
unlike his predecessor was willing to extend, individualized
attention to even the most downtrodden Brazilian.
In a news conference in New York City in January, 1967 the
President-elect stated he was intent on "transferring prosperity
to the people" and on viewing "man as the individual, man as an
entity."

20

Brazilians, who had labored for nearly three years

under Castello's formal, uniform policies of austerity received
these kinds of expressions with a feeling of hope--hope that

^^Ibid., p. 201.
20

See Gerde V/ilcke, "Brazilian Vows Gains in Economy,"
New York Times, January 31, 1967, p. 77.
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the path toward economic and political recovery under Costa e
Silva would require less suffering and fewer individual sacri
fices .
Costa e Silva's inaugural speech and his first policy
statements were a curious blend of evasiveness and confusion.
On the one hand, he said he would be unafraid of public opin
ion, but on the other hand, he said he would not yield authority to mass opinion.

22

It appears that while the President

would presumably permit differences of opinion and possibly
adjust his policies accordingly, he would not tolerate any
attempt to mobilize opinion against the government which
might influence the decision-making process itself.

The anti-

7%
populist character of the "revolution" remained intact," but
Costa e Silva implied opposing viewpoints were welcome.

In

fact, authority was to continue to be exercised at the discre
tion of the "revolution" and opposition tolerated only to the
extent it did not interfere with the government’s policies.
With reference to what he termed were his administration’s
sources of support (ARENA and the armed forces), the President

^^Schneider, Political System, p. 212.
22

For a brief account of Costa’s inaugural speech, see
Paul Montgomery, "Costa Is Inaugurated in Brazil," New York
Times, March 16, 1967, p. 21. For an account of his first
policy statements, see Paul Montgomery, "Humanist Regime
Pledged in Brazil," New York Times, March 17, 1967, p. 18.
See Jerry L. Weaver, "Assessing the Impact of Military
Rule: Alternative Approaches," in Military Rule in Latin Amer
ica: Functions, Conseqi^ences, and Perspectives, ed. by Phillippe C. Schmittèr (Beverly'Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications,
1973), p. 59.
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attempted to clarify the confusion over the role of opposition
in his government:
We might not be a popular government but we
will be, without shadow of doubt, a government
for the people in the most profound sense of
that expression.24
So, while everyone might not have agreed with the decisions of
the "revolution,*' it nonetheless was to continue to determine
the public will.

This position did not represent a change from

the position Gastello had assumed, but rhetorical expressions
like "government for the people" must have encouraged Brazilians
to expect to have a voice in the shaping of their destinies.
Compared to the frenetic activity of the Branco Administra
tion’s final weeks, at its outset the Costa e Silva government
appeared "inactive."

The new Cabinet was comprised of eight

civilian and eight military figures, with the latter holding
an edge in terms of the political importance of their positions;

25

none of its members were holdovers from the previous

government and the Cabinet, as a whole, lacked the intellectual
qualities of the Branco Cabinet.

26

Generally, the "influential" military figures around Costa
e Silva were admired by the linha dura.

Interior Minister

Albuquerque Lima, Chief Military Aide Jaime Portella, and

^^New York Times, March 17, 1967, p. 18.
^^Schneider, Political System, p. 206.
Z^lbid., p. 205.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

123

General Carrastazu Medici, head of the National Intelligence
Service, all
. . . owed their positions in the second govern
ment to the fact that, symbolically and actually,
they represented the opposite of the ideas and
career patterns of the core group of officers in
the 1964-1967 government . . . . In fact, these
officers came to power in response to the more
nationalist officers, who were dissatisfied with
the achievements of the first military government
and because of their desire for the military in
general to be more popular.2?
Thus, the essentially technocratic, Branco government was re
placed by a less vigorous and more publie-opinion-conscious
government.
It is possible that Costa e Silva and his influential
advisors decided that, because the "revolution” had been so
institutionalized by the new Constitution that its persistence
was no longer an issue of debate, opposition to the regime's
various political policies would steadily diminish over time.

28

Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that apparently in
order to augment its popularity, the new government must have
decided that a revision of Branco's economic policies was neces
sary.

27
For a discussion of the "influentials” in the Costa e
Silva government, see Stepan and Einaudi, o p . cit., pp. 111-112.
Costa e Silva felt the "revolution" had given Brazil a
responsible political system that had to be given a chance to
work. Rollie Poppino suggests that in this resolve Costa failed
to recognize that Congress had only reluctantly adopted indirect
elections and expected them to be reversed by the new President.
See "Brazil; Second Phase of the Revolution," Current History,
I.VI (January, 1969), 11.
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After prolonged deliberation the government eased infla
tion controls and adopted a less favorable policy toward United
States investments.

While Stepan has suggested that the adop

tion of a stronger nationalist position resulted from civilian
pressures,

29

Roberto Campos asserts that Costa e Silva felt

that by relaxing Castello's long-range economic policies his
popularity, both within the military and among civilians, would
30
be increased.*

Regardless of the new President's motivations,

as soon as the "revolution's" policies were relaxed inflation
started to rise.

By 1967 inflation had been reduced to an

annual rate of 25 percent, the lowest in more than a decade ;
but after economic policies were eased a bit it rose 14.S
percent in the first half of 1968.^^
If Campos' assertion that Costa e Silva was sufficiently
concerned with public opinion to try to influence it by effect
ing policy changes is valid, then the President was playing a
dangerous game.

With his concern for continued economic recovery,

the President would have to re-tighten economic controls if in
flation reached unacceptable levels ; and this could be accom
plished by disappointing heightened expectations and with a sub
sequent loss of support.

29

So it was with many of Costa e Silva's

Stepan and Einaudi, o p . cit., pp. 97, 111.

^^Ibid., p. 95.
^^"Brazil: A Paradise on the Edge of Trouble," U. S. News
and World Report, September 2, 1968, p. 66.
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policies; an initial promise, raised expectations and then
failure to secure the implementation of these promises in the
form of policies, accompanied by a loss of political support.
Problems with the Opposition
Costa e Silva inherited a number of unresolved problems
from Gastello Branco.

Since the latter half of 1966 a wide

variety of opposition elements had been trying to establish
a comprehensive alliance in order to more effectively confront
the government.

Late in the Branco period student groups and

various sectors of the Catholic Church had begun to denounce
openly the ‘'revolution's” restrictions on certain forms of
political activity.

And as Costa e Silva was inaugurated, the

delicate alliance between ARENA and the military government re
mained unpredictably balanced.

It was in dealing with these

critical situations that Costa e Silva was to make his contri
bution to the "democratic revolution."
In August, 1966, shortly after the MDB had been severely
restrained by a series of complementary acts, Carlos Lacerda,
who had seen his presidential ambitions destroyed by the
military government, consulted with ex-Presidents Kubitschek
and Goulart over the possibility of launching a united opposition
movement.

Frente Ampla (Broad Front) , the informal organization

resulting from these consultations, was founded on the unlikely
assumption that these men and the people they represented, with
such diverse and outright conflicting political philosophies,
could form a cohesive opposition movement.

While Frente Ampla* s
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leaders were apparently able to make the necessary rapproche
ments, the movement itself was destined to failure from the
beginning.
Frente Ampla first moved to test the Costa e Silva govern
ment’s intentions in the area of dissent, in order to force the
government to choose between its campaign pledges of normaliza
tion and that of revolutionary continuity.

Lacerda directed

the former editor of Tribuna da Imprensa, Helio Fernandes, to
publish political articles, a violation of regulations placed on
cassados (those whose political rights had been cassated).

The

linha dura regarded this action as a "provocation," but the
President resisted their calls for punitive action on this and
other occasions; his failure to react decisively encouraged the
Frente Ampla to plan further moves designed to expose the govern
ment as just another military* government or to reveal it as a
true "government of the people."

32

Several members of the government, perhaps appreciating
Lacerda’s strategic position in the Frente Ampla and the real
possibility of the center-left elements of the MDB joining an
opposition movement, tried to arrange a reconciliation between
Lacerda and the "revolution.’' This attempt had a disruptive
effect on the infant Frente Ampla; its organizational work
ground to a halt.

Lacerda, after all, was the key to Frente

Ampla’s leadership because, while he had signed separate pacts
32

Schneider, Political System, p. 213.
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with both Goulart and Kubitschek,

33

no evidence indicates the

latter two ever exchanged mutual agreements.

When Frente Ampla *s

leadership became suspicious that Lacerda (being the political
opportunist he was) was seeking realignment with the "revolution"
in order to enhance his presidential aspirations, the Frente
Ampla fragmented along personality l i n e s . T h e

organizational

hierarchy of the Frente Ampla was so fragile that the government
did not have to assert itself to disrupt it.
The fortunes of Frente Ampla did not improve-

Since its

inception it had not enjoyed the support of the executive com
mittee of the MDB and was thus denied the support of the only
recognized body of opposition, itself at odds with the "revolu
tion," but apparently not willing to risk being further sup
pressed.

Janio Quadros refused to join the Frente Amp1a ; thus

it was denied the presence of a popular figure who might have
been able to mobilize

a mass movement.

35

When by the middle

of 1967 the attempted reconciliation between Lacerda and the
"revolution" had failed to materialize, Lacerda assumed his
traditional role of denouncing the incumbent government, per
haps in an attempt to mobilize support for his ill-conceived

??
See Roett, op. cit., pp. 37-38 and Schneider, Political
System, pp. 195, 2 2 2.
3-1

'Schneider states the Frente Ampla was never really able
to overcome the mutual distrust of Juscelinistas, Lacerdistas,
Janguistas, and the Janistas and remained throughout a leader
ship at the top. Political System, p. 223.
35

Roett, op. cit., p. 38.
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coalition.

Though divided and ineffective, the Frente Ampla

did succeed in exacerbating tensions between the military gov
ernment and the opposition, enough that when Fernandes and
Lacerda greeted Gastello’s death in June, 1967 with scathing
attacks on the ex-President, Fernandes was imprisoned and
Lacerda barred from further television appearances.
From its predecessor the Costa e Silva government in
herited a ticklish student opposition.

Since being outlawed

in 1964 the National Union of Students (UNE) had been forced
to meet and conduct its activities in se*cret.^^

Being in agree

ment with some of the students’ grievances, Dominican priests
in Belo Horizonte allowed the UNE to conduct its 28th,Congress
in one of its buildings in July, 1966.

Encouraged by their

success in holding a large, secret student meeting, in Septem
ber, 1966 college students quickly closed ranks in opposition
to newly-imposed tuition payments.

This movement rapidly

flared into a general strike of university students across
Brazil, something expressly prohibited by the Suplicy Law of
1964.
The Suplicy Law had placed student organizations under
strict government supervision, requiring that they be free of
ideological or political content; for that reason few politically

According to George H. Dunne, the pro-Goulart UNE was a
prime target of the 1964 coup after it eliminated Goulart.
See
’’Happening in Sao Paulo," America, September 23, 1967, p. 306.
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minded students joined the organizations that replaced the UNE.
Schneider posits:
The rationale of the law was that, with the
troublemakers removed and autonomy severely re
stricted, student organizations could be used to
channel interests toward academic matters. This
proved quickly to be an illusive vision, if not
a complete illusion.37
The September, 1966 general strike was a clear indication that
the goals of the Suplicy Law were unrealistic.

Nonetheless,

the Gastello Branco government reacted to the strike along the
rationale of that law by arresting a large number of Sao Paulo
students to set an example for the remainder of the country.
The students retaliated with a series of sympathy strikes,
culminated by a ’’National Day of Struggle Against the Dicta
torship" on September 22, 1966.

But the basic issues of dis

sent and freedom of speech went unresolved.
The students welcomed Gastello’s departure but greeted
Gosta e Silva with guarded optimism, suspicious of most of
his campaign promises except the ones pledging to be more respon
sive to student needs and to initiate policies that would improve
XR
educational opportunities.
If the students were selectively
perceptive in being at all optimistic that Gosta e Silva would
be an improvement over Gastello, they also proved to be impatient,
When the new President's promises to "humanize the revolution"
failed to be followed up with specific policies, tensions between

^^Schneider, Political System, p. 230.
^^New York Times, March 17, 196 7, p. 18.
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the disgruntled students and the government peaked.
Costa e Silva did not appear intent on immediately estab
lishing dialogues with the students.

In July, 1967 the mili

tary police forcibly arrested a large number

of Sao Paulo

students in an attempt to thwart the holding

of the UNE’s annual

C o n g r e s s . M u c h to the surprise of the government, the 29th
Congress of the UNE was held later that month in defiance of
the government's attempted intimidation.

Once again the Catholic

Church was implicated in the illegal meeting

of the UNE.

A

Benedictine monastery near Campinas was the site of the daring
29th Congress.
Successfully hoodwinked and embarrassed by a band of 400
students who attended the UNE Congress, the government, in
seeking to repair its damaged stature, over-reacted.

Dissatis

fied by the insistence of the Campinas monks that they had no
idea they were acting as hosts to the outlawed UNE, the govern
ment arrested scores of priests and nuns associated with the
Campinas monastery, violating the sanctuary of churches and
setting off a nationwide, but scarcely unified, Church protest
in the process.

Most influential members of the Church's

hierarchy denounced the government's invasions of monasteries
to arrest priests.

A dissident, conservative wing of the

^^Schneider, Political System, p. 232.
40xhe Campinas monks allegedly told the military police that,
since the students had not asked for their spiritual services,
they thought it best to leave the students to their own devices
and consequently did not know what was going on. The police
found this disciplined lack of curiosity hard to believe.
For
a rather detailed discussion of this church-state confrontation,
see Dunne, op. cit., pp. 306-307.
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Church, as well as the conservative press, however, assailed
the Dominicans and Benedictines as agents of subversion.

By-

over-reacting the government had facilitated the likelihood
that the progressive Church and the students could unite in
common cause against the government.
By the end of 1967 the Costa e Silva government, despite
its announced intention to enter into dialogue, had failed to
win the confidence of the students.

According to one student

spokesman, the effect of the government’s lack of comprehension
and the heavy handed methods employed by the military police
throughout 1967 had been "to unite the students against the
government, something years of left wing propaganda had not
been able to a c h i e v e . E v e n

though opposed to the UNE the

same spokesman 'touched upon some of the basic shortcomings of
the Costa e Silva government.
Every constructive criticism or attempt to
present a grievance is dismissed as the result
of "inexperience," or as "subversive propaganda."
The "dialogues" turn out to be boring monologues.
Solutions are put off and the truth disguised.
This lack of faith aggravates the general lack
of confidence.'^2
Costa e Silva's policy toward students during 1967 seemed to
have alienated even the more conservative students who could
have been expected to support the government, had it converted
some of its promises into concrete policies.

"^^Ibid. , p. 308.

^^Ibid.
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On the military’s attitude toward political mobilization
Stepan has written:
Clearly in 1964 the Brazilian military most
feared chaos and communism.
They felt the need
for a strong government to check inflation and
subversion. Given this vision of societal
disintegration, they perceived all groups en
gaged in confrontation and mobilization politics
as potentially dangerous.^3
Because the progressive Church (liberal and radical churchmen)
had persisted in their support for the Basic Education Movement
(MEB) even after the 1964 coup, despite efforts by the govern
ment to terminate that movement, the Church found itself in
political conflict with the military governments.
One of the goals of the MEB, which was initiated in 1961,
was to make people critically aware of their situation.

Accord

ing to this movement ’’development" was defined as intrinsically
related to political participation, critical awareness (called
conscientizacao) , and mass mobilization.^^

The "revolution,"

which had assumed sole responsibility for overseeing national
development and which viewed the expansion of political partici
pation as detrimental to that development, attacked the MEB as
an undisguised attempt to disrupt its anti-mobilization strategy
and as a threat to the national security.

While there was an

essential philosophical difference between conscientizacao and
the pre-revolutionary, populista technique of mass mobiliza-

4 3step.an and Einaudi,

o p . cit. , p.

86.

44por a discussion of the primary objectives of the MEB,
see Emanuel de Kadt, Catholic Radicals in Brazil (New York:
Oxford University Press, 19/1), "pT 123 and Utepan and Einaudi,
o p . cit., p. 86.
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tion,"^^ the government chose to regard the MEB as a form of
demagoguery and subversion, thereby unnecessarily alienating
many dedicated lay and clerical proponents of the MEB.
Deeply influenced by the philosophies of Mounier, the more
liberal and radical members of the Church found themselves incontrovertibly opposed to condoning a dictatorial form of gov
ernment for the sake of future generations without popular
consent.

Tensions between this group, as visible adversaries

of dictatorship, and the military government, which defined
itself as "democratic,” were inevitable.

And because the

Church, in general, had acquired a greater social consciousness
and had formulated alternative solutions to Brazil's problems,
even the more moderate and conservative members of the Church
found themselves at odds with the government.
In an August, 1967 speech assailing the failures of the
Costa e Silva government to bring "prosperity to the people,"
Dora Helder Camara, the respected Archbishop of Recife and a
founder of the MEB, summed up the Church's new concern for
social problems.

45por an explanation of the distinctions between these
two phenomena, see de Kadt, o p . cit., pp. 94-95.
46de Kadt discusses the influence of Mounier in the
Catholic Church.
See Catholic Radicals in Brazil, pp. 91-93.
Mounier wrote that it was we^ll and good for a generation to
sacrifice its well-being to a future generation, "but there
has to be assent to it without which there are only arbitrary
methods and sterile effects." Emmanuel Mounier, "Christianisme
et communisme," Feu la Chrétienté', translated and quoted in Roy
Pierce, Contemporary FrenchPolitical Thought (London: Oxford
University Press, 1966) , p. 75.
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Today the priest can not be satisfied only to
say his prayers, standing with folded arms before
the problems that afflict the masses . . . . For
too long we have acted as a brake; now we must
act as an accelerator; for had we spoken out more
clearly in the past, millions of human beings
would not today be experiencing penury and
misery . . . . I am not a partisan of violence,
but I am of the opinion that we can not be con
tent with the hyricism of fine phrases that
solve none of the grave social problems.
In addition to implicitly defining a new social policy for the
Church, which was apparently to be offered as an alternative to
the government's "fine phrases," the speech included references
to the failure of capitalism to solve Brazil’s problems.
Dorn Holder's speech, like so many other speeches by church
men during 1967 and 1968, seemed to challenge the government for
the leadership of national development.

The suggestions of

Marxian alternatives to national development were in strong
contradiction to the stringent anti-communist principles of
the "revolution."

It is not surprising, then, that the Costa

e Silva government, which in the tradition of the "revolution"
felt development could only be realized by resisting political
participation and developing a strong capitalist economy, inter
preted this kind of speech as an attempt to subvert its political
and economic reforms.

48

The conservative members of the Catholic Church hierarchy,

47

Cited in Dunne, o p . c_^j_, p. 309.

48
Norman Gall discusses the tensions between the military
government and the Church in "Latin America: The Churcli Militfnit,"
Commentary, April, 1970, pp. 28-31.
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upset over what they felt was an infiltration of the Church by
communists, revived the "Society for the Defense of Tradition,
Family, and Property" (TFP) , which had so effectively helped to
mobilize support against Goulart in 1964.

After quickly winning

government and military support it launched a vigorous campaign
against the members of the progressive Church who had been
speaking out against the government.
At this point, it seems, the government incorrectly per
ceived the conservative and the more progressive Catholics as
comprising two, distinct collections of uniform attitudes, one
supporting and one in opposition to the government.

In fact,

the Church's hierarchy was comprised of clergy with widely
varying political views.

And whereas the Castello government

had managed to avoid significant clashes with the Church, Costa
e Silva's government did not.

With the linha dura wielding more

influence in governmental matters, high-ranking officers began
to levy verbal assaults against all progressive Catholics, call
ing them Marxists, leftists, and subversives.

The result was to

polarize the Church's hierarchy by forcing moderate and liberal
clergy to identify with either the extreme right or extreme
left.*^^

Thomas C. Bruneau explains the process of polarization
in the Catholic Church during the Costa e Silva government in,
"The Changing Political Role of the Catholic Church," in Con
temporary Brazil: Issues in Economic and Political Development,
ed. 15y
Jon Rosenbaum andTWi11iam Ü . Ty1er (New York: Praege c
Publishers, 1972), pp. 317-18.
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Where prior to 1964 the Church had cooperated with the
state in effecting social change (primarily by passively sup
porting the government’s policies), by the end of 1967 the
Church found itself in opposition to the state on the issue
of social development.

Although the progressive Church had

continued to support the same kind of development policies
begun under Quadros and Goulart, the military government had
adopted policies that emphasized political and social stabil50
ity.
Because of its outspoken manner, by 1967 the Church
had placed itself in a position of opposition to the govern
ment and was the only formal institution that consistently
dared to criticize the regime's excesses.

51

As the government’s problems with the student organizations
and the Church increased, its relation with Congress, particu
larly with the supposed pro-government ARENA, also continued to
deteriorate.

After failing to assume the political initiative

during the new government's period of indecisiveness (March to
June 1 9 6 7 ) , ARENA gradually began to assert itself to the
extent that by the end of the 1967 session Costa e Silva was
confronted with a parliamentary revolt.

For the first time

Thomas C. Bruneau discusses the erosion of church-state
relations over the question of political and social change in
his work, "Power and Influence; Analysis of the Church in Latin
America and the Case of Brazil," Latin American Research Review,
VIII (Summer, 1973), 41-43.
^^Bruneau,

"Changing Political Role of the Catholic Church,"

299.
^2$ee Schneider, Political System, pp. 211, 213.
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Congress rejected a presidential decree law and attempted to
circumvent the constitutional provisions which prevented it
from initiating legislation involving additional government
expenditures.

More significantly, twenty-nine ARENA legis

lators voted for an MDB-sponsored constitutional amendment
calling for the restoration of direct presidential elections.
Although the ramifications of this revolt were as potentially
dangerous as the end-of-the-session revolts in 1965 and 1966,
Congress was not forced into recess nor were any cassations
decreed.
The first nine months of the Costa e Silva government
had been marked by undulating outbursts of dissent and 1967
closed with a lull in political confrontations.

Yet, the

antagonisms between the government and each pocket of opposi
tion remained unresolved, requiring only a catalyst to touch
off a chain reaction of protest and confrontation.
1968: Confrontation and Reaction
In a series of interviews during December, 1967 Admiral
Jose Saldanha da Gama, Minister of the Supreme Military Tri
bunal, disclosed that the military’s position of national
leadership was still a subject of debate within the military
itself.

In one such interview Saldanha observed:
The military continue to interfere violently
in the nation’s destinies; it is everywhere de
fending something that it calls national security
but that I call internal security.
The military

5 3 i b i d . , p. 224.
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does not live its basic purpose which is prep
aration for the external defense of the country.
The enemy of the military is the civilian popu
lation; it [the military] exists to occupy ihe
country; it is everywhere except in the barracks
where it ought to be, carrying out its purpose.^4
Subsequent interviews with the prestigious Saldanha da Gama
further demonstrated that the military was far from united on
the question of whether it should retain power or withdraw to
its traditional position of poder moderador.

Once broached, the

question of the military retaining power became a critical issue
of public debate, forcing the Costa e Silva government to pro
vide what the linha dura felt was an expedient answer.
Coincident with the publication of Saldanha da Gama’s inter
views, Carlos Lacerda engaged in another barrage of criticisms of
the incumbent government, presumably in an attempt to increase
tensions within the armed forces to the benefit of his flounder
ing Frente Ampla.

If at this point he could have convinced a

substantial portion of the civilian population that his condem
nations were shared by influential military personnel (whom he
hoped would express more criticisms of the military government),
the possibility of a successful opposition movement would be
come more viable.

He did succted in establishing dialogues

with Albuquerque Lima, thereby exposing the conflicting inter
pretations within the military of its political function; but
while Lacerda was able to encourage anti-government demonstra-

^^For excerpts of several of Saldanha da Gama's interviews
with Galera, the student magazine of the Navy School, see ibid.,
p. 225 .
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tions, he was still unable to mobilize a wide following for
his Frente Amp1a .
As the fourth anniversary of the "revolution'* approached
university students, who had been relatively quiet since August,
1967, planned massive protest demonstrations against the mili
tary government.

On March 28, 1967 military police killed a

student as they attempted to break up such a demonstration, in
the process creating a martyr for the student movement.

This

death also served to heighten the already increasing public
sympathy for the students' cause.

On March 29 fifty thousand

persons, including thousands of non-students, attended the slain
student's funeral, touching off a series of massive sympathy
demonstrations which marched under slogans like "Down with the
Fascist DictajLorship" and "Organized People Will End Dictator
ship."^^

Because such demonstrations were held in violation of

a government ban on them, the government chose to interpret and
deal with them as part of a subversive plot.
In Rio de Janeiro priests and nuns, who had participated in
an April sympathy demonstration, were brutally assaulted by
military security forces.

This type of government brutality

only served to reinforce the Church's sympathy for the students,
who themselves were being dispersed by increasingly violent
t a c t i c s . B u t such government tactics also had broader imnli-

SSpobert 0. My hr describes this entire phase of the student
movement in his work, "Student Activism and Development," in
Contemporary Brazil, op. cit., pp. 358-60 .
^^See "Surpassing All Limits of Unpopularity," Time,
July 5, 1968 , p . 34.
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cations for the entire political system.
plains

As one author ex

. . little opportunity was afforded the moderates

to find ways to avoid polarization and ultimate violent con57
frontation.*•

But the government, feeling it had '’a monopoly

on honesty, patriotism, and national i n t e r e s t m u s t have
concluded that for reasons of national security it was neces
sary to repress any opposition.
Convinced the Frente Ampla was coordinating civil protest,
the government declared that organization illegal.

Because of

this decision, Lacerda acquired a large sympathetic following,
something he had been unable to do while promoting the Frente
Ampla.

By July even influential ARENA deputies had begun to

insist that it alter its policy toward the s.tudents. and listen
to some of their demands.

59

Instead, Costa e Silva ignored

these requests by the "revolution's" own political party.

In

an error of tactical judgment Costa e Silva decided at this
point to implement a reform proposal calling for a reduction
of government expenditures on education, a move that was viewed
as a betrayal of his earlier pledges to expand educational
facilities.

This apparent complete disregard for public

opinion seems to indicate that Costa e Silva was becoming
increasingly subject to the pressures of the linha dura.
57schneider,

Political System, p. 262.

^^See Howard J. Wiarda, "Crisis is Coming in Brazil,"
New Republic, September 14, 1967, p. 16.
^^Mhyr, o p . cit., p. 359.
^^See New York Times, March 17, 1967, p. 18.
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In the eyes of the regime, resistance to its initiatives
had come to be equated with s u b v e r s i o n . W i t h the conven
tional forms of opposition either outlawed or rendered inef
fective by the government's arbitrary use of its expanded
constitutional powers, violence soon replaced demonstrations
as the predominant form of protest.

Bombing of government

facilities and thefts of military arms and explosives prolif
erated.

Thousands of suspected "subversives” were rounded up

in mass arrests, including the 739 who attended the UNE's 30th
62
Congress.
The government was not without its allies during the on
slaught of violence.

Inspired by the government's Department

of Public Order and Security (itself only under the nominal
control of the President), groups like the Anti-Communist Move
ment and the Comando Caca Communistas (Communist Hunters Com
mand) were formed.

They acted like vigilante groups who

exterminated "subversives" without fear of government reprisal,
justifying their violence with mottoes like: "For every dead
democrat we'll kill five Communists."

As one Communist Hunter

spokesman explained, "Through our violence we hope to provoke a

^^See Schneider, Political System, p. 110.
/I

O

Expecting a violent showdown with the students attending
the Congress, hundreds of armed military policemen surrounded
the site of the Congress, only to find unarmed, sleeping stu
dents.
See "Edging Toward the Brink," Time, October 25, 1963,
p. 48.
63see "Threat from the Right," Newsweek, December 9, 1968,
p. 52.
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rightist reaction in the indecisive government so that the
leftists can be totally eliminated.
Government and military personnel were repeatedly impli
cated in the activities of these anti-communists groups and
the Costa e Silva government appeared reluctant to dissociate
itself from them.

As the head of security for the state of

Rio de Janeiro explained, "There is no doubt the terrorist
actions of the right have actually helped us by putting fear
into the left."

Considerations of national security appar

ently encouraged the government to rely on a progressively
narrowing political base on the right; those not in total
agreement with the government seemed to be classified as
"subversive" opponents.
The problems of a military partially but not completely
in power (e.g., permitting the existence of a "representative"
legislative body) had by now become evident.

An insecure gov

ernment of men thoroughly indoctrinated with a rather rigid
doctrine of national security had been prone to exaggerate the
subversive threat and to meet demonstrations of opposition by
excessive repression.

As a result, a vicious cycle had been

set in motion: repression led to violent reaction which only
generated more repression.
In 1966 Sidney Lens suggested that a government which lacks
popular support, as the Branco government did at the time, must
one day perform a "massive bloodletting" or be swept aside by a

64ibid.
65ibid.
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r e v o l u t i o n . T h i s was especially true by August, 1968, for
on any standard of comparison the Costa e Silva government had
far less popular support than its unpopular predecessor.^^
Opposition to the government appeared varied and ubiquitous
and the government’s responses to it seemed to reflect the ten
sions within the armed forces.

On the one hand, many officers,

frustrated over the daily responsibility for governing the na
tion, expressed a desire for the military to withdraw from pol
itics and return to its former poder moderador.

They were,

therefore, reluctant to support any governmental action that
might draw the military even further into the political arena.
On the other hand, the purges and widespread threat of the return
of the exiled to politics made withdrawal from politics an unten
able alternative for the linha dura.

This group was confident

that, if all political restraints were removed, the "revolution”
could resolve the crisis and better pursue its objectives.
The tense, deteriorating condition of the political system
seemed to require a catalyst to bring the crisis to a head and
to force the military to decide whether it would assume total
power or withdraw completely from politics, since a revolution
against the military government was quite unlikely.

^^See Sidney Lens, "Brazil's Police State," The Progressive,
XXX (December, 1966), 34.
f\ 7

For an example of one comparison of the relative popular
support of the first two "revolutionary" governments, see Paui.
Montgomery, "Brazilian Poll Finds Dissention on Government,"
New York Times, May 22, 1968, p. 12.
‘ ''See Stepan, o p . cit., p. 259.
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One incident that precipitated a solution to the deepening
crisis was a speech before Congress on September 3, 1968 by
Marcio Moreira Alves,

Calling for a "boycott of militarism,"

he recommended that parents keep their children out of the
September 7 Independence Day parade as a gesture of protest
against, what he termed, "the nest of torturera."

69

Immediately,

the more conservative, middle level officers, already convinced
of a conspiracy to discredit the armed forces,
Alves be punished for his remarks.

70

insisted that

Costa e Silva, perhaps wary

that yet another unpopular decision might incite another out
burst of violence, approved the proceedings to cassate Alves,
but insisted that ratification of the charges come from Congress
itself.
The President's decision turned out to be a disastrous
gamble.

The best he could have hoped for was that the ARENA

delegation would interpret his decision not to cassate Alves
as a sign that his position was "softening."

Congress might

then have sacrificed one opposition deputy in the interest of
encouraging further executive moderation.

This done, the

President’s popular support might then increase but would also
place him in a position of having to make further concessions,
lest he disappoint the now-expectant nation.

But such a develop-

Perhaps the best account of Alves' speech can be found
in Jose Yglesias, "What the Left Is Saying," New York Times
Magazine, December 7, 1969, p. S3.
70

Schneider, Political System, p. 271.
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ment was unlikely because throughout the 1968 session Congress
had remained insubordinate; ARENA deputies had frequently
crossed the aisle to vote with the opposition against the
government.

It was possible, then, that a vote on Alves*

cassation might serve as a rough indicator of the regime’s
71
popularity.
Congress finally considered Alves* cassation on December
11, 1968, voting 216 to 141 against punishment; at least 93
ARENA deputies voted with the opposition.

The defeat of such

a vital executive measure convinced the military that Congress
could no longer be allowed to function.
Furthermore, the officers tended to carry over
Into the sphere of party politics a military con
cept of discipline. Thus, "abandonment" of the
government by centrist ARENA elements on a critical
issue was viewed as partaking . . . of desertion
in the face of the e n e m y . 72
Although Costa e Silva had resisted demands by the linha dura
to decree an institutional act early in 1968, such a measure
now appeared inevitable.
Institutional Act #5 : Another Military Crisis Resolved
While there does not appear to have been an outright attempt
71

Given the state of executive-legislative relations at
this point, it seems highly unlikely that the popularity of the
regime could not help but to influence Congress* vote more so
than the real issue, that of freedom of speech.
72

See Schneider, Political System, p. 72. Since there were
only 123 MDB deputies, an "additional 93 votes were needed for
the 216 votes against cassation.
In addition, 12 blank ballots
were cast. See Roett, op. cit., p. 39.
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to oust Costa e Silva (as there had been against Gastello in
1965) the President was forced to yield to enough hard line
demands that the December, 1968 crisis came to be called "a
coup within a coup.”

71

It seems that Gastello's promotion

strategy had prevented a move of force by the linha dura
against the President, but Gastello's appointees had not
wielded sufficient influence to prevent the imposition of
more political restrictions on the nation.
The President succumbed to the demands of the linha dura
in the form of the Fifth Institutional Act of December 13, 1968.
The Act was justified as necessary
. . . to assure the authentic democratic order
based on liberty, on respect for the dignity of
the human being, on the combat of subversion and
ideologies contrary to the tradition of our peo
ple, on the fight against corruption . . . in
order to confront directly and immediately the
problems of restoring the public order and
international prestige of our c o u n t r y . 74
The thrust of this statement seems to suggest that at this point
the government interpreted its promise to restore democracy as
restoring stability to the present, "revolutionary” order of
politics, not restoring a purified version of "democracy” as
it had existed prior to 1964,

"Normalization of politics” now

seemed to mean eliminating public discontent in what the

73

Bruneau,

op. cit., p. 517.

^^See Frances M. Poland,"The. Prospects for Brazil: Costa
e Silva's Military Dictatorship," New Leader, LII (January 20,
1969), 8.
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•'revolution" now seemed to believe was an already, authentic
democratic system.
Article II of the Act granted the President the power to
recess Congress, legislative assemblies, and municipal councils
by decreeing complementary acts; they were not to reconvene
until ordered to do so by the President.

Coincident with the

promulgation of this Act was the decree of Complementary Act
#38, which, in the words of one observer, "dismissed Congress
with the ease and insouciance of a Fairy Godmother waving her
wand."

75

The President was empowered "in the interest of the

•revolution’" and "without limitations prescribed in the Constitution^’ to cancel the rights of any citizen for ten years,
to place further restrictions on cassados, and cancel the man
date of any elected official.

In addition, the President,

having been empowered to declare a state of seige under Article
152 of the 1967 Constitution, was authorized to extend a state
of seige beyond the Constitutional maximum of sixty days, to
"confiscate the property of those who have enriched themselves
illicitly" and to suspend the guarantees of habeas corpus in
political crimes against the national security and the economic
and social order.

7fS

Just as the linha dura exploited a political crisis to

75

"Flying Down to Rio,*' National Review, December 31,
1968, p. 1307.
^^For an English translation of the Fifth Institutional
Act, see Burns, History of Brazil, pp. 411-13.
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radicalize military opinion and to force Gastello to the right
in 1965, now it had maneuvered Costa e Silva into a position
where he was forced to submit to their demands.

The military

government's own Constitution, largely the work of the Sorbonnists, had proved unacceptable to the linha dura ; by the
end of 1968 they had found it necessary to violate it in order
to assume unambiguous control over the nation.
vestiges of democracy were thereby removed.

The last

The inconvenience

of elected, civilian interference was suspended and the demon
stration of anti-regime sentiment outlawed under the pretense
of national security.
The Second Phase of the "Revolution": An Overview
During this phase of the "revolution” there had been fewer
alterations in the patterns of political recruitment than there
had been during Gastello's term, although the armed forces was
utilized more as a source of government personnel during the
Costa e Silva government.

The Cabinet and other governmental

positions, formerly held only by civilians, now showed a prepondrance of military figures.

In addition, until he decreed

the Fifth Institutional Act, Costa e Silva initiated few altera
tions in the procedures that had become anticipated and accepted
in the processing and implementation of demands under the 1967
Constitution.

Presumably in an attempt to favorably influence

public opinion, he decreed fewer laws and exercised the powers
of the presidency in a less authoritarian manner than his pre
decessor.

But in his attempt to win more civilian support for

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

149

the ’’revolution” Costa e Silva actually laid the groundwork
for the Fifth Institutional Act.
In his concern for military and public opinion Costa e
Silva offered a dramatic contrast to Castello Branco.

Whereas

the latter remained steadfastly apolitical, refusing to mobilize
support for his policies, Costa e Silva displayed a vacillating
political style, striving to satisfy a variety of elements within
the political system.

Initially he realized a high level of pub

lic support and an apparent high degree of independence from the
linha dura, which he sought to placate by way of compromise.

Yet,

he still labored under the same types of restraints his pre
decessor had.
In light of Castello’s experiences with the linha dura it
was evident he had to remain true to the principles of the
"revolution.”

Policy changes were acceptable so long as they

did not jeopardize continued economic recovery, political sta
bility devoid of populism, and the elimination of corruption
and subversion.
paramount.

Considerations of national security remained

But during the interval between his election and

his inauguration, Costa e Silva appeared to be oblivious to
these restraints, speaking with ease about "democratic normali
zation," establishing dialogues with the people, and "bringing
prosperity to the people."

It soon became evident that these

kinds of policies could be pursued only to the extent they did
not interfere with the military’s rigid doctrine of national
security.
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Perhaps Costa e Silva’s greatest shortcoming was his re
peated failure to convert a sufficient number of demands of
the politically relevant members of the political system, who
had been encouraged to demand more by Costa’s rhetoric, into
policy outputs or to give the impression that these demands
would be fulfilled sometime in the future.
a r e n a ’s

77

The demands of

congressional delegation, the Catholic Church, and the

students were largely ignored and many times interpreted as
subversive in nature.

In addition, Costa e Silva was forced

to reverse certain policy changes once the effects of such
changes came to be interpreted as detrimental to the national
security.

Both of these developments led to a steady erosion

of support for the nation's leadership and the rules and norms
that governed the decision-making process.

Support for the

authorities and regime reached such a low level that the
Costa e Silva government was required to institute widesweeping
institutional and procedural changes, once the influential mem
bers of the linha dura determined that the military would not
withdraw from politics.
David Easton asserts that a highly stratified political
system, with only indirect communications between the members
of the various levels, can persist even if it receives only a
minimum of support from the ordinary members of the system, so
long as each intermediary level of leadership evinces strong

77
See Easton, o p . cit., pp. 47-53 and Chapter 14.
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attachment to the next higher level of leadership.

78

In Brazil,

primarily as a result of Costa e Silva’s policies, the political
system had been polarized into two extreme positions with only
a minute intermediary group.

By interpreting opposition as sub

version and denying its expression, the Costa e Silva govern
ment removed the likelihood that the political system could
continue to function without substantial modification.

The

concern of the linha dura for unity and political stability
resulted in a second, progressive stage of isolation of the
military government from the civilian population.

^^Ibid., p. 227.
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CHAPTER IV

REVOLUTIONARY PRINCIPLES WITHSTAND A
"REVOLUTION WITHIN THE REVOLUTION"
This chapter focuses on the period between the Fifth
Institutional Act of December 13, 1968 and March, 1970, the
sixth anniversary of the "revolution."

The circumstances

surrounding Costa e Silva's erosion of military support and
the ensuing succession crisis are examined in some detail.
The military's solutions for this crisis suggested that true
democracy would be realized only in the very indefinite future.
Implanting a Military Dictatorship
The promulgation of the Fifth Institutional Act once
again served to indicate that the Brazilian political system
had lost its capacity of jeitinho, or to slide through each
crisis without violence or total breakdown of the existing
political processes.

As the political stakes had become

more important, politics likewise had become more deadly
serious.

By the end of 1968 the traits of compromise and non

violence, characteristics the Brazilian people had long imagined

^See leda S. and Howard J. Wiarda, "Revolution or CounterRevolution in Brazil?" The Massachusetts Review, VIII (Winter,
1967), 163.
152
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their social order possessed,
decisions and violence.

2

had been replaced by arbitrary

The overall effect of the Fifth In

stitutional Act, in particular, was quite disruptive to Brazil's
political processes and the expectations that the Brazilian
people had for their government.
In seeking to restore political stability prior to issu
ing the Fifth Institutional Act the military governments had
continued to tinker with Brazil's political system, hoping that,
perhaps with the re-writing of certain rules and the elimination
of a few more opponent^, the system would begin to function
according to its expectations.

Prior to December, 1968, mili

tary intervention in Brazil's political life had been justified
as a temporary, instructional necessity with repeated lipservice given to the notion that "democracy" would shortly be
restored.

Even the 1967 Constitution retained a body of

popularly-elected representatives, which although severely
restrained could still act as a kind of "check" against the
executive; the 1967 document also included an electoral appa
ratus by which the military might withdraw from power.

How

ever, with the issuance of the Fifth Institutional Act tutelary
%
democracy was supplanted by an open military dictatorship.

^The Brazilian self-image of being a non-violent society
is tested by Henry H. Keith in his article, "The Nonviolent
Tradition in Brazilian History: A Myth in Need of Explosion?"
in Conflict and Continuity in Brazilian Society, ed. by Henry
H. Keith and S . Fl Edwards (Columbia: University of South
Carolina Press, 1969), pp. 231-40.
*Z
Stepan, op. cit., p. 216.
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Apparently distraught over the regime’s dismal performance
between March, 1964 and December, 1968, despite a successive
increment of executive power during that time, the military
renewed the unfinished task of defining its authority role; it
did so by violating its own self-imposed, constitutional limita
tions and, in the process, by expanding the scope of its govern
ing authority.

In the words of one author, after December 13,

1968
Harsh repression quickly replaced benevolent
semi-authoritarianism . . . . The survival and
permanence of the "revolution," it was announced,
were vital, and its irreversibility had to be
guaranteed.4
Before undertaking to insure the permanence of the "revolu
tion," however, Costa e Silva found it necessary to guarantee
his continuation as President.

In a speech before the Army's

Command and General Staff school on December 16, 1968 he at
tempted to recover the political initiative and to reassure
skeptical members of the linha dura that he shared their com
mitment to the principles of the "revolution."

He pleaded that

he was a "companion in arms," who "not even for one day forgets
his loved days in the Brazilian military."

He continued, "The

tranquility and order of the country are our responsibility."^
He stressed that whenever conditions required it "revolutions
within the revolution" should be made by the armed forces.^

^Rosenbaum, "Brazil's Military Regime," 74.
^"Justifying the Crackdown," Time, December 27, 1968, p. 24.
^Speaking before the predominantly military audience, Costa
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It appears that the emphasis placed on the military's re
sponsibility to guarantee ’’order” and its obligation to promote
"revolutionary” changes implied that the President perceived a
political role for the armed forces which would require it to
retain governing authority indefinitely.

Withdrawal from pol

itics, given this perception, seemed remote.

Combined with the

ascendant priority placed on order and stability, the strong
likelihood that the military would continue to govern must have
allayed the hard-liners’ fear of Costa e Silva’s revolutionary
intentions.

Having made his peace with the linha dura, the

President moved to silence the regime’s critics.
On December 30, 1968 Costa e Silva exercised the power of
cassation for the first time in his term, suspending the polit
ical rights of eleven persons.

Included in his list of cassados

were: Carlos Lacerda, whose presidential aspirations were thus
7
laid to rest for at least a decade; Marcio Moreira Alves, whose
speech helped to precipitate the executive-legislative showdown;
and other individuals associated with the Frente Ampla.

These

cassations were followed on January 16, 1969 with the most exten
sive purge of the national legislature to date: two senators and

said, ” . . . ^ will make new revolutions."
Political System, p. 276.

See Schneider,

Who could have foreseen such a development back in 1964
when in a speech praising the "revolution” Lacerda said: "In
Brazil today there is more freedom than ever before. Only those
few who wanted to destroy liberty for everyone have lost the
liberty to do so." See "Brazil: The New Government," Vital
Speeches, XXX (September 15, 1964), 719.
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thirty-five deputies (primarily from the MDB) were expelled,
principally because of their antagonistic actions toward the
’’revolution" in the past.

On February 7, thirty-three congress

men were cassated, bringing the total to seventy-seven deputies
O
cassated under Institutional Act #5.
Costa e Silva seemed in
tent on making certain that when (and if) Congress was recon
vened it would not again disappoint the "revolution's" expecta
tions .
Upon the promulgation of the Fifth Institutional Act an
editorial in 0 Estado de Sao Paulo charged:

"You can’t run a
g
country of eighty million people like an army division."
But
the government thought otherwise.

It invoked the Press Law

and clamped a state of strict censorship on the communications
media, proclaiming that anyone who published articles detri
mental to the national security would be arrested.

The armed

forces occupied the offices of several of Brazil's leading
newspapers and many of the country’s leading journalists were
arrested.
Under the conditions of outright censorship many newspapers
ceased publications altogether until the government eased its
press policy and called for "self-censorship" on the part of the
press and broadcast media.

Even then no overt unfavorable

8See Schneider, Political System, p. 275. Note: Not all of
the congressmen who were purged suffered cassation. The MDB was
hardest hit by the purges, losing 40 percent of its strength in
the Chamber.
^Cited in "Crackdown in Brazil," Time, December 20, 1968,
p. 36.
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editorial comments on the government and its institutional acts
were espoused because press and broadcast officials were re
quired to adhere to strict governmental guidelines in order to
resume operations.^®

Still, the press occasionally conveyed

the mood of the nation.

With no reference to meteorological

conditions, a front page Journal do Brasil weather report read:
Weather black. Temperature Suffocating.
The
air is unbreathable. The country is being
swept by a strong w i n d . H
As the government's definition of subversive activity expanded
in scope, however, the requirements of "self-censorship" became
increasingly restrictive.

As a result, in the succeeding years

critical political commentary came to be noticeably absent in
a nation that had traditionally enjoyed a free and often sensa
tional press.
The purges of the forcefully closed Congress and the cen
sorship of the media were accompanied by a renewed government
effort to reform the rules and authority structures of the
political system.

With the final vestiges of representative,

democracy stripped away, the Costa e Silva government steered
a closely guided course to the right, toward the further involve
ment of the military in more areas of Brazilian life.
Reforms Within the "Revolution Within the Revolution"
As Stepan explains, the increasing removal of "buffers,"

Rosenbaum, op. cit., 75.
^^Cited in "Crackdown in Brazil," op. cit., p. 36.
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such as Congress, "made the government even more exposed to the
1?
conflicting demands coming from different military groups." "
The persisting tensions between the two dominant opinions within
the military regarding the issue of continued military presence
in Brazil’s political life had not been alleviated as a result
of the Fifth Institutional Act.
visible.

They were merely rendered less

Several reasons account for this situation.

First, press censorship prevented the publication of anti1%
government sentiment that existed within the armed forces.
As a result, the military was able to project a false image of
unity.
Second, the resignation of Interior Minister Albuquerque
Lima (who had been at odds with Costa e Silva since his unsuc
cessful attempt to unseat the President in December, 1968)
strengthened the President’s authority, at least initially.
The Cabinet was thereby reduced to a body of uniform opinion;
presidential directives were implemented with a minimum of
intra-government opposition.

This development helped to dis

guise the growing polarization of the military hierarchy and
the lower levels of the command structure.
Finally, because of a new series of retirements and promo
tions and the President's increasingly favorable disposition

1?

Stepan, o p . cit., pp. 261-62.

^^The press censorship clouded many of the details of
developments within the military throughout 1969. See
Schneider, Political System, p. 273.
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toward the principles of the linha dura,^^ by February, 1969
the hard line opinion had emerged as clearly as predominant
within both the government and armed forces.

In this regard,

the military high command was perhaps more unified in opinion
than it had been since the 1964 ’’revolution.”
All of these conditions and developments helped Costa e
Silva present his government as one united in purpose, acting
first on the behalf of those civilians who still supported
the ’’revolution.”

Yet simultaneously, this image of a united

front also masked the potential turmoil brewing within the
military,

15

which, while it was not evident, increasingly in

fluenced the direction the ’’revolution” took during 1969.
February 1, 1969 marked the beginning of a seven month
period during which the authority structures and the rules of
decision-making and political recruitment underwent extensive'
modification.

On that date Costa e Silva decreed the Sixth

Institutional Act, which reduced the Supreme Court membership
from sixteen to eleven justices and reaffirmed the jurisdiction
of the Superior Military Court over national security crimes.

14

Rosenbaum argues that Costa e Silva’s move to the right
was designed to placate his hard-line critics within the mili
tary. ’’Brazil’s Military Regime,” 74.
^^Some officers (up to the rank of colonel) were so dis
enchanted with the military regime during 1968 that they estab
lished contacts with Lacerda and Kubitschek to discuss how a
military withdrawal might best be expedited.
See Francis B.
Kent, ’’Brazilian Storm Warning,” The Nation, February 10, 1969,
p. 178. Their convictions were not easily dissuaded after such
contacts were prevented by the Fifth Institutional Act.
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The first provision of the Act actually amended Article 113
of the 1967 Constitution and represented a retreat from the
regime's own Institutional Act #2, which had increased the
membership from eleven to sixteen.

(See Chapter II).

Why the Supreme Court was retained at all is not clear.
It, like Congress, had drawn the wrath of the government in
the weeks before December 13, 1968 by granting writs of
habeas corpus to some seventy-nine students who had been sum
marily arrested by the military p o l i c e . A f t e r three justices
were forced into retirement on December 30, 1968 a succession
of Supreme Court justices refused the "honor” of succeeding
the President of the Court; in fact, two more justices resigned,
17
leaving the Court with only eleven judges. •

Perhaps to avoid

any further embarrassment in seeking replacements, Costa e
Silva decided to freeze the Court's membership at this point.
The composition of the Supreme Court at the time of the
Sixth Institutional Act was of limited significance because it
was prohibited from hearing any cases except those the govern
ment would allow it to review.

All the acts initiated in accord

with the Fifth Institutional Act and the "effects" of those acts
were exempt from judicial review.

In addition, the Supreme

Supreme Court decisions during the latter part of 1969
were extremely unpopular with the military government, partic
ularly in light of other simultaneous political developments.
See Schneider, Political System, pp. 272-73.
17

f

In 1863 a similar series of resignations by Supreme
Court justices■occurred. That case served as a precedent for
the justices to follow in 1969.
See Schneider, Political
System, p. 2 75.
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Military Court held exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving
national security, the volume of which increased as the concept
of national security drew a progressively expanded definition.
With the pretense of democracy dropped and the chances of an
appeal to the Supreme Court all but nonexistent, the functions
of the Supreme Court throughout 1969 and 1970 were just as sym
bolic as its existence.
On February 26, 1969 Institutional Act #7 was issued.

It

provided for the cancellation of all elections scheduled to be
held before the gubernatorial and congressional elections
slated for November, 1970.

The President was authorized to

set new dates for elections as he felt necessary.

This Act

also recessed the MDB-controlled legislatures of Goias and
Para and provided for governmental regulation over legisla
tive assemblies and municipal councils in matters involving
salaries and special sessions.

This Act seemed to suggest

that the military government would intervene in the affairs
of state and municipal legislatures whenever it concluded those
institutions were promoting policies (or sentiment) which might
jeopardize the peaceful social order or interfere with the smooth
implementation of national government policy.
Decree Law #477 also appeared on February 26.

Unlike the

Seventh Institutional Act, which authorized the closure of
institutions whenever it appeared those institutions were
facilitating conditions contrary to the interests of the gov
ernment (and therefore the nation), the intent of Decree Law
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#477 seems to have been to correct conditions in order that
educational institutions might remain open.

In the words of

Fagundes Bandeira, the decree law
. . . aimed at actions designed to bring to a
standstill the activities of the [educational]
institution; plots against persons or property;
acts designed to organize, or participate [sic]
in subversive movements, picketings, parades
or unauthorized assemblies; the transportation,
preparation, printing, possession or distribu
tion of "subversive" material of any nature.18
The logic of the laws enacted on February 26 was allinclusive and in a strange way disclosed the priorities of the
military government.

Under the provisions of the Institutional

Act, if an institution failed to perform up to the expectations
of the

government, it would simply be closed.The national and

statelegislatures had proven easy

to close.

But under the

decree law, the government seemed to have recognized it had a
vested interest in keeping the university system open.

As the

government was aware, when the universities had closed students
were freed to participate in demonstrations and terrorism.

19

If

the continued functioning of the universities was jeopardized, the
decree law provided for the eradication of the detrimental condi
tions and disruptive causes.

1A

Fagundes Bandeira, "Brazil: Subverting the Universities,"
The New Republic, November 8, 1969, p. 17. The author of this
article teaches in Brazil.
^^Historically, Brazilian students have played an impor
tant political role, especially when the universities have been
closed down. See Robert 0. Myhr, "The University Student Tradi
tion in Brazil." Journal of Inter-American Studies, XII (Jan
uary, 1970), 126-40.
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Under military rule some of the country's institutions
had to maintain a proper compatibility with a carefully con
trolled political environment, while the same environment was
manipulated to guarantee the proper functioning of other in
stitutions.

Regardless, the paramount consideration of the

military was to guarantee the "order” and "tranquility” of
Brazil.
Two interesting developments soon ensued.

On April 25,

1969 the Minister of Education issued instructions authorizing
anyone to bring charges of subversion against any member of
an educational institution.

If the director of such an insti

tution, who had the responsibility of judging each accusation,
found the accused not guilty, the case was automatically referred to the Minister of Education for further consideration.

20

In cases involving charges of subversive activity in an educa
tional facility, the accused stood guilty until proven innocent.
In a case involving thirty-six students on trial for subversion,
thirty-four were acquitted but two were punished because they
failed to "succeed in proving their innocence regarding recent
movements of agitation in the school.”

20

21

Bandeira, op. cit., p. 18.

^^0 Estado de Sao Paulo, July 30, 1969, cited in Bandeira,
op. cit., p. *18. The presumption of guilt until innocence is
proven is not entirely alien to the Brazilian legal system
since it was derived from Roman Law. See Fernando de Azevedo,
Brazilian Culture: An Introduction to the Study of Culture in
Brazil (New York: Uafner Publishing Company, 1971), p. 186.
Also see Peterson, op. cit., p. 565.
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But the government’s measures of repression were not con
fined to the academic community alone.

In March, Costa e Silva

issued decree laws calling for the punishment of anyone incit
ing activity against the regime in private as well as in public.
The law seemed to be aimed at those individuals engaged in
guerrilla warfare, terrorism and sabotage and those suspected
of inciting racial discrimination, animosity toward the armed
forces, subversion, and bank robbery.

22

All of these activities

were regarded as violations of the national security by the
armed forces.

The provision against bank robbery seemed to

imply that crimes against a private institution, that is as
vital to the economic and social order as a bank is, were now
to be equated with crimes against the government itself.

This

was a rather indirect, albeit effective, way of punishing crimes
that were disruptive of the social order as violations of the
national security.

In addition, it now appeared that meeting

for the purpose of planning any of the aforementioned activi
ties was a crime against the national security, even if the
decisions made at the meeting were not carried out.

The armed

forces were now nearing that point of involvement in the coun
try’s political life where the attempted regulation of what
people were thinking seemed to be an inevitable next step.
Increasing numbers of civilians, who had long sympathized
with the ’’revolution,” were now turning against the military

^^See ’’Brazil Tightening Her Security Laws,” The New York
Times, March 23, 1969, p. 12.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

165

government both as a result of these additional restrictions on
civil liberties and because of the excessive application of
23
earlier restrictions.
In fact, when Costa e Silva delivered
the state of the union address early in April, he divided it
into four one-hour installments in order not to antagonize the
television viewing audience by interfering with its favorite
evening soap o p e r a s . B u t while the government made rela
tively minor concessions in order to minimize middle-class
opposition, it found itself increasingly confronted by opposi
tion elements which had completely dissociated themselves from
the conventional means of opposition.
By 1969 opponents of the regime could be classified in
one of two general groups.

On the one hand there were the more

moderate elements that were still convinced the best way to op
pose the government and to promote social change and a rapid
return to democracy was to run opposition candidates in elections, to distribute pamphlets and to call strikes.

25

However,

increasing numbers of Brazilians, alienated by the government's
ban on political opposition in the name of national security,
swelled the ranks of opposition elements committed to the pro-

23Rosenbaum writes: "Some individuals who formerly admired
the political tranquility established by the regime became re
sentful because their friends and relatives were subjected to
harsh and sometimes brutal treatment." "Brazil's Military
Regime," 76.
Cheers for the Heroes," Time, April 11, 1969, p. 36.
25por a discussion of this, the more moderate group's meth
ods, as well as those of the more extreme groups, see Sanche de
Gramont, "How One Pleasant Scholarly Young Man From Brazil B e 
came a Kidnapping, Gun-toting, Bombing Revolutionary," The New
York Times Magazine, November 15, 1970, pp. 43-45.
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motion of social change via armed action and violence.
About the causes and ramifications of the growing appeal
of armed action as an alternative to peaceful protest, Rosen
baum has written:
The enemies of the regime were even more
embittered than previously and some began to
resort to terrorist methods.
For instance,
in the late winter and spring of 1969, polit
ically inspired bank robberies, calculated to
disrupt the economy, to finance future antigovernment activities, and, eventually, to
destroy the political system occurred almost
daily in Sao Paulo and . . . in Rio de Janeiro.
Bombings of government installations and mass
communications facilities also became common.
The government’s response was the application
of even sterner punishment.26
The greater the perceived threat to the survival of the regime,
27
the more vigorous its response.
Costa e Silva had reacted to anti-government opposition in
1968 by unintentionally closing the existing channels through
which grievances could have been addressed and redressed.

In

the process, the President set in motion another cycle of ci
vilian criticism, government repression of that criticism,
harsher and less conventional expressions of civil dissent,
and further repression by the government.

28

Those who remained

Rosenbaum, op. cit., 76.
27

Stepan asserts that with the rise in terrorist activity
against the government, the hard-liners became increasingly pre
occupied with repressive measures and even less concerned with
social reform. Stepan and Einaudi, op. cit., p. 114.
^^Stepan, op. cit., p. 262 and William G. Tyler, "Intro
duction : An Overview," in Contemporary Brazil: Issues in Eco-
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politically active were, in turn, forced by the government’s
national security policies to engage in activities that were
in violation of those policies.
Despite indications to the contrary, a sizable number of
Brazilians still remained fairly optimistic that a move toward
?Q
constitutional normalcy would soon occur.
By April, 1969
speculation abounded as to whom would be ARENA’S next Presi
dent when Congress reconvened, even though the government’s
statements as to when Congress would be called back into ses
sion remained vague.

This kind of speculation and accompany

ing hopes were rudely disappointed when 199 individuals were
purged from the universities and government service during the
last week in April.

With new ’’revolutions within the revolu

tion" being made with unpredictable frequency, it appeared
Brazil was headed more toward a kind of "revolutionary normalcy"
than constitutional normalcy.
. The concept of democracy itself was undergoing yet another
subtle transformation.

In February, 1969 Justice Minister Gama

e Silva defined democracy as "a magic word, a concept that varies

nomic and Political .Development, ed. by H. Jon Rosenbaum and
William G . Tyler (New York; Praeger Publishers, 1972), p. 9.
^^Political speculation was on the upswing by mid-1969 as
indicated by two political polls.
See Schneider, Political
System, pp. 284, 287.
^*^The concept of "revolutionary normalcy" was put forth by
Justice Minister Gama e Silva to justify the continuation of tiie
regime’s arbitrary powers; a return to constitutional normalcy
was still referred to as being probably only in the indefinite
future. See Schneider, Political System, p. 278.
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in time and place, principally in an instant, like that through
which we are passing, that is the moment of the Revolution.
Previous reference by the government to "democracy" suggested
that it was a preconceived system of interaction that would be
instituted once the "revolution" accomplished its objectives.
Now, "democracy" seemed to be coterminous with the "revolution,"
a pragmatic concept, devoid of principles, and subject to
redefinition according to the direction and character the
"revolution" assumed.
On May 18, 1969 the President decreed Institutional Act
#10, levying still more restrictions against cassados (those
deprived of their political rights).

The Act, retroactive to

March 31, 1964, specified that the suspension of political
rights, also included (1) compulsory retirement from any public
enterprise that was in part state-owned, (2) termination of
any electoral mandate that had not already been cancelled and
(3) a prohibition on holding positions in foundations, public
service institutions, educational establishments or organizations that were in any way concerned with national security.

32

Restrictions like these must have had a deterrent effect on
many kinds of political activity (except by the most radical)
and must have served to reinforce political apathy.

The intru

sion of the military government into the private lives of

^^Quoted in Schneider, Political System, p. 2 78.
^^Facts on File Yearbook: 1969, ed. by Lester A. Sobel
(New YoxTcT Facts on File, Inc. , 1970), pp. 362-63.
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Brazilians had now reached the point where it could deny a
livelihood to anyone who lost his political rights.
Throughout 1969 urban terrorism and violence proliferated
apace.

According to Schneider, by the middle of 1969 the pri

mary concern of the armed forces high command was one of de
veloping a democratic system, which could defend itself against
the dangers of the pre-1964 modernizing elite and clientelistic
politics.

33

The military government, on the other hand, seems

to have become totally preoccupied with repressing its per
ceived enemies; the desired end result of its repressive meas
ures was not at all c l e a r . P e r i o d i c a l l y tensions flared
between the armed forces high command and the government and,
though not serious in and of themselves, these tensions took
on added significance-as Costa e Silva fell into disfavor with
the various factions within the military.
It appears that by the middle of 1969 the issue of con
tinued military rule had been resolved in the affirmative by
the military leaders.

But this resolution really represented

contrasting opinions within the military.

Lower ranking offi-

33
Schneider, Political System, p. 288. Reference to the
"high command" shall be understood to include all of those
officers of four and five-star rank, or any officer exercising
authority over strategic commands. The three military ministers
in the Costa e Silva government can be considered as a part of
the high command until they formed a junta on August 31, 1969.
^'^Stepan has written: "Politically, the military govern
ment, since the Fifth Institutional Act of 1968, appeared to
be without a program and without direction." Stepan, o p . cit.,
p. 263.
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cers, who sided with Albuquerque Lima, sought to assert their '
dominance over the linha dura in order to pursue an "authentic
revolution" in which national development (directed by the
military) would receive greater attention.

Given Albuquerque

Lima’s earlier position, if this group acquired power, military
7r

rule for up to fifteen years was planned.

This group sought

to align itself with the Castelista elements (those still loyal
to the principles of Castello Branco), which, while sharing the
view that the military should retain power in order to direct
national development, envisioned a shorter duration of mili
tary rule and a greater civilian voice in planning national
development than did Lima’s counterparts.

The Castelista’s

prime concern was that the Costa e Silva government was a
failure and that Brazil could not afford two more years of its
incompetent rule.
The followers of Lima and the Castelistas were more united
in their opposition to Costa e Silva and his perception of the
governmental role of the armed forces than they were in agree
ment as to what form continued military rule would acquire or

35

See Stepan, o p . cit., p. 260.

^

«
7

The Castelistas had a particular disliking for Costa e
Silva because they felt he exploited the 1965 crisis to his
own benefit at Castello’s expense^ . See Schneider, Political
System, pp. 289-90.
Due to the question of national develop
ment, Stepan argues that by this time the distinctions between
the linha dura and the soft line had become more complex. The
linha dura, he asserts, could more accurately have been termed
"authoritarian nationalists" and soft-liners better termed
"liberal internationalists." See Stepan, op. cit., pp. 250-52
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how long that rule would last.
The erosion of support for Costa e Silva and his policies
should have served as a sign that unless the President shored
up his support, his continuation in office was in serious dan
ger.

Having placed the military government in a position where

it was largely dependent on the support of the armed forces.
Institutional Act #5 also exposed the President to the real
threat of removal from office if his military support fell below
37
a "threshold level."
At this point there were noticeably
fewer restraints on this kind of military action than there
had been in October, 1965 when Gastello Branco was faced with
a similar low level of support.

There was no longer any pre

tense that civilians had any function in determining the fate
of the President, although declined civilian support was one
factor leading many officers to desire Costa e Silva’s ouster.

38

Also, in light of the constitutional developments since 1967,
the constitutional limitations on military action against the
President could hardly be counted on to deter the armed forces
from removing the chief executive and commander-in-chief.

The

President himself had stated that whenever it was necessary, the

3?The Fifth Institutional Act created a situation wherein
the military government was almost totally dependent on mili
tary support. This condition offered a variation of Easton's
concept of support and the effects of that support falling be
low a minimum level.
See Easton, o p . cit., pp. 222-24.
will be recalled that Costa e Silva and his Cabinet
came to power in response to the demands of more nationalist
officers who wanted the military in general to be more popular
with the people.
See Chapter III.
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armed forces would make "new revolutions within the revolu
tion."
A "Revolutionary" Development: A Military Junta Takes Over
The expansion of terrorism and violence during 1969, des
pite (or because of) the adoption of stringent laws of national
security, had a disquieting effect on the armed forces and con
tributed to the growing sentiment within the military that a
more effective executive was needed.

A full-scale military

crisis appeared imminent when highly respected General Moniz
de Aragao and General Lyra Tavares, members of Costa e Silva's
Cabinet, exchanged harsh accusations over the government’s
handling of a case involving alleged subversive activity by
TQ

a high-ranking officer.

The suspension of Moniz de Aragao

from the Army's high command, because of his remarks, only
increased the possibility that the armed forces might move
against Costa e Silva.

But Brazil was saved this spectacle

and was treated to another kind of "revolutionary" develop
ment.
On August 31, 1969 Brazilians were notified that Costa e
Silva had suffered a "circulatory impediment."

The President

had suffered a stroke, leaving him partially paralyzed and
unable to speak.

Contrary to the constitutional provision

^^For an account of the circumstances surrounding the
dismissal of Colonel Francisco Boaventura Cavalcanti and the
ensuing Moniz de Aragao-Tavares dispute, see Schneider, Polit
ical System, pp. 286, 290.
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stating that the Vice President "shall replace the President
i£ he is incapacitated,"^® it was simultaneously suggested that
Vice President Pedro Aleixo, a civilian personally selected by
Costa e Silva for the position, would not replace Costa e Silva.
Principally because of Aleixo's opposition to Institutional Act
#5 and convinced by the rise in terrorism that they were con
fronted with a military w a r t h e

Ministers of Navy, Army, and

Air Force decreed Institutional Act #12 on August 31, authoriz
ing them to form a military junta to replace the stricken Presi
dent.

There was not even any mention of the Vice President, but

then, perhaps that was not necessary.

After all a "revolution

within the revolution" was in the making.
In part, the Act read:
The situation that the country is experienc
ing . . . precludes the transfer of the respon
sibilities of supreme authority and supreme
command of the Armed Forces, exercised by his
excellency, to other officials, in accordance
with the constitutional provisions.
As an imperative of National Security, it
falls to the ministers of the Navy, of the Army ■
and o f 'the Air Force to assume, for as long as
the head of the Nation is incapacitated, the
duties given to his excellency by the constitu
tional documents in f o r c e . '^2

^®Article 79 of the 1967 Constitution, see Burns, History
of Brazil, p. 40 7.
Thomas G. Sanders, "Institutionalizing Brazil’s Conser
vative Revolution," American Universities Field Staff Reports:
East Coast South America Series, XIV, Nol 5 (December, 19 70),
pp l '8-9 '.
'^^Roett, o p . cit., p. 41.
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For the first time in the nation's history, in the interest of
the "national security" a military junta would govern Brazil,
at least until the President recovered.

Once again, the armed

forces' perception of the imperatives of the "revolution" had
displaced the already frequently modified constitutional norms.
For the second time since promulgating its constitution, the
military had blatantly violated the provisions of that docu
ment.
By the latter half of August, Costa e Silva had fallen out
-of favor with the great body of the armed forces.

His stern

application of the anti-subversion laws had evoked a new series
of condemnations from the Catholic C h u r c h , w h i c h complained
more loudly as the government's repression grew more intense.
Many within the armed forces felt the further alienation of
the Church and its followers could have been avoided by a more
prudent application of the laws.

This, coupled with the general

aimlessness of the government and its handling of the Moniz de
Aragao-Tavares dispute, led to discussions among officers of
initiating a pre-emptive golpe against the P r e s i d e n t . O n l y
Costa e Silva's sudden illness prevented his suddenly being

Costa's policies succeeded in uniting the conservative
and progressive Catholics against the regime. During the last
week of September, the Brazilian National Conference of Bishops
called for the end of military dictatorship, indicating the
junta's policies of repression earned the anger of the con
servative Church also. See "Brazilian Bishops Criticize Junta,"
America, October 4, 1969, p. 250.
^^Schneider, Political System, p. 294.
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removed from office by force.
The tripartite junta was comprised of Admiral Rademaker
Grünewald, General Lyra Tavares, and Brigadier Marcio Sousa
e Mello.

Because of the Aragao-Tavares dispute and its mem

bers' general low esteem with the armed forces, the "caretaker”
junta found itself in a weak position to command the obedience
of the armed forces.

But what it lacked in popular military

support, the junta more than compensated for in its resolve to
guarantee the "revolution."
There seems to be little evidence to suggest that the
junta would serve only as a temporary replacement for the
duration of the President's illness.

In assuming the supreme

authority of the nation it seemed clear that the junta repre
sented the general will of the military that the President be
47
replaced.
But due to the questionable ability of the junta
to act as the supreme command of the armed forces, it was also
apparent the junta would serve as a substitute successor until
a more suitable, permanent successor to Costa e Silva could
be found.

Nonetheless, during the interim period the junta was

forced to confront a crisis precipitated by terrorists and to
decree its own brand of punitive, national security legislation.

45costa's decision to hold partial municipal elections in
November, 1969 only augmented his opposition within the mili
tary. Given his extremely low level of support, it is difficult
to imagine how he could have possibly finished out his term.
^^Schneider, Political System, p. 294.
47

Roett, op. cit., p. 44.
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The junta’s precarious position vis à vis the armed
forces was even more severely tested after the kidnapping of
the American Ambassador to Brazil, C. Burke Elbrick, on Sep
tember 3, 1969.

Terrorists, seeking to demonstrate the extent

of underground opposition and to maximize publicity for their
demands, abducted Elbrick from his limousine, leaving behind a
’’manifesto,” part of which read:
With the kidnaping of the Ambassador we want
to demonstrate that it is possible to defeat the
dictatorship and the exploitation if we arm and
organize ourselves. We show up where the enemy
least expects us and we disappear immediately,
tearing out the dictatorship, bring terror and
fear to the exploiters, the hope and certainty
of victory to the midst of the exploited.
In exchange for the victim’s safe return the terrorists issued
two demands that had to be fulfilled.

First, they demanded the

release of fifteen political prisoners and their safe passage
to either Algeria, Chile, or Mexico (where political asylum
awaited them) within forty-eight hours.

Second, they demanded

that the preceding ’’manifesto" be published in its entirety in
Brazil’s highly censored press.

If these conditions were not

met, the "manifesto" ended, the abductors would be forced to
carry out "revolutionary justice" and execute the Ambassador.
As Schneider points out, Elbrick’s kidnapping and the
accompanying demands placed the junta in an "extremely delicate
p o s i t i o n . I n attempting to satisfy the United States desire
48^ more complete account of the manifesto may be found
in Facts on File, p . 570.
49schneider, Political System, p. 295.
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for Elbrick*s safe return, the junta only further alienated
officers already disenchanted with the regime.

By this time

the officers closely identified with the linha dura had
adopted a less pro-American and more nationalist stance.
These and other highly-nationalist officers seemed quite
willing to risk Elbrick*s lifp and an estrangement of rela
tions with the United States rather than to bow unhesitatingly
to this threat to the social and political order.
they had a point.

Of course,

In light of the widespread publicity this

situation would receive if the government gave in to these
demands, other terrorists would be encouraged to conduct more
kidnappings.

The entire affair was further complicated be

cause the prisoners the terrorists selected for exchange
seemed to be those the military would be most reluctant to
see set free,
Much to the dismay of the military high command, the fif
teen prisoners were rounded up and released on September 6,
but not until the government thwaited the effort of a number
of officers and enlisted men who attempted to prevent the
c2
freedom flight from taking off.
Elbrick*s safe return several

“^See Stepan, op. cit., pp. 250-51.
^^Schneider, Political System, p. 295. The author explains
that the careful selection of the individuals involved guaran
teed internal dissention within the military. For interviews
with the exchanged prisoners see Andy Truskier, "The Urban
Guerrillas in Brazil," Ramparts, October, 1970, pp. 30-34.
^^Facts on File, p. 571.
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days later had little favorable impact on the disgruntled
officers-

The entire episode tended to place the continued

survival of the junta in doubt.
Presumably foreseeing the unsettling effect that their
decision to release the prisoners would have on the already
alienated officers, the junta decreed Institutional Act #13
on September 5, which empowered the executive to banish any
Brazilian considered ’’manifestly harmful and dangerous to
national security."

53

Actually, the Act served to legitimize

the liberation of the fifteen prisoners who were banished by
a subsequent complementary act.
The provisions of Institutional Act #13 seemed to be
designed to deal with the Elbrick situation alone.

Also

formulated on September 5, but not announced publicly until
September 9 (probably so as not to endanger Elbrick’s release),
was Institutional Act #14.

The preamble read:

. . . considering the acts of adverse psycho
logical warfare and revolutionary and subver
sive war that, actually disturb the life of
the country and maintain it in a climate of
intranquility and agitation, these deserve
more severe repression.
"Adverse psychological warfare" was defined as
the employment of propaganda, of counter
propaganda, and actions in the political,
economic, psycho-social, and military fields,
with the intention of influencing or provok
ing opinions, emotions, attitudes, and be
havior of foreign groups, unfriendly, neutral.

^^Ibid,
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or friendly, against the execution of na
tional objectives.
Exactly what the "national objectives" were was not entirely
clear, but for actions intending to influence opinions, one
could conceivably receive the maximum penalty of death, a
punishment abolished in 1891 and expressly prohibited in
Article 150 of the 1967 Constitution.

With this and other

kinds of punishment for those convicted of subversive activity
there was no need to banish them from Brazil--Institutional Act
#14 superseded Institutional Act #13.

The junta had not com-

I

pletely bowed before the terrorists demands after all.
The junta’s actions propelled the military into a position
of still further involvement in the national life of Brazil.
.

•

Military courts, which were assigned jurisdiction over all
cases stemming from Institutional Act #14, were required to
rule on an individual’s motivations and the intent of propa
ganda.

In addition, the military had assumed the responsi

bility of providing answers to basic questions of life itself:
could the holding of certain ideas be sufficient cause to
necessitate the ending of an individual's continued survival?
In a very real sense the military had become indistinguishable
from the state, for it alone possessed the right to use vio
lence.

How far from the classical national security function

CC
Bandeira, op. cit., p. 18.
^^It seems that at this point instead of existing as a
means of violence to be utilized at the state|s discretion,
the armed forces were in a position to determine under what
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of the armed forces--that of defending the nation from ex
ternal aggression--the Brazilian armed forces had deviated.
Despite its promulgation of excessively repressive acts
and its general crackdown on suspected oppositionists, the
junta remained in low esteem with the bulk of the officer
corps.

A permanent successor to Costa e Silva had to be

found.
The search to locate a successor gained momentum through
out September, 1969.

Since it was evident that no civilian

would even be considered and because Congress was still in
58
recess,
the question of succession of necessity was resolved
in a typically military fashion, on the basis of seniority.
All generals of four-star rank were instructed to compile a

circumstances their force should be used. This corresponds
closely to what Weber has written about the relationship be
tween force and the state: "Specifically . . . the right to
use physical force is ascribed to other institutions or to
individuals only to the extent to which the state permits it."
Only in the present case the armed forces were in a position
to make this decision. See Max Weber, "Politics as a Voca
tion," in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. and trans.
by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New YorkT Oxford Univer
sity Press, 1946), p. 78.
57
Bengt Abrahamsson discusses the apparent correlation
between military professionalization and increased political
activity by the military in Military Professionalization and
Political Power (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications,
1972), pp. 101-50.
^^By this time the military in general had adopted a rather
cynical view of civilian politicians, not because they were
corrupt, but because the officers felt none of them possessed
an adequate concept of national security. Until a civilian
developed an adequate concept, none could be trusted to govern
Brazil. See Schneider, Political System, p. 289.
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list of the three most preferred candidates of their command;
when all the military regions had been polled, the various
lists were to be reduced to a single list of preferred can
didates.

From this list, high-ranking officers would then

select Brazil's next President.
By the end of September after a kind of intra-military
campaign. Generals Garrastazu Medici, Orlando Geisel, Antonio
Muricy, and Albuquerque Lima emerged as the leading contenders.
The armed forces command structure seemed to be functioning
much like a political party trying to select its strongest
nominee.

59

In this case, however, a nomination was the equiv

alent of an election.
The consensus of opinion gradually coalesced around Medici,
a long-time associate of Costa e Silva.

The high command agreed

Medici possessed the appropriate qualifications: his close
association with Costa e Silva would soften the image of an
illegitimate succession; he was not an extreme nationalist and
was, therefore, acceptable to the international finance commun
ity; and was not associated with the Escola Superior de Guerra,
the anathema of civilian and military nationalists.^^

However,

the high command's inevitable election of Medici was not
accepted without question.

See Schneider, Political System, p. 299. The author
writes that the command structure came to be Brazil's major
political party. At the time, the command structure was really
the only political party.
60 See Stepan and Einaudi, op. cit., p. 115.
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Albuquerque Lima, who had built a vast basis of support
among lower-ranking officers since his resignation, tried to
preclude Medici's "election" by demanding that the interests
other than those of the high command be c o n s i d e r e d . T h i s
attempt by a three-star general to question the electoral pro
cedures decided upon by his superiors drew a swift response
from Army Minister Tavares.

"This [the military] is not a

political institution," he said.
low dictate to those on top."

"We can not have those beSeniority prevailed, as on

October 7 Medici was elected by a majority of the 230 top
ranking officers and confirmed by the three member junta.
The election of a President was still not a routine practice
in Brazil.

(See Chapter I.)

With regard to the "succession crisis" of 1969, Stepan
has remarked that the senior officers were "barely able to

In a letter to Lyra Tavares, Albuquerque Lima wrote:
"If those responsible for the final decision do not agree to
hear and respond with realism and patriotism to the desires,
not of a few but of the majority of the armed forces, we can
not foresee the risks the nation will be running, when other
leaders, perhaps more audacious and less resistant to the
temptations of power, may dare to pass the military chiefs."
Lima was not alone in his condemnations. About the selection
process Admiral Baptista Mello said it could better be called
"a cold military coup." See Facts on File, p. 638.
^^See "The Generals' Choice."
p. 64.

Newsweek, October 20, 1969,

^^Sanche de Gramont, op. cit., p. 44. Other sources indi
cate Medici’s election was by a unanimous vote. See, for
example, Facts on File, p. 638. Schneider, Political System,
suggests 239, not 230, officers participated in thè “erection,
pp. 298-99.
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carry the day" and install their candidate.

This may well

have been the case because as Schneider points out
Fully half of the generals participating in the
selection of Brazil’s new President occupied . . .
desk jobs and, in varying degrees, were out of
touch with the sentiment of the middle grade offi
cers exercising troop comands.
Initially, then, it is quite possible that Medici's support
came primarily from the military hierarchy, with only a minimum
of support from lower-ranking officers and enlisted men.

If

the members of the military hierarchy were sufficiently out of
touch with lower echelon officers that outright animosity toward
Medici existed, then military obedience of presidential orders
would be difficult to guarantee.
It seems that the procedure the armed forces used in
selecting Costa e Silva's successor was founded on two faulty
assumptions.

First, permitting members of the armed forces to

specify their preference for President implied that the military
could resolve an essentially political question on the basis of
democratic procedures (and in this respect the high command
gave the impression they viewed the military as a political
institution, despite Tavares' disclaimer).

Yet, the ultimate

^^Stepan and Einaudi, op. cit., p. 114.
^^Schneider, Political System, p. 300. In many ways this
situation was much like the one confronting Goulart and his
cobertura railitar (military cover) in 1964. As Stepan has
observed: '‘Officers closest to him, who urged him [Goulart]
forward on his course of increasing pressure on Congress,
were more and more out of touch with the bulk of military
sentiment." Stepan, op. cit., 193.
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decision had to fall within parameters defined by "those on
top," just as Tavares' statement implied.

The military hier

archy refused to abide by any decision other than its own.
As developments since March, 1964 had revealed, only to the
extent that the opinions of those outside of the high command
(in this case middle grade and lower-level officers) coincided
with the opinions of the high command did democracy exist.
Second, permitting an intense political campaign also
implied that there was as small a range of political opinions
within the body of the military as there was in the high com
mand.

In fact, political opinions were quite varied and fre

quently antagonistic.

The campaign tended to demarcate these

antagonisms and to demonstrate the polarity of high command
and lower echelon opinion.

As Stepan asserts, "Ranks were

finally closed behind the choice of the senior generals, but
only because of the specter of complete military fragmentation."^^
So, it appears that primarily for the sake of military ex
pedience, many officers shelved their political persuasions with
the hope that by doing so military unity would be restored.

It

seemed, however, that for the immediate future President Medici
would have to reckon with the political unity, as well as the
institutional unity, of the armed forces.

^^Stepan, op. cit., p. 264.
.^^One of the components of civil-military relations in
Brazil mentioned in Chapter I is that a politicized military
is the norm. The presidential campaign resulted in a high
degree of politicization of the military, except that in this
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Congress "Elects" Medici: Recreating the Facade of Democracy
President-designate Medici could not constitutionally
succeed Costa e Silva for a year and a half, or until March,
1971 when Costa's term expired.

The high command, however,

had decided Costa e Silva had to be replaced immediately, so
this constitutional obstacle posed little problem; after all
their candidate had been elected by a clearly unconstitutional
procedure.
In order to diminish charges of impropriety, the junta had
requested that a respected French physician examine Costa e
Silva, presumably to announce the stricken President unfit to
resume office.

When it became evident that such a prognosis

would not be forthcoming,^^ the junta, not wanting to delay
Medici's accession, decreed Institutional Act #16 on October
14, 1969,

The Act stated, "considering that the superior in

terests of the country require the immediate and permanent fill
ing of the office of President," the position

of President "is

declared v a c a n t . F i l l i n g the presidency was no problem:
Medici had been elected one week before by the high command.

case it was political actors within the military who attempted
to co-opt fellow servicemen, instead of civilian politicians
outside the military institution attempting to co-opt the
military, as had customarily been the case.
^^The physician in question stated that Costa might fully
recover but only after-prolonged rest and therapy. See
Schneider, Political System, p. 298. The doctor never did
pronounce Costa unable to resume his duties. See Rosenbaum,
op. cit., 78.
^^Cited in Roett, op. cit., p. 46.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

186

Hence, the inevitability of Medici's accession under the "un
written constitution" became a mere formality under the pro
visions of the latest addition to the "written constitution."
(See Chapter I.)
Complementary Acts #72 and #73, decreed on October 14
under the auspices of Institutional Act #16, called for Con
gress to reconvene on October 22 for the purpose of electing
Brazil's next President and Vice-President on October 25.
But this did not mean Congress' ten month military-imposed
recess was being concluded in order that the presidential
election might be more democratic; instead it was ended
principally so that Congress could meet and ratify the mili
tary's "election" of Medici and his vice-presidential running
mate. Admiral Grünewald Rademaker.

There was little reason

for Congress to believe it had been reconvened for any other
electoral function since Medici delivered his inaugural speech
on October 7, a full two weeks before Congress was even re opened. 70
Medici and Rademaker were going to be Brazil's next Presi
dent and Vice-President, of that the military commanders were
certain; but in order to insure maximum compliance within the
military for the choices of these officers, the junta also

Even members of the international community recognized
the October 7 "election." Shortly after the generals "elected"
Medici, the Shah of Iran cabled his best wishes to the new
President. See "New President; Medium Hard," Time, October 31,
1U6D, p. 33.
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decreed Institutional Act #17 on October 14.
There was a curious inclusion in the preamble of this Act.
One sentence of the preamble stated that the armed forces, "as
institutions that serve to sustain the constituted powers of
law and order, are organized on a basis of the principles of
71
hierarchy and discipline."
This expression apparently repre
sented a redefinition of the powers of the armed forces: the
phrase ". . . and subject to the limits of the law," which
followed a similar definition of the powers of the armed forces
72
in the 1967 Constitution, had now been deleted.
So, while the
armed forces were charged with the responsibility of sustaining
the constituted laws, the actions of the armed forces were seem
ingly no longer subject to the limitations of those laws.

The

armed forces did, however, remain under the supreme authority
of the President.
The provisions of the Seventeenth Institutional Act were
designed to silence those within the military who were disen
chanted with the selection of Medici and the course of events
71
since Costa e Silva's stroke.
One provision authorized the
President to
transfer to the reserve, for a specified period,
military who [sic] have made an attempt against

^^Cited in Roett, op. cit., p. 47.
^^See Article 92 of the 1967 Constitution in Burns,
History of Brazil, p. 408.
^^This is the conclusion of both Roett, op_^ cit., p. 47
and Schneider, Political System, p. 309.
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the unity of the armed forces, thereby divorcing
themselves of their constitutional mandate.74
The effect of this Act was to extend to the President the power
to impose the will of the military hierarchy (the President,
the service ministers in the Cabinet, and the high ranking
division commanders) on the remainder of the armed forces with7
out having to rely on coercion or intimidation.
The implication of Institutional Act #17 was that the
divisiveness within the military, exacerbated by the "Presi
dential campaign," had progressed to the point that the armed
forces high command could no longer depend* on the unquestioning
allegiance and obedience of lower ranking officers.

That the

cohesion of the armed forces had to be guaranteed at all by
such a measure is an indication of how much the authority of
the command structure had been eroded by the high degree of
politicization of the armed forces: the Act also tended to
demonstrate how superficial the high command felt the decision
to close ranks behind Medici had been.

The kind of political

conformity the high command had been trying to impose of the
civilian sector it now found vital to impose on the body of
the armed forces.
The decision to reconvene Congress seems to have reflected

^^Cited in Facts on File, p. 730. It will.be recalled that
a transfer to the reserves is the equivalent of retirement.
^^This kind of development almost suggests the high command
now equated military unity with unanimous opinion within the
military.
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the confidence of the military government that civilian poli
ticians had been intimidated enough so that a representative
body would now function according to its (the government's)
expectations.

Since December 13, 1968, the date of the Fifth

Institutional Act, the government had purged eighty-eight
federal deputies (sixty-one MDB and twenty-seven ARENA),
thirteen alternate federal deputies (six MDB and seven ARENA),
five MDB senators, and one alternate MDB s e n a t o r . T h o s e
federal congressmen who escaped the last list of cassations
on September 30, 1969 must haVe been those whom the government
felt could be expected to support the "revolution" out of
loyalty or renewed intimidation; congressmen who remained
recalcitrant after Congress reopened could easily be purged.
Given their reprieve from political extinction, civilian
politicians performed according to the military government's
desires.

ARENA dutifully nominated General Medici and Admiral

Rademaker Grünewald on October 17; the MDB offered no opposi
tion slate.

On October 25 Me'dici and Grünewald were ’-'elected"

by a combined congressional vote of 293 in favor and 76 absten
tions.^^

Civilian politicians had learned their lessons well.

Perhaps "democracy" could function in harmony with "revolution-

Brazilian embassy figures cited in Facts on File, p. 730
It might also be noted that, since March, 1964, one-hundred
eighty-eight Congressmen had been purged.
^^This was the final vote as reported by the Brazilian
press. Of the total 369 votes cast, I have been able to ac
count for 368, by using data furnished by Roett, Schneider,
and the Facts on File. See Appendix A.
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ary" developments.
Members of Congress had to have been aware that other
legislative functions would be just as symbolic as this "elec
tion ."

On October 20, a full five days before the presidential

election. Constitutional Amendment Number One was made public
and, as a result, legislative functions were curtailed so much
that there was not really very much for a legislative body to
do.
Constitutional Amendment #1, sometimes referred to as
f
the Constitution of 1969 even though 95 percent of the 1967 '
78
Constitution survived intact^
was actually a series of
fifty-eight amendments which significantly increased the
legislative prerogatives of the executive at the expense of
Congress.

The President was given expanded authorization to

decree laws on national security, public finance (including
tax policy), and to establish public offices and determine
their functions.

Legislative assemblies were prohibited from

introducing any constitutional amendments; and congressmen
were no longer protected by congressional immunity when they
made, declarations "injuring national security," meaning con
siderations of national security took precedence over the
rights of legislators.

In addition. Congress was reduced from

409 to 293 members, with the representation to be calculated on
79
the number of votes rather than the number of inhabitants.
7R

See

Roett, op. cit., p. 47.

79prior to this reapportionment, the populous, illiterate
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The Amendment removed the presidential power of veto, but
Congress could be impelled to "re-examine" any one of its de
cisions.

The death penalty for those convicted of "external,

psychological, subversive, or revolutionary war," which had
been reinstated by Institutional Act #14, was made a permanent
part of the Constitution,

And finally, all institutional acts

decreed since December 13, 1968 were to remain in full effect
for as long as the President wishes, which seems to suggest
that the executive retained indefinitely the power to decree
on

the recess of Congress "during a state of seige, or otherwise."
Once reconvened. Congress would be on trial and the President
would be the judge of its performance.
Because Amendment #1 was actually issued on October 17 it
is interesting to conjecture as to whom within the -military
authorized its decree, since the presidency was declared
"vacant" on October 14.

The rough outline of the Amendment

took shape during the final months of Costa e Silva’s term
but he was incapacitated before it acquired its final version.
The three-man junta added its own provisions (e.g., death pen
alty) but did not decree the Amendment during its reign of

states held a large representational advantage over the modern
izing, urban centers.
It is interesting to note that the new
membership total for Congress was the same as the total number
of votes Medici received when Congress elected him, although
there is no evidence to suggest the government actually was
able to foresee such a development,
^^See Article 2 of the Fifth Institutional Act in Burns,
History of Brazil, p. 411.
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power.

Because the junta had removed itself from power by

declaring the presidency vacant, it appears the person most
likely to have accepted the final version of the Amendment was
Garrastazu Medici, who had been "elected" President by the
military hierarchy on October 7, and for all intent and pur
poses Me'dici acted in a presidential capacity after that

date.^^
If Medici did decree the Constitutional Amendment, then
he authorized full-scale changes in the constitutional frame
work of the government before he was actually "constitutionally"
verified as the President of Congress on October 25.

This in

itself would demonstrate the military’s disdain for its own
self-imposed constitutional limitations and how lightly it
regarded the congressional "election" of the President;

The

military seemed to be operating under the provisions of some
"unwritten constitution."

That the constitutionality of

Me'dici’s election may be regarded as a moot point only further
emphasizes the emptiness of Congress' functional existence.
If the Constitutional Amendment was decreed by someone
other than Medici, say members of the high command, then the
military's failure to find or to provide a "constitutional"
basis for these changes only displays their complete contempt
for the existing constitutional procedures.

This kind of

^^Admittedly this is speculation on my part, but it does
seem quite probable that it would have been extremely difficult
for the junta to adopt policies against the wishes of Medici
after he was "elected" by the officer corps.
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disposition foreshadowed a bleak future for democracy, for,
despite the reopening of Congress, Brazil clearly was not
headed in the direction of constitutional normalcy.

She was

headed instead for a kind of transient normalcy that shifted
course with the "revolution.”
Medici; Hope, Wait, and See
In his October 7th inaugural speech Medici conceded that
"Brazil is still far from being a developed nation, being
under a regime we can not consider fully democratic."

82

He

explained, "There must be freedom but there can be no license
to contradict the political desires of the nation . . . .

To

have freedom institutions must free themselves from minority
83
groups that preach violence and corruption."
As a compromise
candidate of the military moderates and the linha dura, the
new President announced the two major goals of his administration
would be (1) accelerated economic and social development and (2)
the "installation of democracy" by the end of his term in March,
OA
1974.
He seemed to be offering more to the moderates than to
the linha dura.

He appeared to be challenging Brazilians to

^^See Schneider, Political System, p. 301.
^^These sentences from Medici's inaugural speech are taken
from excerpts of the speech quoted in "New President; Medium
Hard," Time, October 31, 1969, p. 34 and "The Generals' Choice,"
Newsweek, October 20, 1969, p. 64.
peripheral dispute in Medici's election was whether or
not he would merely finish out Costa’s unexpired term or be en
titled to a full term. The high command finally decided Medici's
term would last four years.
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dare to hope that they, and not the military hierarchy, might
elect his successor.
Once reconvened, Congress seemed to represent the predom
inant mood of the nation.

Members of both ARENA and the MDB

pledged cooperation with the government either by public
announcements or by their actions, suggesting that they were
testing the government's intentions by taking the path of least
resistance and provocation.

Perhaps they hoped that, con

fronted with just symbolic opposition as it determined the
"political desires" of the nation, the Medici government would
have no reason to recess Congress or to cancel upcoming congres
sional and state elections.

However, in its capacity as the

political director of Brazil, as well as the overseer of the
national security, it was also inevitable that members of the
high command would be assigned to help institutions "free"
themselves of violent and corrupt influences.

This kind of

development would render any drive toward democracy a specious
one.
The constitutional modifications included in Constitutional
Amendment No. 1 preserved certain provisions of the National
Security Law of 1967 and expanded others.

Subversive propaganda,

as a result, came to be defined by the government as:
1. Using any organ of social communication, such
as newspapers, magazines, periodicals, books,
bulletins, pamphlets, radio, television,
cinema, theater, and related media as a
vehicle of propaganda for adverse psycho
logical war, or revolutionary or subversive
warfare.
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2. Inciting people in their places of work or
study.
3. Holding assemblies, public meetings, or
public demonstrations.
4. Holding forbidden strikes.
5. Causing injury, libel or defamation, when
the offended party is an organ or entity
that exercises public authority, or an
official in the course of his duties.
6. Manifesting'solidarity with any of the acts
listed above.
As Bandeira has observed:
All offenses under the anti-subversive law
(penalties vary from 6 months to 20 years) are
tried before a military court. During pre-trial
investigation a person may be held in prison for
30 days, 10 days incommunicado. After the de
fense has been
presented, the court may convict
the accused of
an offense not specified in the
accusation, even if such an offense involves a
more serious penalty than that imposed for the
original charge . . . . Roughly 70 per cent of
those charged are convicted.86
If these provisions and procedures were an attempt by Medici
to purify the political system as a first step in implementing
democracy, it appeared that, given the high rate of conviction
and the longevity of punishment, for many years there would be
only a few Brazilians who could participate in the military's
system of democracy.

Apparently Brazilians could undertake

or support (number six

above) any kind of contradiction to the

"political desires of the nation"

only at the risk of losing

85'’cited in Bandeira, op. cit., p. 18.
86

^Ibid.
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what small measures of freedom they presently enjoyed.
During the last few months of 1969 the government vigor
ously clamped down on anti-government terrorist activities,
which had continued without respite since the Elbrick affair.
On November 4, Carlos Marighella, the charismatic leader of the
terrorist movement, was assassinated by military police.

His

death seemed to mark the beginning of the decline of terrorism.
Possibly because it sensed the battle against subversion and
terrorism was being won, the government relied more frequently
on increasingly excessive policies.
Reports of police torturing civilians, including nuns and
priests, dramatically increased.

Documented cases revealed

that the military police were using "unusual methods" in order
to extract information from those suspected of subversion or
actions detrimental to the national security. 8 7 Under pressure
from Pope Paul VI (who had received and personally discussed
the problem of police torture with Dorn Helder Camara), the
President announced that his administration would eliminate
any police personnel found guilty of torture.

Medici, fully

cognizant of the dangers caused by arousing the Church, seemed
to be willing to mold government policies somewhat by public

^^Periodically since 1964 there had been sporadic reports
of police torture, but only during the latter half of 1969 did
they receive widespread attention. Ralph Della Cava discusses
some of the different kinds of torture tactics employed by the
police in his article "Torture in Brazil," Commonweal, XCII
(April 24, 1970), 135-41. Also see Robert H. Bolton, "Brazilian
Torture: Specifically New, Specifically Terrible," The Christian
Century, April 1, 1970, 387-88.
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opinion.

But any kind of hope that the military regime would

be receptive to public opinion soon proved to be ill-founded,
when it became evident that the Medici government would sur
render to public opinion only in those cases involving world
opinion.
Early in 1970 Medici abandoned his promise to restore
democracy by 1974, stating that the military would remain in
power
as long as it might take to implant the polit
ical, administrative, judicial, social, and
economic structures capable of raising all
Brazilians to the minimum level of well-being.&&
The restoration of democracy now appeared to be more condi
tional and improbable than it had been since 1964.

With

political stability all but guaranteed, economic development,
another dimension of national security, received new attention.
Once again democracy was to be subordinated to the newly-defined
goals of the "revolution."

Only to the extent that these goals

were achieved and enhanced the national security would It be
possible for Brazilians to participate in the formulation of
the policies that determined their destinies.

Excerpts from this May, 1970 speech can be found in
Rollie E. Poppino, "Brazil's Third Government of the Revolu
tion," Current History, LX (February, 1971), 104.
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CHAPTER V

THE NEW FRAMEWORK OF POLITICAL EXPECTATIONS
Deviation from the p o d e v m o d e v a d o v
Writing in 1970 Charles Wagley made this assessment of
Brazilian politics:
The history of Brazilian politics since 1964
is one of a steady increase of military power
over civilian power, until in 1970 the mili
tary rules almost outright, with only the
shadow of any legalistic validation.
It would seem that the Brazilian "game of
politics" was over, at least for some time.l
Perhaps, however, it was not so much that the "game of politics"
was over as it was that the outcomes of the "game" could no
longer disappoint the expectations of the military high com
mand.
The application of the poder moderador by the armed forces
between 1945 and 1964 created a framework of expectations on the
part of civilians with regard to the execution of that function.
This framework resulted in a limitation being placed on military
intervention at the removal of the President and ruled out the
assumption of governmental power by any of the officers involved,
While military intervention was regarded as legitimate, mili-

^Charles Wagley, An Introduction to Brazil (New York
Columbia University Press, 19 71) , PP* 3 U 6 - 71
198
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tary rule was considered illegitimate.^
In addition to this type of civilian expectation for mili
tary intervention into politics, it must also be recognized
that high-ranking military officers developed a framework of
expectations for the functional performance of the political
system between 1945 and 1964.

At first the armed forces

applied the poder moderador only after being requested to do
so by civilian elites and, then, only in accordance with the
specifics of the civilian demands.^

Gradually, however, the

armed forces assumed more autonomy in exercising the poder
moderador, until in 1960 the high-ranking officers, disillu
sioned with the performance of the civilian politicians, imple
mented a fundamental change in the governmental structure; they
transformed Brazil from a presidential to a parliamentary form
of government even though they were not specifically instructed
to do so by the civilian sector.

Military intervention had not

even been requested in this instance and so it was clear that
the poder moderador had been modified in two ways: first, in
the determination as to when that power would be applied and,
second, the manner in which that power would be applied.
After over three years of political disorder under Joao

^Stepan, The Military in Politics, p. 115.
^ibid., p. 102. The author writes ” . . . civilians rarely
gave the military carte blanche to decide for themselves what
action to take. Demands were often quite specific as to the
limits and purposes of military intervention into politics.
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Goulart, civilian elites demanded his removal by the armed
forces.

The armed forces obliged by removing Goulart and by

assuming governmental power, a move not all Brazilians either
supported or opposed.

By assuming power the military officers

seemed to be indicating that they were no longer content to
act in the capacity of political arbitrators and were now
going to act as political directors for an indefinite period
of time.

And, so, after a series of developments that had

made it ’’psychologically easier" for the officers to inter
vene in politics,^ they decided to retain power and direct
Brazil's politics on a continuing basis rather than on a
periodic, temporary basis.

For all practical purposes, the

poder moderador had been abandoned.
The gradual expansion of the military’s political prerog
atives under the poder moderador seemed to parallel the grow
ing concern of military officers about communism and subversion
during the 1950’s and early 1960’s.

They seem to have become

convinced that civilian politicians were either directly abet
ting the ruination of the political system by condoning the
presence of communists in government or were indirectly promot
ing its downfall by failing to enact comprehensive policies of
economic development so that the conditions on which communism
thrived might be removed.

The officers felt Brazil was defi-

^de Dubnic argues that the post-election coup of 1955 by
one faction within the military made it "psychologically easier"
for other groups to intervene in the subsequent decade. Po~
litical Trends in Brazil, p. 16.
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cient in both o£ the areas suggested by her national motto:
Order and Progress.

Both deficiencies, they felt, had to be

corrected if Brazil was not to succumb to communism.

Due to

the strong influence of the linha dura, the restoration of
political and social order received the highest priorities
after the armed forces assumed power in 1964.

Between 1964

and 1970 political activity was permissible only so long as,
and to the extent that, it did not endanger the "national
security," a concept that drew an increasingly broader défini
tion as the military regime sought to cleanse the political
system of corrupt or subversive influences.
Historically, the office of the presidency, as well as
congressional seats, seem to have been regarded as purely
political prizes by civilian politicians rather than as in
stitutions designed to process and implement demands and to
coordinate Brazil's national affairs.

Hence, when Brazil

began to experience a high rate of social mobilization after
1945, she lacked both the political community and political
institutions sufficiently developed to mediate, refine, or
moderate group political interaction.^

When the leaders of

one of these institutions sought to assume the initiative,
they were forced by intra-government wrangling to pursue

^In this sense Brazil was highly characteristic of a "prae
torian society." In the absence of effective political insti
tutions power was fragmented and authority over the system as
a whole was transitory. See Huntington, Political Order in
Changing Societies, pp. 196-97.
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extreme or extra-legal courses of action.

On these occasions

the armed forces, charged with the function of upholding the
Constitution, were summoned forth to exercise its poder
moderador.

Each time the officers acted more independently

of civilian instructions, perhaps with the intention of
effecting enough structural and procedural changes that
those political institutions could begin to process the high
volume of political demands.

When these efforts were frus

trated,^ the officers decided that in addition to "modernizing”
the nation’s political institutions, the high level of political
participation had to be checked if political stability was to
be restored.
After assuming governmental power, the military leaders
sought to impose political order on Brazil by altering the
process of political recruitment and by modifying the patterns
of the decision-making process.

The effects of these kinds of

policies were (1) to introduce an increasingly larger number of
military personnel into governmental positions and (2) to cen
tralize more and more power in the executive office.

The offi

cers welcomed both of these developments as necessary for the
national security.
Under Gastello Branco the military regime was not concerned
with public opinion; this was understandable since dedication to

national referendum conducted on January 6, 1963 scrapped
the parliamentary system and returned Brazil to a presidential
form of government.
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one's duties and the necessary reforms, even in the absence of
popular support, was a major maxim of the doctrine of the Escola
Superior de Guerra.

It was as if the Gastello Branco govern

ment diagnosed Brazil's sickness and administered the bitter
medicine prescribed for stabilization and recovery, caring little
for the amiability of the doctor-patient relationship.^

A purged

and intimidated Congress was expected to support the government's
policies and when it repeatedly failed to enact executive pro
posals, the President exercised more and more legislative dis
cretion by decreeing laws.
Near the end of the Gastello Branco government the basic
»

differences of opinion over what course Brazil's political
recovery was to take became more intense.

The linha dura

faction, which had professed the necessity of prolonged and
repressive military rule, now wanted the "revolution" (as the
military regime and its civilian supporters were referred to)
to be more popular as it continued to direct Brazil's politi
cal recovery.

On the other hand, the Sorbonnists, interested

in short-term, reformative military rule, held a vision of an
"ideal democracy," which they felt Brazil could realize only
after more unpopular reforms had been instituted.

The essen

tial difference seems to have been that the linha dura de
sired prolonged military rule over a complacent civilian pop
ulation, while the Sorbonnists desired a temporary, reform^Schneider, Political System, p. 201.
op. cit., pp. 182-BT. '
'

Also see Stepan,

^This analogy is adopted from Stephen Clissold, L&tin
America; New World. Third World (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), p. 210.
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oriented military rule over a temporarily displeased civilian
population.

The inability of these factions to resolve their

differences resulted in a situation which subjected the mili
tary governments to the vacillating influence of one and then
the other group.

The ascendance of one group's influence over

the other's resulted in a continual redefinition of the goals
and objectives of the "revolution," which in turn necessitated
the postponement of the restoration of democracy.
As the linha dura emerged as the predominant force, a cycle
of civilian dissent--government repression--more extreme civilian
dissent--more extensive repression was set in motion when the
civilian sector grew disillusioned with Costa e Silva's failure
to live up to his campaign promises to promote the "redemocrati
zation" of Brazil.

Soon civilians began to challenge the regime

by terrorist and violent tactics, which had the effect of en
couraging the military to interpret these actions as "subversive"
and to formulate even more comprehensive policies of repression
to preserve the national security.

In doing so, the military

seemed to be equating the continued survival of the military
regime with the national security of Brazil.

Between 1967 and

19 70 only a kind of "democratic" system that was harmonious
with the preservation of military leadership was allowed to
function.
By 1970 it appeared that "democracy" was a type of polit
ical interaction wherein
. . . elected officials at all levels [would]
be held by members of a single, disciplined
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party immediately responsive to the policies
and directives of the chief executive.9
In this context, politics were democratic only in a very super
ficial sense in that participation was permitted at all.

The

"game of politics" was clearly more manageable and its outcome
more highly predictable.
Isolation of the Military Regime from Civilian Influences
As the officers' concept of internal national security
expanded from one that sought to eradicate all corrupt and
subversive influences to one that seemed to necessitate con
trolling the social and political behavior of all Brazilians,
the military government was incrementally isolated from the
civilian sector.
In the period between April, 1964, when the armed forces
assumed power, and December, 1968, when Institutional Act #5
was decreed, the military regime permitted a trial run of
tutelary democracy but increasingly restricted the political
prerogatives of the elected representatives because of national
security considerations.

The powers of the executive were

gradually increased at the expense of the legislative branch;
when the legislators retaliated by obstructing executive pro
posals, the officers began to equate them with subversives.
It seems that as the military leaders broadened the scope of
their institution's doctrine of internal national security and

^Poppino, "Brazil's Third Government," 104
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increased the extent of their political involvement, they lost
the capacity to distinguish their military roles from their
political roles.

Perhaps this was because the officers came

to regard their institution's political functions as synonymous
with its defense functions.

The officers interpreted the fail

ure of Congress to revoke Deputy Alves' congressional immunity
much like desertion in the face of the e n e m y . T h e military
regime subsequently closed Congress and, thereby, concluded
its experiment in limited, instructional democracy.
During the period between the promulgation of the Fifth
Institutional Act and the re-opening of Congress on October 22,
1969, the isolation of the military government from civilian
inputs achieved its zenith.

Since civilian participation had

not resulted in favorable officer responses, even after a suc
cessive curtailment of civilian political prerogatives, civil
ian participation was eliminated altogether.

This development

had several consequences for the military as an institution.
First, the framework of political expectations that mem
bers of the high command had held for the civilian population
was transferred to the body of the armed forces.

Prior to

the decree of Institutional Act #5, "democratic” procedures
had been adhered to so long as the end result of those pro
cedures conformed with the results anticipated by the high
command.

To the extent there had been conformity, "democracy"

^^See Chapter III
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had existed--to the extent conformity was absent, the concept
of democracy was revised.

Just as the high-ranking officers

had expected civilians to perform up to their expectations
for a ’’democratic" form of government, after civilian partic
ipation was denied, these officers transferred similar expec
tations to the political performance of the armed forces.
For example, after assembling a list of probable candidates
(in a highly, internally-democratic fashion) to succeed Costa e
Silva, officers of the high command dispelled any moves by
lower-level officers and enlisted men that might have endan
gered the election of Garrastazu Medici, the popular choice
of the high command.

As in the period prior to December, 1968,

to the extent widespread participation appeared capable of
rendering the results anticipated by the high command, "demo
cratic" procedures were retained,

lüien it appeared that those

results might be jeopardized, participation was restricted or
suspended, and the concept of democracy correspondingly rede
fined.
Second, by closing Congress, Costa e Silva forced the
armed forces to probe within the military government for the
sources of problems; there were no longer any civilian scape
goats to blame.

The expansion of anti-government terrorism

during this time must have convinced many officers that the
terrorism was a product of repression, a reaction against
oppression.

In a sense, they concluded that Costa e Silva’s

policies of political repression were creating a permanent
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national security threat and that a more effective executive
was needed.

Isolation of the government seemed to have re

sulted in a demand for increased executive accountability to
the armed forces.
A third and related consequence of the denial of civilian
participation was that a kind of "mini-political system" was
created within Brazil’s existing political system.

That is,

the relationship between the military government and the armed
forces came to resemble the kind of relationship one usually
observes between a government and the public sector in a po
litical system that provides for civilian participation.

In

this case, the armed forces were substituted for the civilian
sector.
After Institutional Act #5 was decreed the President and
his government were made almost exclusively dependent on the
support of the armed forces.

12

It was pointed out in Chapter

IV that Costa e Silva ignored the erosion of his military sup
port at his own peril.

There was a greater likelihood that

Costa e Silva would have been forcefully removed from office

^^In 1965 the armed forces had held Castello Branco, as
head of the Sorbonne faction, responsible for the "revolu
tion’s" disastrous showings at the polls.
In that instance
the President was caught between the struggle of the two
dominant factions within the military. In 1969, however, it
seems to have been a case of the military government versus
the armed forces; Costa e Silva, as head of the military govern
ment, was held increasingly accountable personally for the per
formance of the government, especially after the closure of
Congress,
12 See Stepan, o p . cit., p. 261.
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if his support fell below a "threshold level" than there had
been in 1965 when Castello Branco experienced a similar de
cline in support.

(See Chapter IV.)

When the question of presidential succession was broached,
the armed forces were directed to resolve this purely political
dilemma.

Owing to the absence of civilian participation as

well as the failure of the military regime to develop an insti1%
tutionalized succession process,
the members of the armed
forces were required to participate in an improvised electoral
procedure and the norm of a highly politicized military under
went a radical transformation.
The traditional pattern of civil-military relations had
included attempts by the major political actors to co-opt the
military,however,

in the 1969 presidential "campaign" cer

tain high-ranking military officers attempted to win the po
litical support of fellow servicemen.

One effect of the "cam

paign" was to expose and to polarize the existing, but hereto
fore

latent, political animosities within the armed forces.

Only because of their dedication to military discipline and
due to the real possibility of complete institutional frag
mentation did the lower- and middle-grade officers and the

^^See H. Jon Rosenbaum, "Introduction: An Overview," in
Contemporary Brazil: Issues in Economic and Political Devel
opment, ed. by H. Jon Rosenbaum and William G. Tyler (New
York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), p. 26.
^^See

"Aspects of Civil-Military Relations in Brazil,"

Chapter I.
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enlisted men close ranks behind the presidential selection of
the high command.
Perhaps realizing that the conditions conducive to intra
military demagoguery and ’’palace coups” had been created,
Medici sought to ”de-politicize” the armed forces and to re
move the threat of a politically-inspired military coup against
him.

Whereas the military regime had reacted to antagonistic

civilian opinions by isolating the government, once it realized
the government was unable to impose political conformity on the
civilian sector, it now attempted to insulate the government
against a politically fragmented military opinion via military
procedures.

In this instance the officers realized, as they

had in 1964 when Goulart had attempted to divide the armed
forces along political lines, that the political unity of the
armed forces was an essential factor in the institutional unity
of that body.

After all, a military in political disorder

could hardly expect to promote political order in the civilian
population.
A facade of democracy was re-instituted in October, 1969
when the severely restrained national Congress was reconvened.
Devoid of any substantive functions, the Congress was comprised
of the loyal, pro-regime legislators of the ARENA and only the
most carefully scrutinized members of the MDB, the now very

^^DuTLng the Costa e Silva term, however, the officers
themselves iiad helped to create the conditions that resulted
temporarily in a politically divided military.
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loyal opposition party.

A series of cassations between Decem

ber, 1968 and October, 1969 had helped to guarantee legislative
as well as judicial cooperation with the executive once civil
ian participation was restored.

Perhaps during the first two

phases of the '’revolution” this was precisely what the leaders
of the military regime had desired: a functioning political
system that was highly manageable and predictable and com
patible with the officers' doctrine of national security.
This was hardly democracy.

But in view of the officers

comprising the armed forces hierarchy and their determination
to continue to provide political directorship, there were
literally no alternative forms of participation open to ci
vilians.

The survival of the military government depended on

a degree of civilian participation.

Considerations of internal

national security prevented that participation from being more
than symbolic.
Prospects for the Restoration of Democracy
When one speaks of the possibilities of the armed forces
"restoring” democracy in Brazil, he must recognize that the
word "restore” means to re-establish or to bring back.

If one

accepts the premise that the Brazilian political experience
between 1945 and 1964 was democratic, then references to the
armed forces "restoring” democracy would imply that the offi
cers would recreate a prior condition, or would re-establish
the political conditions and practices that existed during that
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era.

That populist or demagogic politics will ever return to

Brazil, while the military regime supervises any kind of
"democratic” transition, is beyond the realm of possibility.
Therefore, references to the "restoration of democracy" must
be confined to a discussion of the re-establishment of civil
ian participation in the political processes.
Any kind of a re-establishment of meaningful civilian
participation will result in the creation of a system of po
litical interaction that will be necessarily different than
the pre-1964 system.

Such a system will likely not be demo

cratic, except in a very limited sense.
*
The restoration of sufficient civilian participation
that the Brazilian political system may be accurately labelled
as truly democratic seems to be inextricably dependent on the
complete withdrawal of the armed forces from politics.

Until

the armed forces do withdraw, the regime's system of democracy
will only be as open to civilian participation as the officers'
considerations of national security will permit.

Given the

officers' recent proclivity to centralize power, to make the
"restoration of democracy" dependent on the achievement of an
increasingly larger number of "revolutionary" goals, and to
increase the extent of military surveillance over civilian
affairs, participation by civilians promises to be extremely
limited and, at most, symbolic.
So the question appears to be, what factors may bring
about a military withdrawal from political power?
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Several of the same factors that shaped the historical
development of Brazil’s civil-military relations and enabled
the officers to assume governmental power in 1964 might also
be useful in trying to identify some of the probably factors
that might result in the military's withdrawal from power.
Having won her independence from Portugal in a relatively
peaceful manner which did not require a sustained military con
frontation, Brazil was not indebted to a generation of military
heroes.

Subsequently, unlike in the Spanish-American republics

where the armed forces were held in contempt and suspicion, the
Brazilian armed forces were respected and trusted by civilians.
After the military assumed the function of the poder moderador
in 1889, civilians continued to assign the military a political
function each time a new Constitution was adopted.

Military in

volvement in politics was authorized under certain conditions.
Because Brazil has not engaged in hostilities with her
neighbors since 1864, the armed forces have not been pre
occupied with defending the nation from external aggression.
Instead, the armed forces were free (and welcomed by civil
ians) to participate in civil assistance programs and to
develop alternative proposals for national development in

For a discussion of how the civilian sectors in the
Spanish-American nations have looked upon their armed forces,
see Johnson, Military and Society, pp. 153-73. The author
describes how the Brazilian experience with its armed forces
has been at odds with that of her neighbors. See pp. 177223.
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its national "war" college.
Because of the unique development of civil-military rela
tions and because they found themselves surrounded by a "low
conflict environment," the Brazilian armed forces functioned
in an atmosphere that legitimized military participation in
civilian social and political affairs.

However, in 1964 the

armed forces violated the implicit trust that had been an
intrinsic part of civil-military relations, which means the
armed force will never again act as the poder moderador even
if the officers withdraw from governmental power.

So long as

the region remains peaceful, military withdrawal from power is
not likely to advance beyond the point where the armed forces
would exercise a veto power over any decisions made by a
civilian government.

17

And a civilian government, which would

remain in power only at the sufferance of the military in this
kind of arrangement, could only succeed so long as the officers
felt the civilians possessed adequate concepts of national
security.
The outbreak of international hostilities in Latin America
could act as a double-edged sword with regard to military with
drawal from power.

On the one hand, increased international

tensions could result in the officers being preoccupied with
Brazil's external defense to the extent that they would turn
the day-to-day responsibility for administering the government

^^See Needier, Latin American Politics in Perspective,
p. 68.
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over to civilians ; here, too, the officers might act in a
veto capacity.

A more likely result, however, would be that

if Brazil were to be confronted with the threat of external
aggression, the military regime would be further entrenched
in power in order to coordinate a national effort against an
aggressor.

In this case, the regime would most likely be

more repressive than ever, suspending all civilian participation and eliminating all sources of social tension.

18

Considerations of what the officers define as the national
security will undoubtedly influence how much political power
they will surrender to the civilian sector.

Regardless, Brazil

will never again experience a political reality in which the
armed forces act as only an indirect influence in the shaping
of that reality.

1 O

In a speech before military planners in late 1970,
Medici said, "National security strategy must take into account
the elimination of the sources of social tensions and the rais
ing of the cultural and economic standards of our people." See
"Popular Brazilian Chief," The New York Times, December 8, 1971,
p. 24. The need to eliminate the sources of internal tensions
would be most intense in a time of national emergency.
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APPENDIX A

Congressional vote for President:

October 25, 1969

Membership by House
Deputies

Senators

409

66

- 101
308

- 6
60

Deputies
ARENA
MDB

Senators
ARENA
MDB

December 1968
Purged
October 1969
Membership by Party:
December 1968

277

132

Purged

- 34

- 67

October 1969

243

65

47

19

47

-6
13

Straight Party-line vote :
ARENA (for Medici)
MDB
(abstention)

245 + 47 = 290*
65+13=
78

-Since the final total was 293 for Medici, three MDB Con
gxessmen probably voted for Medici.

Sources :
Riordan Roett, "The Changing Role of the Brazilian Mili
tary," in Brazil in the Sixties, ed. by Riordan Roett (Nash
ville: Vanderbilt University Press, 197 2), p. 37, Ronald M.
Schneider, The Political System of Brazil: Emergence of a
"Modernizing" Authoritarian Regime,~TÏÏ6+-1970^ (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1971), ppl 2/5, 503. F a c ts
File Yearbook: 1969, ed. by Lester A. Sobel (New York: Facts
oh File, Inc., 1970), p . 730.
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